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“I shall proceed from the simple to the complex. But in war more than in any 
other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more 
than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together”. 





Since the end of the Cold War, most Western governments and International Organisations (IOs) invested 
heavily in the ability to conduct expeditionary operations that focus on the stabilisation and recovery of 
post-conflict zones (Brahimi, 2000; Lindley-French et al., 2010; Woollard, 2013; De Coning, 2016; 
Verweijen, 2017). Examples of post-conflict zones are the Former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Mali. 
IOs such as the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European Union 
(EU) designed a normative framework to respond to the increasingly complex situations that characterise 
post-conflict zones (Watkin, 2009). This normative framework is better known as stabilisation operations. 
In its simplest form, stabilisation operations are defined as “military and civilian activities conducted across 
the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions” (DoD, 2005, p. 2). 
Moreover, stabilisation operations are characterised by international efforts to establish an integrated and 
comprehensive approach between the many military and civilian actors involved (De Coning and Friis, 2011; 
Egnell, 2013; Ohlson, 2013; Maley and Schmeidl, 2015). According to many scholars and practitioners, the 
successful integration of IOs, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), host nation governments, local 
actors both state and non-state as well as the private sector is key to successful stabilisation operations 
(Dutch Ministry of Defence, 2000; De Coning and Friis, 2011; Zelizer et al., 2013; Lindley-French, 2013; 
Heinecken, 2013).  
Stabilisation operations include (humanitarian) interventions, counterinsurgency operations (COIN) and 
peacebuilding missions (van der Meer, 2009). Most of the literature on stabilisation operations focuses on 
post-conflict activities (Pouligny, 2003; Manning, 2008; Howorth, 2013). However, the UN offers a much 
broader scope of their integrated missions by defining the concept as “aimed at preventing the outbreak, 
the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict” (Brahimi, 2000, p. 1). Thus, the UN makes a distinction 
1 Parts of this chapter have been presented at the following peer reviewed conference: 
Gans, B.: Understanding stabilization operations as complex systems. Ninth International Conference on Complex 
Systems (ICCS 2018), July 22 – 27 2018, Cambridge MA, USA. 
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between pre- and post-conflict peacebuilding. To summarise, an integrated or comprehensive approach to 
stabilisation operations can be applied to the many civilian and military actors involved, across various 
sectors and levels, aimed at creating peace, security and stability in a certain geographical area, country or 
region throughout the whole spectrum of conflict.  
 
1.2 A SYSTEMS VIEW OF STABILISATION OPERATIONS 
 
IOs such as NATO, UN and EU as well as Western governments institutionalised the concept of an 
integrated and comprehensive approach to stabilisation operations (Brahimi, 2000; US Department of 
Defence, 2005; Lindley-Fench et al., 2010; Woollard, 2013; UK Stabilisation Unit, 2014; Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2014). NATO defines the concept as: “the cross-governmental generation and application 
of security, governance and development services, expertise, structures and resources over time and distance 
in partnership with host nations, host regions, allied and partner governments and partner institutions, both 
governmental and non-governmental” (Lindley-French et al., 2010, p. 2). The UN aims to integrate their 
various agencies (e.g. UNDSS, UNHCR, UN OCHA etc.) underneath a centralised Command & Control 
(C2) structure which is defined as UN integrated missions (UN IMPP, 2006). This integrated missions 
design integrates both organisational design as well as processes with the intent to improve planning and 
coordination. In an official memo, former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1997) defines the UN 
integrated missions as: “an integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared 
understanding of the priorities and types of program interventions that need to be undertaken at various 
stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximise its 
contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent 
and mutually supportive manner” (p. 61). The EU applies two different definitions to explain their view on 
an integrated and comprehensive approach. One narrow and one broader definition. The narrow definition 
is simply defined as civil-military integration (European Council, 2003). The broader definition is defined as 
“an integrated EU approach towards a third country or towards another region or group of countries. An 
integrated approach means that the EU has a set of objectives developed by and agreed to by all relevant 
EU institutions and it then has policies, “tools”, and activities to implement these objectives. Both the 
objectives and the activities may be contained in a strategy towards the country or region in question” 
(Woollard, 2013, p. 1). The Dutch government appreciates the absolute necessity of a broad and integrated 
approach throughout the whole spectrum of conflict. In a high-level policy document, they stress that “in 
many fragile states and conflict situations, state actors cannot or will not provide security and stability to 
their population. Some form of international intervention is then needed to improve the security situation 
and living conditions of the people. The recognition that root causes and symptoms require a coherent 
response from the many actors involved has grown over the last decades. However, we have learned - even 
painfully – that the political, ethical, socio-economic and security factors are inherently interconnected in 
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such situations. Therefore, an integrated approach is required” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands, 2014, p. 3). 
Throughout the last decades, stabilisation operations turned out to be structurally complex (Leslie et al., 
2008; Lindley-French, 2013; De Coning, 2016), yet Western thinking of their strategic model follows a 
general and linear structured input-process-output model that should be applicable to different operations 
(Eriksen, 1996; Ramalingam, 2013; ADDP, 2014; Chandler, 2016). However, one of the primary lessons 
learned from the interventions in the Former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan is that such a general and 
linear structured input-process-output model is insufficient to represent the complexity of stabilisation 
operations, since the interactions between the actors involved often show complex and dynamic patterns 
(Wislow, 2002; Manning, 2003; Rathmell, 2005; Rietjens and Bollen, 2008; Paris, 2009; De Coning, 2016). 
The first and most obvious complicating factor is the number of actors involved. While actors share the 
common goal of stabilisation, they often must cope with extreme cultural differences causing daily friction 
(Bollen, 2002; Abiew, 2003; Soeters et al., 2003; Frerks et al., 2006; Autesserre, 2014; Holmes-Eber, 2016), 
and behave strategically to maximise their own interests and subscribe to different priorities (Williams, 
2011). This can easily lead to opportunistic behaviour. As a result, the number of potential interrelationships, 
coalitions, issues and conflicts increases exponentially as the number of actors increases. Furthermore, in an 
environment that is characterised by its uncertainty and ambiguity, actors also develop differences in 
problem perception, conflicting moral judgments - about right and wrong, and about who is right or wrong 
- which further deepens the contradictions, conflicts of interest and preferences for particular solutions 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Boré, 2006; Salmoni and Homes-Eber, 2011; Posey, 2014; Holmes-Eber, 2016; 
Noll and Rietjens, 2016). This social complexity is boosted by interdependencies, differences in power, 
knowledge and information levels. Hence, coordination between the many actors and across hierarchies is 
therefore an important challenge to embrace (De Coning and Friis, 2011; Rietjens et al., 2013; Verweijen, 
2017). These inevitable paradoxes can be best explained by the definition of the primary unit of analysis in 
this study: the organisational system. 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) define an organisational system as “a system of interrelated behaviours of 
people who are performing a task that has been differentiated into several distinct sub-systems, each sub-
system performing a portion of the task, and the efforts of each being integrated to achieve effective 
performance of the system” (p. 3). Differentiation explains for “the state of segmentation of the 
organisational system into sub-systems, each of which tends to develop particular attributes in relation to 
the requirements posed by its relevant external environment. It includes the behavioural attributes of 
members of organisational sub-systems” (p. 3). By contrast, integration is “the process of achieving unity 
of effort among the various sub-systems in the accomplishment of the organisation’s task” (p. 4). Reflecting 
on the above definitions, stabilisation operations require a highly differentiated as well as integrated 
organisational system with interaction between the actors of their sub-systems. These interactions relate to 
a broad range of issues, take place under complex conditions, with each interaction following its own pace 
dictated by its specific conditions. Hence, stabilisation operations can be understood as an organisational 
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system that is formed around various sub-systems which interact in a non-linear fashion, in turn influencing 
a system’s condition from inside the system’s boundary (i.e. influenced by the internal organisation). 
Interactions in a non-linear fashion are defined as “complex” (Perrow, 1972; Waldrop, 1992; Capra, 1997). 
Thus, stabilisation operations can be viewed as complex systems. According to systems thinking, a closed 
system is in a state of being isolated from its environment and operates deterministically, while open systems 
are characterised by a certain degree of interaction with their environment and operate most probabilistically 
(Wiener, 1952; Von Bertalanffy, 1968). Stabilisation operations take place in a highly complex environment 
from which they cannot be isolated, thereby influencing a system’s condition from outside the system’s 
boundary (i.e. influenced by the external environment). Accordingly, we study stabilisation operations as 
complex open systems impacted by both its complex internal organisation and external environment (i.e. 
environmental conditions). 
As we have described above, stabilisation operations are characterised by their non-linearity, yet the logic of 
an integrated and comprehensive approach is based upon linear thinking (Eriksen, 1996; Ramalingam, 2013; 
ADDP, 2014; Chandler, 2016). Typically for stabilisation operations such a linear way of thinking is 
explained through a MEANS – WAYS – ENDS diagram (Gray, 2006). Perrow (1972) defines linearity as 
“interactions in an expected sequence” (p. 78). In other words, inputs and outputs are expected to be 
proportional, and interactions are well traceable through clear and predictable cause and effect relationships 
(Von Bertalanffy, 1968; Prigogine and Stengers, 1984). By this logic, an integrated or comprehensive 
approach are the WAYS which are achieved by simply applying all the purposeful activities of the 
participating actors from the various systems (MEANS) into a post-conflict zone without determining its 
feasibility or desirability in relationship to the desired situation (ENDS) (Gelot and Söderbaum, 2011; 
Ramalingam and Mitchell, 2014). IOs such as NATO, UN and EU, therefore, tend to find linear solutions 
to non-linear problems, in an environment which is characterised as highly non-linear. The paradox between 
the linear logic of a comprehensive approach and the non-linearity of the complex system on the one hand, 
and between the complex system and its external environment on the other hand, indicates the purpose of 
this study: offering complex systems thinking as an alternative for the strategic modelling of stabilisation 
operations and supporting the debate over the extent to which integration is feasible and desirable. 
  
1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
Researchers and practitioners focus on strengthening coordination and integration efforts amongst the 
actors of various sub-systems involved in stabilisation operations (Patrick and Brown, 2007; Schnaubelt, 
2009; De Coning and Friis, 2011; Hynek and Marton, 2011; Smith, 2012; Maley and Schmeidl, 2015). This 
reasoning is based upon linear thought processes in which inputs and outputs are proportional and cause 
and effect relationships can be mathematically predicted (Von Bertalanffy, 1968; Prigogine and Stengers, 
1984; Ramalingam and Mitchell, 2014; Chandler, 2016). However, complexity derived from the 
environmental conditions influences stabilisation operations in a non-linear fashion resulting in the dynamic 
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equilibrium conditions of the complex system. Indeed, as demonstrated in this study, the conditions of the 
systems are highly uncertain and ambiguous. As a result, coordination between the many actors and across 
hierarchies is therefore an important challenge to embrace (Bollen, 2002; De Coning and Friis, 2011; Rietjens 
et al., 2013; Verweijen, 2017). Moreover, during stabilisation operations profusion of information circulate 
by different means amongst the actors involved (Rathmell, 2005; Rietjens et al., 2007; Rietjens and Baudet, 
2017). To cope with such uncertainty and ambiguity, complex systems require not only quantity but also 
quality of information (Galbraith, 1973; Gell-Mann, 1994; Holland, 1995). Additionally, conflicting interests 
coupled with a form of incentives to mistrust information, add complexity to the dynamic and uncertainty 
of stabilisation operations (Eriksson, 1996). Congruently, information asymmetry amongst the many actors 
involved has been identified as the second main challenge to be undertaken (Rietjens et al., 2007; Manning, 
2008; De Coning, 2016; Rietjens and De Waard, 2017). 
There is little knowledge in regards to the influence of complex systems thinking on the strategic modelling 
of stabilisation operations. To better control the impact of information asymmetry in such context, this 
study focuses on gaining an understanding on how concepts and principles operate in theory and practice. 
Particularly, this study explores how the complexity of the environmental conditions influences stabilisation 
operations as complex systems. Second, it addresses subsequent influences on a system’s required self-
organising ability to differentiate and integrate its various sub-systems, their organisational resources and 
competencies. Third, this study regards the development and adjustment of condition-dependent 
capabilities as key to reaching a state of dynamic equilibrium while processing, distributing and exchanging 
information. The aim of this study is both theoretical and practical: offering complex systems thinking as 
an alternative for the strategic modelling of stabilisation operations and supporting the debate over the 
extent to which integration is feasible and desirable. This study is embedded in practice, offering a valuable 
set of narratives and data. Recommendations and conclusions are therefore grounded in both theory and 
practice. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
 
This study has two main objectives. We first aim to understand the impact of complexity derived from the 
environmental conditions on stabilisation operations as complex systems and the subsequent influence on 
their required self-organising ability to apply differentiation and integration.   
Second, we explore the role of information processing as a key organising concept through which the self-
organising system differentiates and integrates its sub-systems, resources and competencies into condition-
dependent capabilities. Against this background, the main research question in this study is:  
How to better cope with the complexity of multi-actor interaction during stabilisation 
operations, and how does information processing enable this interaction? 
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While answering the main research question, we also discuss the following sub-questions:  
Q1. How do the environmental conditions impact stabilisation operations? 
Q2. How do stabilisation operations respond to the complexity derived from environmental 
conditions? 
Q3. How do stabilisation operations differentiate and integrate their sub-systems, organisational 
resources and competencies into condition-dependent capabilities? 
Q4. How do condition-dependent capabilities positively influence the attainment of outcomes? 
 
1.5 RESEARCH JUSTIFICATION 
The stabilisation of post-conflict zones remains a topic which is of utmost importance to the world. 
Although large-scale inter-state conflict has decreased over the last decades, more blurred intra-state or 
regional conflict has surfaced. These conflicts are characterised by an increasing number of external 
actors who intervene in order to protect their national interests. This growing number of actors are 
inherently fragmentised which leads to increasing complexity on the ground. Hence, peacebuilding will 
remain an important topic on the agenda of the international community and stabilisation operations 
will remain an important intervention mechanism. 
Reflecting on the above, academic contributions to the fields of peacebuilding and post-conflict 
reconstruction are of high importance. This dissertation aims to contribute to this research agenda by 
examining the increasing complexity of stabilisation operations. This study contributes both conceptually 
and empirically to the organisational design of stabilisation operations which deals with the complexity 
of multi-actor interaction. 
 
1.6 RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
Reflecting on the research objectives and questions, a design-orientated approach with a system perspective 
of problem-solving together with design evaluation is best suited (Romme, 2003; Van Aken et al., 2009; 
Soeters et al., 2014). This research approach combines two research methods of solution-orientated 
research, namely design science (Romme, 2003; Hevner et al., 2004) and case study research (Yin, 2014) as 
illustrated in figure 1.1.  
The aim of designing a conceptual model to cope more effectively with the complexity of multi-actor 
interaction during stabilisation operations corresponds with the concept of the design and evaluation of 
artefacts in design science (Romme, 2003; Hevner et al., 2004). Design science aims to create knowledge 
(i.e. design artefact) that practitioners can apply to gain understanding of real-world problems and their 
potential solutions (Hevner et al., 2004). The initial conceptual model presented in this study is evaluated in 
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two real-world situations with the aim to provide practitioners with guidance in regards to the strategic 
modelling of stabilisation operations. The final conceptual model, as the primary design artefact, will be the 
main outcome of this study. 
We view stabilisation operations as complex systems differentiated into various sub-systems and part of a 
supra-system. Hence, the unit of analysis is twofold: first, we focus on the multi-actor interaction between 
the sub-systems of a stabilisation operation (i.e. within a single system). Second, we study the multi-actor 
interaction between a stabilisation operation and the other systems as part of the greater supra-system. 
 
Figure 1.1: Research approach. 
 
As described above, this study combines design science together with case study research. Moreover, since 
this process is iterative it should be repeated several times. Hence, the evaluation of the design artefact is 
realised through the application of the initial conceptual model to two case studies. Each case study is 
considered a single iteration including the analysis of the identified problem, application of the conceptual 
model to the respective case, generate findings and recommendations for design improvement.  
Ultimately, the conceptual model will be finalised and offers complex systems thinking as an alternative for 
the strategic modelling of stabilisation operations and supports the debate over the extent to which 
integration is feasible and desirable. 
 
1.7 RESEARCH PROCESS 
 
The research process applied in this study enables us to meet the research objectives and seeks to answer 
the research questions. It includes the following elements: 
 Literature review  
 Development of an initial conceptual model and generate preliminary propositions  
 Research method  
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 Data collection and analysis  
 Finding conclusions, development of the final conceptual model and generate final propositions 
1.7.1 Literature review  
Conducting the literature review has two objectives: first, we aim to gain a detailed insight in the main 
phenomena being studied and offer a detailed description of the constructs, in turn, enabling the 
development of the conceptual model (Bacharach, 1989). Second, we aim to provide current insights 
regarding the research topic by delving into the domain of study and adjacent domains. Additionally, we 
look at the research topic from a historical perspective with the intent of preventing undesirable duplication 
of effort from previous studies. Moreover, it supports us to relate our own findings to previous studies and 
to offer an agenda for future research. 
To be able to examine how the complexity derived from the environmental conditions influences 
stabilisation operations as complex systems and their subsequent impact on the development of condition-
dependent capabilities, the literature review should offer insights in the following domains of study:  
 The complexity derived from the environmental conditions and their influence on a system’s 
condition. 
 A system’s condition and its accompanied behaviour. 
 How complex systems differentiate and integrate their sub-systems, organisational resources and 
competencies into condition-dependent capabilities. 
 Outcomes gained from condition-dependent capabilities. 
1.7.2 Development of an initial conceptual model and generate preliminary propositions 
The results derived from the literature review allowed us to select the theoretical constructs relevant for this 
study. The constructs, in turn, serve as foundation for the design of the initial conceptual model. The initial 
conceptual model aims to shape boundaries for this study by defining the theoretical constructs. 
Furthermore, the initial conceptual model illustrates the relationships between the constructs by generating 
preliminary propositions. In short, the initial conceptual model is designed to solve the identified problem 
and is subsequently evaluated in relationship to the utility provided by the conceptual model as solution to 
the respected problem. 
1.7.3 Research method  
This study has an explorative character. Its main objective is to find and better understand the relationships 
between the phenomena investigated (Soeters and Heeren-Bogers, 2013). The starting point of any research 
method should be defining a suitable research question (Yin, 2014). Within this research the research 
question can be categorised as a “how” question. According to Yin (2014), “how” questions can be answered 
by using experiments, historical analysis and case studies (Yin, 2014). Further analysing the research topic 
learns that the research focuses on a set of contemporary events that do not require the researcher to control 
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the environment. That is, the research should be done in a current non-contrived setting. After combining 
these observations and consulting the Yin-framework, a multiple case study research is a desirable choice 
for this study. 
1.7.4 Data collection and analysis 
The initial conceptual model will be applied to two case studies to discover and bridge the challenges 
identified, to add value to the literature on stabilisation operations and to evaluate the shortcomings of the 
model itself. Data is collected from two case studies and analysed accordingly. The first case study describes 
the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) mission in Afghanistan. This case represents the first iteration of the 
conceptual model by providing feedback on the problem and its potential solution to a ‘real world’ situation 
(Simon, 1996). This process can be viewed of as circular and should be repeated several times in order to 
enable the development of the final model (Markus et al., 2002). Therefore, the second case study, the 
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (UN MINUSMA), elaborates on 
the first case study by presenting a second iteration of the conceptual model which aims to offer a more 
detailed insight in the respected problem. Finally, we presented the conceptual model to 5 senior members 
of the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. One could consider this an 
ex-post analysis of the conceptual model to provide the final information feedback over both the model itself 
as well as the process for explanation building. 
From a theoretical point of view, this research aims to enhance the theoretical understanding of stabilisation 
operations as complex systems, and offer a conceptualisation which introduces complex systems thinking 
as an alternative for the strategic modelling of stabilisation operations to cope more effectively with the 
complexity of multi-actor interaction. From a practical perspective, the actors involved in stabilisation 
operations can utilise the insights derived from this study to determine how the complexity derived from 
the environmental conditions impact the predictability of stabilisation operations as complex systems. More 
importantly, the actors involved can use these determinations to better understand how a system’s condition 
impacts its required self-organising ability to differentiate and integrate its sub-systems, their organisational 
resources and competencies. The in-depth analysis provides an understanding on how differentiation and 
integration enables the development of condition-dependent capabilities. Thus, interesting insights on how 
stabilisation operations apply C2 and information processing to conduct their daily operations and 
counteract the various disturbances which might cause them to deviate from those tasks. In sum, the 
outcomes of this study provide new insights for both academics and practitioners offering complex systems 
thinking as an alternative for the strategic modelling of stabilisation operations and supporting the debate 
over the extent to which integration is feasible and desirable. 
1.7.5 Phase 5 – Assessment of conclusions and generate design guidelines 
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In the final phase of this study the conclusions are presented and discussed. This will be done by presenting 
the key results of this study which are applicable to both theory and practice. Additionally, we present the 
final conceptual model, generate design guidelines and make recommendations for future research. 
 
1.8 READING GUIDE 
 
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. In chapter 2 we present a literature review of stabilisation 
operations, systems thinking, strategic management theory and information processing theory. This is 
followed in chapter 3 by the introduction of the initial conceptual model. The research method is presented 
in chapter 4. In chapter 5 and 6, the initial conceptual model is applied to the first case study: the Task Force 
Uruzgan (TFU) mission in Afghanistan, and subsequently the second case study: the UN Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (UN MINUSMA). What follows are the cross-case analysis and 
development of the final conceptual model which are presented in chapter 7 and 8 respectively. We finalise 
this dissertation in chapter 9 with discussing the contributions, limitations and conclusions of this study. 












“Today the network of relationships linking the human race to itself and to the 
rest of the biosphere is so complex that all aspects affect all others to an 
extraordinary degree. Someone should be studying the whole system, however 
crudely that has to be done, because no gluing together of partial studies of a 
complex nonlinear system can give a good idea of the behaviour of the whole”. 





In this chapter, we first present a general overview of the literature on stabilisation operations to provide 
some background against the domain of study. What follows is the presentation of the literature on multi-
actor interaction from an organisation theory perspective since we believe the literature on organisational 
design and organisational structure, relationships between organisations and their external environment, and 
the behaviour of the actors within organisations is highly relevant for stabilisation operations. Finally, we 
connect both parts to illustrate the connection between both domains 
What follows is the review of the literature on systems thinking. This literature is used to describe the 
connection between complex systems thinking and stabilisation operations, thereby illustrating the proposed 
alternative for the strategic modelling of stabilisation operations. To have a better understanding of how 
complex systems use information processing as the key operating process through which they adapt and 
self-organise their organisational resources, we will delve deeper into the literature on information 
processing, distribution and exchange. Finally, to better understand the relationship between stabilisation 
operations as complex systems and the outcomes produced, we present the literature on strategic 
management theory to illustrate that a complex system can be viewed as an organisational resource or a 
collection of organisational resources.  
The findings of this literature review serve as the foundation for the development of the initial conceptual 
model which is described in the next chapter. 
2 Parts of this chapter have been appeared as the following peer reviewed published article:  
Gans, B. (2018). The complexity of peacekeeping intelligence. Journal of European and American Intelligence 
Studies 1(1), 35-60. 
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2.2 STABILISATION OPERATIONS 
 
This section outlines the key sectors of stabilisation operations, namely security, development and 
governance (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; Manning, 2008; De Coning and Friis, 2011; Egnell, 2013; Neuteboom 
and Soeters, 2017). Security is concerned with actors conducting tasks related to physical security (e.g. 
protection of civilians as well as critical infrastructure), human security (e.g. protection of refugees, Internally 
Displaced People and human rights) and tasks such as capacity building and Rule of Law (Feigenbaum et 
al, 2013). 
The development sector is focused on social and economic domains. The social domain includes providing 
basic needs to local communities, refugees and IDPs. This type of aid is also known as humanitarian support. 
Economic development relates to sustainable trade and investments as well as micro finance projects (Wisler 
and Onwudiwe, 2007; Verweijen, 2017). Finally, the development sector includes also the Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of former members of armed groups into the civil society 
(Weinberger, 2002; Egnell, 2013). 
Governance refers to the ability of a government to offer basic services to their population. It includes 
political processes such as free and fair elections, constitution building but also elements of good governance 
such as anti-corruption and free press (Zelizer, 2013). 
2.2.1 Introduction to the sectors 
Security. In the military, the establishment of a clear and single chain of command is critical in the design 
and of any military operation (Weinberger, 2002; Vogelaar and Kramer, 2004; Kramer, 2007; Olsthoorn and 
Soeters, 2016).  Multiple military operations which are in place simultaneously can each have their own 
mandate and mission. This can generate friction between the military commanders themselves but more 
importantly, it can create friction between coalition and the (temporary) political settlement in the conflict 
area (Leslie et al., 2008). This was particularly the case in Afghanistan when two different types of missions 
were being conducted simultaneously (Guo and Augier, 2013). In this case, the United States (US) mission 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was focused on Counter Terrorism (CT) while the ISAF mission 
focused on post-conflict reconstruction. As a result, potential troop contributors to the ISAF mission were 
anxious because they had concerns regarding an unexpected evacuation of their staff members in case the 
security situation deteriorated (Weinberger, 2002; Manning, 2008; Williams, 2011). 
According to Pirnie (1998) the unity of command becomes even more important in the case of a 
comprehensive approach. First, clear nominally distinct areas of responsibility have to be defined. According 
to Rathmell (2005) difficulties arose in the Iraqi case as the “civilian leadership only sporadically 
acknowledged the causal linkages between security and other policy areas such as political and economic 
reforms. The military leadership, meanwhile, did not do a good job of conceptualising the campaign as an 
integrated political-military effort, sometimes failing to put tactical military operations in the broader 
political context” (p. 1031). This friction can mainly be addressed to a lack of collaborative governance at 
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all levels of the mission (Pirnie, 1998; Vogelaar and Kramer, 2004; Soeters, 2008; Olsthoorn and Soeters, 
2016). 
When it comes to mission planning there is continues debate about the organisation of security forces. Some 
argue that a large international rapid response force is key for the stabilisation of conflicts. Others will say 
that working side-by-side with indigenous security forces is key for establishing and maintaining security 
and rule of law. This latter is also known as Military Assistance (MA). MA is a long-term investment and 
focusses on the strengthening of the local government (Oakley et al., 1998): “the local government is 
typically characterised by an extremely weak or dysfunctional domestic law enforcement apparatus; … 
[leading to the] incapacity of the host government to provide public order, especially when measured against 
international standards for policing and human rights. This void in institutional capacity can be bridged by 
effective use of international civilian trainers and mentors. This process tends to begin while the military 
contingent is still present, but it ought to continue well after their departure…” (p. 11-15). The training of 
an indigenous army and police force is closely connected to the process of DDR of former combatants. 
During the ISAF mission in Afghanistan UN Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Chairperson of the Bonn 
Conference Brahimi stated that he hoped that “the international community would help those who had 
participated in Afghanistan’s many wars to return to civilian life in dignity” (United Nations, 2002, p. 3). 
Ultimately, there was no specific program for the DDR of former combatants in the Bonn accords 
(Weinberger, 2002).  
Development. The delivery of aid and assistance into conflicts cannot be done without some support of 
the security sector. Even the most basic services to support a local community, such as the delivery of food, 
water and medical aid cannot be done in an environment where the security situation is still fragile (UN, 
2014). Previous experiences of stabilisation operations with a sole focus on humanitarian objectives have 
been proved to be unsuccessful. The UN mission’s in Somalia (UNOSOM) primary goal was to provide 
food security to the population of Somalia which was affected by famine. This mission became a failure 
after the United States withdrew their forces after the failed raid by its special operations units (Hirsch and 
Oakley, 1998). Another example of a failed mission with humanitarian goals is the UNPROFOR mission in 
the former Yugoslavia. The main goal of this mission was the protection of civilians, provide food and 
medicine to suffering communities throughout the conflict affected country (Betts, 1994). Serbian troops 
repeatedly obstructed the delivery of aid by UN forces. Due to the humanitarian mandate of the mission 
and the neutral position of the UN they were not capable to stop the Serbian forces.  
In the aftermath of September 11th, American forces started a CT campaign in Afghanistan. The previous 
years of civil war and the hard Taliban regime made the Afghan population pay an inevitable toll. The UN 
and multiple NGOs tried to provide aid (e.g. water, food, medicine) to Afghan population. The lack of 
sufficient and well-trained security forces in the country could not provide the aid workers with proper 
security, let alone the Afghan public (Weinberger, 2002). According to Rathmell (2005) in the Iraqi case “the 
collapse of the security sector was a microcosm of the wider paralysis of Iraqi governance at all levels” (p. 
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1024). The power and authority in the Saddam regime was too centralised for subordinates to take over and 
start with the organisation of security. This reality meant that providing humanitarian aid was far more 
complex and challenging then was initially planned for (Rathmell, 2005).     
Most of the international donors for providing aid are focused on long-term needs. These long-term needs 
require thorough planning and coordination and therefore require a lot of critical time. Conflicts are highly 
vulnerable to demographic pressures such as lack of water, food and high numbers of refugees. These 
threats require the rapid deployment of humanitarian aid. The International Crisis Group (2008) made an 
initial assessment for the Afghanistan case and made the following recommendations: “to get assistance 
moving as rapidly as possible - trusted partners - those NGOs already operating in the country… should be 
the court of first resort…. Most donors appear to recognise that a province-by-province, and perhaps even 
a village-by-village, approach will be needed…. Afghanistan needs to be built from the ground up” (p. 3-5). 
The International Crisis Group also stressed that it was favourable to distribute aid in a small, flexible and 
decentralised way. An important role here as actors had to be played by local communities (Weinberger, 
2002).  
The security situation in conflict affected areas is playing a decisive role whether humanitarian aid can be 
distributed rapid and easily or not. The recommended concept of distributing aid, made by the ICG, was 
successful in promoting recovery in East-Timor (Weinberger, 2002). In countries such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the immense security threats made such a concept impossible and requires interaction between 
actors from the security and development dimension. The risk of failure is considerable since multiple actors 
are involved, holding different, often competing interests and perspectives on problems and solutions.  
A key challenge in stabilisation operations is the planning and management of the deployment of 
international resources (Rietjens et al., 2013; De Coning, 2016). Indeed, according to Eide et al. (2005): 
“while there is a tendency to blame the limited success rate on lack of resources, it is equally possible that 
the main problem is more related to a lack of coherent application of the resources already available” (p. 5). 
In the Iraqi case, processes such as planning, coordination and resource management were never effectively 
integrated (Rathmell, 2005). Additionally, the lack of coherence between resource allocation and a mission’s 
mandate was also stressed by Brahimi (2000) in his report on UN Peacekeeping Operations. 
Governance. An explicit link can be made between reconstruction and the construction of democratic 
states (Boutros-Ghali, 1997). Therefore “International intervention must extend beyond military and 
humanitarian tasks and must include the promotion of national reconciliation and the re-establishment of 
effective government” (p. 9). Boutros-Ghali (1997) describes effective government in conflicts as 
democracy: “there is an obvious connection between democratic practices – such as the rule of law and 
transparency in decision-making – and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable 
political order. These elements of good governance need to be promoted at all levels of international and 
national political communities” (p. 62). Effective state building includes the elements of authority, legitimacy 
and capacity and needs to be conducted at all levels (i.e. national, provincial and local) in order to establish 
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an integrated government which is capable to reach out to the whole of society (Manning, 2008). The state 
here is being defined as “an organisation or set of organisations with the authority to make and enforce the 
definitive rules for a given society, using force if necessary” (p. 29). We can speak off an effective state when 
the government can offer basic services to its citizens, is capable of organising free and fair elections and 
includes a democratically elected parliament. Furthermore, DDR needs to be effective while rebuilding basic 
facilities, transportation and communications networks, building educational and health infrastructure and 
providing employment and community life at the local level.    
Policy for state building is being established on the national level. The national level commonly exists of 
few political elites or diaspora. First, this small group of people are typically working closely together with 
the multinational organisation in order to develop policy, rules and structures. Second, public support need 
to be found through elections and finally this needs to be extended to the provincial and local level. 
According to Gunther et al. (1996) “democracies become consolidated only when elite consensus on 
procedures is coupled with extensive mass participation in elections and other institutional processes” (p. 
145). The greatest challenges for this process can be found on the local level (Manning, 2008; Hilhorst, 
2008; Auteserre, 2014; Verweijen, 2017). Causes and effects of the civil war are here most visible since 
reconstruction mechanisms such as resettlement of IDPs, DDR and proving basic rights and services for 
citizens create potential risks for instability (Manning, 2008; Mustafa et al., 2016).   
The practicing of the political settlement at all levels of government throughout the country is highly 
complex. According to Migdal et al (1994) “the cacophony of sounds from the widely different arenas in 
which components of the state and social forces interact often have resulted in state actions that bear little 
resemblance to the original schemes or policies conceived by leaders of the state or by particular state 
agencies” (p. 17). The translation of centrally-negotiated peace accords into practice is concerned with the 
complexity of processes such as collaboration between local and central government officials, leadership of 
political parties, international actors and NGOs.         
State building is an element which must run parallel with long-term reconstruction. It is during the 
employment of these activities where root causes of conflict can be addressed. This requires a thorough 
comprehensive reconstruction and development program combined with true commitment from the 
international community (Weinberger, 2002; Paris, 2009; De Coning, 2016). Such a program consists of 
sufficient financial resources, infrastructure development, health care, human resources, gender 
empowerment and education. Before starting with long-term reconstruction activities, the international 
community has to wonder about the willingness for long-term commitment. Long-term economic and social 
projects which will be unfulfilled can create social unrest and therefore instability (Weinberger, 2002; Zelizer 
et al., 2013).  
2.2.2 Motives for collaboration  
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In multi-actor environments, the many actors involved all have different motives for committing themselves 
to collaborate. Generally speaking there are so called “push” and “pull” motives which be divided in three 
main categories: instrumental, relational and moral motives. 
Instrumental motives. There are instrumental models which posit that humans are searching for control 
(Tyler, 1987). The sense of control can maximise the favourability of the outcomes (Aguilera et al., 2007; 
Brocades, 2008; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2009). Organisations have several instrumental motives to 
collaborate with other organisations.  
 Efficiency: by joining and coordinating between the deployment of organisational resources and 
activities, organisations can be more cost-effective.  
 Consistency: is another important instrumental motive for organisations to seek for collaboration. 
Especially within the perspective of post-conflict reconstruction, the many actors involved 
recognise the importance of having “shared awareness” of their operational environment.  
 Legitimacy: by collaborating with others there will be a higher level of legitimacy. More actors 
working together will increase the political and moral legitimacy.  
 Urgency: most Western IOs do not have endless time to participate in stabilisation operations. Time 
always has been a critical factor. Especially in relation to the level of progress that have been made. 
Nowadays when most Western organisations also face financial recession in their home country the 
sense of urgency becomes even more important. Creating a unity of effort, the many actors involved 
can send integrated reports back to their home country. This is an essential aspect in providing the 
domestic tax-payers with information and important property of the expected return. 
Relational motives. These motives are concerned with the quality of the relationships between actors 
which can be displayed on the individual level vs. organisational level or citizen level vs. government level. 
These motives have a strong linkage to the psychological need for belongingness. This is part of the field of 
organisational justice which is often seen as a catalyst for enhancing social cohesion. Injustice, by contrast, 
refers to social exclusion (Aguilera et al., 2007; Rietjens, 2008). This dynamic is where self-identity is drawn 
from (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
Social cohesion means that “cohesive society works towards the well-being of all its members, fights 
exclusion and marginalization, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers its members the 
opportunity of upward mobility. While the notion of ‘social cohesion’ is often used with different meanings, 
its constituent elements include concerns about social inclusion, social capital and social mobility” (OECD, 
2011, p. 7). Social exclusion is defined as “a low level of welfare i.e., economic disadvantage and the inability 
to participate in social life i.e. socio-political disadvantage (Berger-Schmitt, 2000, p. 24). This indicates that 
social exclusion refers a certain result or outcome. According to Berghman (1998), social exclusion includes: 
 “The democratic and legal system which promotes civic integration. 
 The labour market which promotes economic integration; 
36
 The welfare state system which promotes what may be called social integration; 
 The family and community system which promotes interpersonal integration” (p. 258 – 259). 
In situations where a government ignores the debate between social cohesion and exclusion the risk of social 
instability rises. (Room, 1995; Haan de, 1999). In many conflict affected countries, the government is not 
willing or not capable to provide basic services to its people. These core functions are generally linked with 
citizenship rights. This relationship is therefore equal to a multidimensional notion to poverty which can be 
caused by state failure (Gaudier, 1993).  
Another influential element that is concerned with the quality of the relationships between actors social 
capital. According to the Social Capital Initiative (1998) “the social capital of a society includes the 
institutions, the attitudes and values that govern interactions among people and contribute to economic and 
social development” (p. 1). Most studies concluded that social capital cannot be used to address a single 
person, it is the property of a social entity. The concept is drawn from a relational perspective and is only 
valid when it is shared by a number of individuals. From this perspective, social capital is a property of a 
community instead of the individual (Grootaert, 1998; Immerfall, 1999; Narayan, 1999). Immerfall (1999) 
conceptualises three distinct levels of social capital, namely: 
1. “The level of interpersonal relations, such as family, friends and neighbours. 
2. The level of intermediary associations and organisations, such as clubs, firms and political parties. 
3. The macro-level of societal institutions” (p. 121 – 122). 
Moreover, social capital may also serve as an indicator that determines the state of wealth of a nation and it 
is a reliable indicator for determining economic growth and other capital such as physical, human and 
environmental (Jenson, 1998; Grootaert, 1998; Wiman, 1999). 
Morality-based motives. Morality-based motives are related to the need for meaningful existence. This 
psychological need refers to the common idea that most humans are sharing basic respect and human dignity 
towards each other (Aguilera, 2007). The need for meaningful existence is a sense or feeling that individuals 
have towards their fellow human beings but also towards organisations. Interesting aspect of this morality-
based motive is the difference between an individual’s self-interest, group standing or an individual’s opinion 
of ethical appropriateness (Cropanzano et al., 2003). Previous research indicated that individuals have a 
sense for fairness, even when self-interest or economic benefit is involved. This indicates that moral-virtue 
plays and important role in this psychological process (Kahneman et al., 1986; Folger, 1998;  Cropanzano, 
et al., 2001; Turillo, et al., 2002). From an organisational perspective this indicates that employees are 
demonstrating a higher level of Organisational Citizenship Behaviour (OCB). More importantly, it is 
possible that when an organisation demonstrates a high level of ethical and moral management, employees 
will prefer morality-based motives above relational or even instrumental motives (Folger and Cropanzano, 
2001; Rietjens, 2008; UN OCHA, 2015). This could mean that employees who demonstrate a higher level 
of OCB also are motivated to contribute to the society as a whole. This assumption is supported by Barbian 
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(2001) who showed that generally people are willing to downsize personal benefit when their organisation 
is social responsible. 
2.2.3 Framing multi-actor collaboration 
The level of collaboration between different organisations differs. First there are differences between the 
many actors involved. Generally speaking we find higher level of collaboration within governmental, non-
governmental or business actors than between them. Secondly differences can be identified at the 
organisational level. De Coning and Friis (2011) developed a framework (see table 1) for analysing 
collaboration between the many actors involved. They identified six types of relationships (e.g. unity, 
integration, cooperation, coordination, coexistence and competition) and four levels (intra-agency, whole-
of-government, inter-agency and internal-external) of collaboration (De Coning and Friis, 2011).  










Members of the 
Coalition Operation 




national IEC work 
together to organize 
elections in DRC in 
2006 
Integration Various 









mission and UN 
Country Team in, 
e.g. Liberia, 2009 
Liberia 2009: 
International 
agencies and local 
actors agree to use 
PRS as common 
framework and 
action plan 
Cooperation DPKO and OCHA 
(both UN 
Secretariat) work 




military pillars of 





in Chad, 2008 
EULEX and the 
Kosovo 
government, 2009 
Coordination DPKO and OCHA 
in the field 
Civilian and 
military pillars of 
Norwegian PRT in 
Afghanistan, 2009 
Humanitarian 













Coexistence Various parts of EU 
in Chad in 2008 
DFID and MOD 
fail to agree on 
common 
evaluation 










Sudan in Darfur, 
2008 
Competition Various sections of 











for funding Defence and CIA 
in 
Afghanistan, 2007 






Unity. The level of unity within organisational collaboration means that (international) organisations are 
agreeing voluntarily to the formation of a unified structured organisational design (e.g. multi-national 
coalition). This type of organisation is under centralised combined joint leadership. Each participating actor 
deploys its resources under the leadership of the unified structure. This level of collaboration requires a 
combined joint strategic vision with implied (specific) goals, desired effects and objectives, e.g. targets. These 
targets are often formulated in an official campaign plan, including desired effects and/or end-state. This 
requires centralised type of leadership, joint planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of 
operational processes. This level of collaboration between organisations is rare. They occur only under very 
specific circumstances and are of limited time span. 
Integration. Organisations are integrated when they integrate the deployment of their organisational 
resources and activities without the loss of individual entities and right for independent decision-making. 
At this level of collaboration there can be joint planning, monitoring and evaluation. The implementation is 
being done separately and each organisation uses its own resources. The UN uses the level of integration 
for the collaboration with partner organisations. 
Cooperation. Organisations are complementing the deployment of their organisational resources and 
activities. They also can have overlapping mandates allowing them to operate jointly. This is especially useful 
when certain organisational resources are scarce. This type of collaboration can often be found with a single 
action and/or operation.  
Coordination. Coordination between organisations intents to prevent conflict or friction between the 
deployment of organisational resources and activities. Coordination mostly consists of sharing information 
with partner organisations with “deconfliction” as primary aim. This level of collaboration leaves the most 
space for an organisation to operate independently and participate on a voluntary basis.  
Coexistence. When organisations are forced to collaborate with each other we speak of coexistence. The 
fact they are forced to collaborate will not mean that they are doing that out of interest. In fact, they mostly 
have minimum interest in the coordination of the deployment of their organisational resources and activities.  
Competition. The last level of collaboration is competition. This will occur when organisations have 
visions, strategies or values that are opposite to each other. The level of collaboration between organisations 
is not necessarily one particular level. It is possible that there will be an overlap of two or even multiple 
levels. This depends primarily on the organisational level of analysis. 
The collaboration matrix describes four types of organisational collaboration. 
39
Intra-agency. Collaboration within an individual organisation or entity. This means that there has to be 
some form of consistency within a specific policy or program.  
Whole-of-government-approach. When there is consistency between different national government 
departments we speak of whole-of-government.  
Inter-organisational. Uniformity among the policies and activities of multi-disciplinary and multi-national 
organisations is described as inter-organisational collaboration.  
Internal-external. The last type of organisational collaboration is internal-external. This means that there 
is consistency between international and local actors.  
The framework can be useful when mapping the different forms of collaboration during conflict 
management. Furthermore, it shows that contemporary stabilisation operations have a multilevel and 
multidisciplinary character and includes a broad range of organisations and activities (Brzoska, 2006; Ayub 
& Kouvo, 2008; Davids, 2011). The framework is an instrument which describes the different structures 
among organisations interacting with each other. It has no normative function and therefore cannot be used 
for measurement purposes.   
2.2.4 Factors for success and failure 
As indicated in the above section, the many actors operating in security, development and governance are 
expected to think and act in more multidisciplinary (i.e. governance, rule of law, economics and security 
assistance) and multi-actor (i.e. local, international, governmental and non-governmental) integrated ways. 
In order to improve interaction various obstacles need to be taken. The main obstacles include a lack of 
credible commitment, knowledge problem, political economy, bureaucracy, business economy, institutional 
factors, organisational cultural factors and environmental factors (Weinberger, 2002; Bollen, 2002; Rathmell, 
2005; Manning, 2008; Rietjens, 2013 De Coning, 2016; Verweijen, 2017).. 
A lack of credible commitment relates to the desire for credible commitment in regards to economic 
reforms. Such reforms typically require long-term stable behaviour. However, reconstruction efforts in 
general require stable behaviour. Unfortunately, many actors involved in stabilisation operations (and 
particularly those employed by governmental actors) are driven by continuous change in behaviour which, 
in turn, leads to contradictories (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002; Bollen, 2002; Abiew, 2003; Soeters et al., 
2003; Frerks et al., 2006; Holmes-Eber, 2016). Ultimately, time inconsistency of reforms leads to regime 
uncertainty and therefore an increased risk of conflict (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Boré, 2006; Salmoni and 
Homes-Eber, 2011; Coyne and Pellillo, 2011; Posey, 2014; Holmes-Eber, 2016; Noll and Rietjens, 2016). 
The lack of credible commitment is understood as an important factor of failure for economic 
reconstruction (Boettke and Coyne, 2009; Flores & Nooruddin, 2009; Autesserre, 2014). 
According to Coyne & Pellillo (2011) a lack of credible commitment in the Iraqi and Afghanistan cases was 
born out of “the complexity caused by the interactions of multiple reformers (e.g., U.S. military officials, 
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Afghan national government officials, aid organisation officials, local warlords, etc.), some of which may 
perceive that they must change their strategies given new developments or have competing objectives” (p. 
629-630).  Filkens (2009) describes an excellent example of how a lack of credible commitment can influence 
the relationship between home and host country officials. The situation took place in Afghanistan where 
the former commander of ISAF, General McChrystal, was visiting Abdullah Jan, the governor of Garmsir. 
During their meeting Abdullah Jan told General McChrystal that: “Everyone in Garmsir sees that you are 
living in tents, and they know that you are going to be leaving soon. You need to build something permanent 
– a building. Because your job here is going to take years. Only then will people be persuaded that you are 
going to stay” (p. 18). This example perfectly illustrates the importance of being credible committed to the 
long-term reconstruction policy and including tasks.  
The knowledge problem is presenting the argument that development activities are conducted by two 
distinct type of actors. Easterly et al. (2006) describes the group of ‘planners’ who are administratively 
planning reconstruction efforts from behind a desk, usually far away from the actual field. Second, there are 
the ‘searchers’ who are operating in the field and use ground-truth knowledge and understanding to work 
on social- and economic development projects. Historical cases show that planner-led efforts as the main 
effort leads to failure (Coyne & Pellillo, 2011; Shetler-Jones, 2016).  
Especially in countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan the need to exploit the knowledge of the local 
actors both state and non-state are key success factors (Mortenson & Relin, 2006; Salmoni and Holmes-
Eber, 2011; Holmes-Eber, 2016). Large centralised development programs also address the knowledge 
problem (Olsthoorn and Soeters, 2016). According to Pritchett and Woolcock (2004) “valuable local 
‘practices’ – idiosyncratic knowledge of variables are crucial to the welfare of the poor (e.g., soil conditions, 
weather patterns, water flows) – get squeezed out, even lost completely, in large centralised development 
programs” (p. 197). Therefore development efforts need to address the local level and have to make use of 
indigenous drivers. 
The local actors such as individuals, households and businesses are the key element in the economic 
reconstruction of a conflict affected area. They need to have the motivation to be engaged in social- and 
economic development activities. International actors are there to advice, assist and support. The type of 
economic activities they can deploy (and thus provided by international MEANS) are depending on their 
particular circumstances and geographical location.  
In order to give full support to the notion of the indigenous drivers, we need to understand historical context 
of the operating environment including the highly valuable insights of the local actors. The acknowledgment 
of this understanding was made by the President of Liberia (UNDP, 2010) by stating: “In the case of Liberia 
where we have had over 15 years of war and before that some other 10–15 years of intermittent violence, 
one cannot ignore the mechanisms and institutions that helped people survive.… Clearly ordinary people 
had some capabilities of their own, even if they were residual. Villages were plundered; young boys went in 
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and burned down villages, killing a lot of people, but some people as a whole community survived. What 
did they do? My idea basically is that we need to understand these internal capabilities” (p. 14 - 15). 
Reconstruction efforts and international support require a certain level of understanding of the socio-
historical context (Ohiorhenuan and Stewart, 2008; Rietjens, 2016). To have a full understanding of the 
socio-historic context we need to focus on the local level. Although engaging in local level reconstruction 
activities require more preparation time, a historical view on reconstruction efforts explains that focusing 
on the local level is more likely to be successful. Local level reconstruction includes the participation of 
national and local actors, institutions and resources. Development assistance, provided by international 
organisations plays an important role in these difficult processes. Development assistance should be focused 
on two main tasks and directed by one guideline: first, there is the continuation of delivering support to 
indigenous efforts including the acknowledgement of their limitations. Second, is enabling local level 
initiatives by focusing particular on solutions for possible constraints or obstacles. Initial needs assessments 
and analyses of capabilities and political economy can provide the baseline for the recovery process. 
Furthermore, in order to prevent social tension or any possible action that can lead to a relapse of conflict, 
support strategies need to take political, ethnic and religious dynamics into account. Key element of the 
indigenous drivers approach is the focus on decreasing the risk of conflict. Ohiorhenuan and Stewart (2008) 
recognises the need for reducing conflict risk: “nurturing indigenous drivers involves explicitly identifying 
the capacities, capabilities and tensions inherent in systems and processes and in organisational, community 
and even national dynamics as observed in the immediate aftermath of conflict. Recovery policies should 
respect these dynamics even as they determine where they may need to be modified or strengthened” (p. 
50). Although the indigenous driver approach is a key element for the successful reconstruction of a conflict 
affected area, the need for development assistance from the international community remains necessary. 
This means that local communities should be engaged in strategic planning. This requires interaction 
between the local and international level. 
The political economy factors address the need of International (governmental) actors to implement 
democracy into conflict affected areas. While the restoring of democracy stands high on the agenda of actors 
working in conflict management, the implementation of the accompanying goals and targets such as the 
holding of elections must be carefully performed to support economic development (Coyle and Pellillo, 
2011). According to Flores and Nooruddin (2009) “countries that undergo extensive democratisation in the 
immediate post-conflict period recover more slowly than countries that do not” (p. 5). The reason for this 
could be the fact that “typically early elections in a highly polarized society empower elites, senior military 
leaders, and organized criminal elements” (Caldwell, 2009, p. 18). Montgomery (2008) analysed the donor-
led reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and describes 5 factors that illustrate the democracy – economic 
trade-offs as: 
1. “The rule of law can degenerate into the rule of lawyers – litigious, costly, and dilatory; 
2. Economic efficiency can turn into profligacy – piratical and predatory; 
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3. Free speech can reward superficiality and extremism; 
4. The demand for unfulfilled rights can invite invidious reverse discrimination; 
5. Checked-and-balanced governmental institutions can yield policy stasis” (p. 36).   
Bureaucracy factors address the lack of effective interaction amongst the many actors involved. 
Furthermore, these factors concern corruption, waste, nepotism, and inefficiency regarding the (interim) 
national actors and international actors (Coyle and Pellillo, 2011; Mustafa et al., 2016). These problems 
require synchronisation, coordination, and integration of activities to achieve unity of effort. Many actors 
involved receive their funding through governmental support. The budget allocation depends on the 
relationships between these actors, logistical and compensatory needs (Coyle & Pellillo, 2011). Due to the 
often limited financial resources available, actors will compete with each other in order to retrieve a certain 
part of it. These processes are influencing the economic reconstruction in several ways. First, actors are 
typically aiming for retrieving the largest share of the financial resources. They also strive for a position in 
which they will have associated influence over the reconstruction efforts. Instead of sharing the same goal 
and share efforts, actors start to compete. Competitive behaviour amongst actors leads to ‘own agendas’ in 
order to be distinguishable instead of creating the desired unity of effort. As a result, actors intend to spend 
all of their budget because in most bureaucracies, ‘the failure’ to spend a designated budget typically leads 
to reductions for the next year (Tierney, 2010; Coyle & Pellillo, 2011; Mustafa et al., 2016). However, 
unnecessary budget spending is highly contradictory to the goal of reconstruction since it should be aimed 
at maximising the benefits for the local population instead of the donor. Additionally, the effective allocation 
and reallocation of organisation resources is hindered by the lack of an adequate feedback loop (Mises, 1983; 
De Coning, 2016). 
The fact that most actors are being judged based on short-term outputs, they typically are less focused on 
long-term economic and development reconstruction efforts and thus spend most of their budget on short-
term efforts (Easterly et al., 2006). According to Diamond (2005) this was particularly the case in Iraq where 
“a number of U.S. government agencies had a variety of visions of how political authority would be re-
established in Iraq. In the bitter, relentless infighting among U.S. governmental actors in advance of the 
war, none of these preferences clearly prevailed” (p. 28-29).   
The decision-making processes and management of information between these actors is another key 
element which affect the multi-actor interaction. Conflicts are complex and have a high level of uncertainty 
and rate of change, therefore actors need to display adaptive behaviour in order to fit best the complex and 
uncertain environmental conditions. According to Montgomery and Rondinelli (2004) in a country such as 
Afghanistan, where the security situation remains fragile, “many of the decisions about how to promote the 
development of Afghanistan are likely to be made rapidly, reactively, and in response to uncertain and ever-
changing political forces. Careful deliberation is likely to be in short supply in the face of rapidly changing 
political trends and complex social and cultural conditions in Afghanistan” (p. 12).  The absence of effective 
feedback mechanisms and accountability resulted in bureaucratic waste and inefficiency in both the Iraqi 
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and Afghanistan cases (Glanz and Rohde, 2006).  In Afghanistan the US spent almost $860 million on 
training the indigenous police over a 7 year time period. According to Rashid (2009) “results were almost 
totally useless. This is because DynCorp (i.e. a by State Department contracted private firm) was training 
the indigenous police force to fight an insurgency rather than support their localities. The actions of the 
local police thereafter were observed to be as ‘rapacious’ as they were before (p. 205). Now current President 
of the GIROA, Ashraf Ghani, recognises the waste of international funding by stating “International 
technical assistance is considered to be largely wasted … hundreds of millions of dollars have gone into 
technical assistance only to increase corruption and misgovernance (p. 334).  
Business economy factors are dealing with simply the cost-benefit reasoning behind collaboration. Intensive 
collaboration can lead to greater efficiency of resource management. Of course, there is a moment where 
the costs of coordination are higher than the gains got from coherence. Also organisations typically look for 
advantageous for themselves when it comes to coherence. Coherence can also create friction within a 
multidimensional organisation, especially when it comes to funding. This can either be because organisations 
need collaboration or government funding due to their own limited budget. On the other hand large 
organisations, who have sufficient own funding, can operate independently in terms of goal setting and 
policy making (van der Lijn, 2011).  
Institutional factors address the fact that organisations with the same goals, aims and mandate are more 
likely to collaborate with each other than those who have differences between them. Organisations who 
want to become more interdependent need to collaborate with each other on fields as training and 
operations. Once collaborating becomes more common within the organisation, the leadership and 
communication will adapt accordingly. This enhances the chances of operational success. Efficient 
collaboration on the institutional level requires a common structure, rules, culture, planning and decision-
making process. The Iraqi case identified two key lessons when it comes to inter-organisational collaboration 
(Rathmell, 2005): 
1. “The importance of institutionalising processes and table top exercises, including the planning of 
multiple scenario’s, contingency planning and availability of resources for better or worse 
scenarios”; 
2. “The need for an institutionalised feedback loop whereby the field can recommend policy 
adjustments to higher decision-makers” (p. 1032-1033). 
According to Rathmell (2005) friction was seen in “the locus of planning in a mission and the relationships 
of the mission headquarters both upwards, to its higher headquarters in national capitals, and downwards, 
to field offices (p. 1033). Indeed, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had to deal with poor C2. This 
was particularly the case in the relationship between Baghdad and the CPA regions (Rathmell, 2005). The 
fact that the CPA had to deal with a lack of reliable IT assets resulted in a lot of face to face communication. 
IT assets are defined as “widely available, off-the-shelf or commodity like information technologies that are 
used to process, store, and disseminate information” (Wade and Hulland, 2004, p. 109). Those consultations 
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were hindered or time-consuming due the fragile security situation throughout the country. This indicates 
the importance of the strategic deployment of IT-assets, preferably providing a collaborative information 
environment. The failure of effective integration also can be blamed to the distance between policy makers 
and those conducting field work. Mission design, goal setting and guidelines often are made by policymakers 
remote from the operational environment (Weinberger, 2002; Soeters, 2008). Further, there are difficulties 
with coordinating aid strategies among UN departments, international financial institutions, NGOs and 
bilateral donors (Patrick, 2001), as well among military, humanitarian and private organisations (van 
Marrewijk and Were, 2003; Reuther, 2011). Miscommunication between civilian and military actors can be 
found in Bosnia (since 1995) and Kosovo (1999) where NATO was in command of security and the UN in 
collaboration with NGOs were responsible for humanitarian affairs and development aid. Moreover, the 
coordination of efforts appeared to be even difficult in missions with a single C2 structure such was the case 
in East-Timor, where UNTAET had difficulty with leading and coordinating their broad range of activities 
(Weinberger, 2002; Soeters, 2008; Oltshoorn and Soeters, 2016). 
Organisation cultural factors describe the differences in the values and beliefs, or organisational culture of 
the many actors involved. There are differences in planning, decision-making and management practices 
which has to seek for coherence. More importantly, military organisations usually have a short-term planning 
horizon which is often focused on targets or desired effects (van der Lijn, 2011; Shetler-Jones, 2016). Civilian 
organisations and Ministries of Foreign Affairs commonly focus more on long-term efforts. This highlights 
again the essence of the locus of planning described by Rathmell (2005).  
Environmental factors describe that the context in which the stabilisation operation operates is a critical 
element in relationship to the interaction of the many actors involved (Leslie et al., 2008; Lindley-French, 
2013). In areas where the security situation is unstable the more likely the need for coherence exist. In such 
situations the military component can be responsible for the security sector and provide a more secure 
environment for civilian organisations to conduct activities related to the development sector (Melkon et 
al., 2016; Shetler-Jones, 2016). The moment the military component will become more dominant this may 
change. Civilian organisations will be precocious with the deployment of their activities as long as kinetic 
activities remains high. Another factor is that NGOs are closely linked to civil society. The more engaged 
the local population is with the presence of the multidimensional organisation, the more likely they will seek 
for collaboration (Auteserre, 2014; Holmes-Eber, 2016). Finally the support from the home country or 
public support is essential for the mission as a whole (De Coning, 2016). Creating close collaboration, 
organisations can send integrated reports back to their home country. This is an essential aspect in providing 
the domestic tax-payers with information (Manning, 2008). This is an important property of the expected 
return. Especially in relation to the level of progress that have been made. Nowadays when most Western 




Over the last decades, stabilisation operations have been structurally complex (De Coning, 2016), yet their 
strategic model follows a general and structured input-process-output model that should be applicable to 
different operations (Ramalingam and Mitchell, 2014; ADDP, 2014; Chandler, 2016). However, one of the 
primary lessons learned from the interventions in the Former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan was that 
such a general and linear structured input-process-output model (i.e. MEANS-WAYS-ENDS) is insufficient 
to represent the complexity of stabilisation operations since the interactions between the actors involved 
often show complex and dynamic patterns (Weinberger, 2002; Manning, 2003; Rathmell, 2005; Paris, 2009). 
Actors working in the field of stabilisation operations must thus think and act in more holistic way that 
would consider the needs of a situation at the systemic level and how their individual efforts relate to those 
of others in order to achieve a unified effort (Williams, 2011; Rietjens et al., 2013; De Coning, 2016; 
Olsthoorn and Soeters, 2016). In other words, the behaviour of the whole cannot be explained by looking 
at the individual actors. As a result, the network supporting the integration, and mostly the strength, type 
and scope of the relationships between the actors is crucial to successfully bridging multi-actor efforts into 
an effective approach to the challenges that stabilisation operations face.      
If linear thinking is not sufficient for the strategic modelling of stabilisation operations due to their 
complexity, an alternative is desirable. This alternative is proposed to be that of complex systems thinking 
and supports the debate over the extent to which integration is feasible and desirable. 
 
2.3 SYSTEMS THINKING 
 
In the early 20th century, several scholars from various backgrounds were involved in research regarding the 
control over systems, development of computer language and a relatively new field as a response to 
behaviourism, namely cognitivism (Barnard, 1938; McCulloch and Pitts, 1943; Wiener, 1948; Von 
Bertalanffy, 1950; Churchman, 1963; Berrien, 1968). Their research formed the basics of a new stream 
within organisational theory which came to be known as the systems approach, or systems thinking (Ackoff, 
1962; Churchman, 1963). Systems thinking is characterised by it generality and is therefore applicable to a 
broad range of fields and problem areas (Mingers and White, 2009). We will now present the literature on 
systems thinking to better understand its history and logic which enables us to make the connection with 
stabilisation operations. 
2.3.1 Isolated systems 
The fundament of the systems approach, or systems thinking was called general systems theory (von 
Bertalanffy, 1950). It argued that the organisation was to be thought of as a system that is formed around 
various distinct sub-systems. Conversely, a system was to be part of a larger supra-system (Scott, 1961; 
Simon, 1969). This is known as systems hierarchy (see figure 2.1).  
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 Figure 2.1: Systems hierarchy.  
 
Barnard (1938) defines a system as follows: “a cooperative system is a complex of physical, biological, 
personal and social components which are in a specific systematic relationship by reason of the cooperation 
of two or more persons for at least one definite end. Such a system is evidently a subordinate unit of a larger 
systems from one point of view; and itself embraces subsidiary systems-physical, biological, etc.-from 
another point of view. One of the systems comprised within a cooperative system, the one which is implicit 
in the phrase “cooperation of two or more persons,” is called an “organisation” (p. 3).  
Researchers found that these sub-systems were interdependent and hence affected each other. Therefore, 
research on systems theory focused for the most part on understanding the interaction between the sub-
systems as part of a system, or interacting systems as part of a supra-system (Boulding, 1956; Berrien, 1968; 
Buckley, 1968).  
The connection between systems thinking and organisation was explicitly made by Scott (1961) when he 
connected organisational theory and systems thinking as follows: “the distinctive qualities of modern 
organisation theory are its conceptual-analytical base, its reliance on empirical research data, and above all, 
its integrating nature. These qualities are framed in a philosophy which accepts the premise that the only 
meaningful way to study it as a system… Modern organisation theory and general systems theory are similar 
in that they look at organisation as an integrated whole” (p. 21).  
At the beginning of systems thinking many scholars studied systems as a linear phenomenon based upon 
the Newtonian paradigm. Linear systems are characterised by two mathematical principles, namely 
proportionality and superposition (Von Bertalanffy, 1968). Proportionality explains that a certain input (X) 
is generating a certain output (Y). When we multiply the input with a constant factor (A), the output will 
multiply accordingly (AY). Superposition relates to what is known as ‘the whole is equal to the sum of its 
parts’. 
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Simply explained, input X1 and X2 are generating output Y1 and Y2. If we add an equal input to X1 and 
X2, an equal output of Y1 and Y2 is expected (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1972). These mathematical principles 
can be solved analytically or numerically and hence it is possible to calculate future output based on the 
initial conditions and a set of linear equations. In other words, they are deterministic. As a result, most of 
the research at the beginning of systems thinking was focused on the modelling, analyses and simulation of 
the behaviours of the system. According to this Newtonian paradigm, linear systems are characterised by 
impermeable boundaries in respect to their environment and thus are in a state of being isolated from its 
environment (Barnard, 1938; Boulding, 1956). According to the first law of thermodynamics, the internal 
energy of an isolated system is constant. Thus, an isolated system cannot exchange energy, information or 
matter with the environment (Tisza, 1977; Prigogine, 1997). Therefore, these systems are known as isolated 
systems (see figure 2.2). 
 
Figure 2.2: A system isolated from its environment. 
 
2.3.2 Closed systems 
A subsequent development in systems theory is that of cybernetic systems (Wiener, 1948; Ashby, 1952; 
Beer, 1979). Cybernetics are characterised by their ability to exchange energy and information with its 
environment (not matter) which allows for interaction with that environment (see figure 2.3). The process 
of energy exchange between a system and its environment is explained through the second law of 
thermodynamics: “heat cannot by itself pass from a colder to a hotter object” (Clausius, 1850). The second 
law explains that even in an isolated system differences in temperature or pressure can be observed. A 
commonly used example is that of the mixture of warm and cold water. This dynamic proceed in a certain 
direction, namely from order (i.e. warm or cold) to disorder (interaction). When considering a system of 
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being in a state of isolation, it will proceed towards ever increasing disorder. This process can be measured 
and expressed in ‘entropy’, which is the quantitative measurement of the level of evolution within a system. 
 
Figure 2.3: A closed system capable to exchange energy and information with its environment. 
 
This view leads to the introduction of the element of feedback which allows for cybernetics, which means 
‘steersman’, to demonstrate the self-regulating ability to response to disturbances from the environment 
with a stabilising adjustment while maintain their focus on goal-attainment (Wiener, 1948; Anderson, 1974; 
George, 1971). Since feedback is the main mechanism through which cybernetic systems self-regulate we 
need to distinguish between negative and positive feedback (Capra, 1996). At the beginning of cybernetics, 
research was primarily focused on negative feedback which occurs in a system when disturbances are 
amplified in order to maintain stable conditions. A commonly used example to illustrate the logic of a 
cybernetic system is that of a thermostat connected to the central heating of a building. Once someone sets 
the thermostat at a designated temperature it will automatically determine whether there’s a gap between 
the designated temperature and the actual temperature sensed. This sensing will either trigger the heating 
system to switch on or off to keep a stable and ordered situation (i.e. the designated temperature). In systems 
theory, this is known as the concept of homeostasis (Heylighen and Joslyn, 2001). Figure 2.4 illustrates such 
feedback controls.  
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Figure 2.4: Simple negative feedback controls in a cybernetic system. 
 
Beer (1967) describes closed systems, with their focus on controlling the disturbances from both inside and 
outside the system’s boundary to settle the system in a state of homeostasis as follows: “a self-regulating 
servomechanism needs to operate as a closed system […] The whole point of homeostatic self-regulation 
in cybernetic machines is that the system should deal with disturbances; moreover with disturbances that 
have not been foreseen in principle by the designer. This requirement can be met only by a closed system 
in the servomechanism model” (p. 166). 
2.3.3 Open systems 
The Newtonian paradigm and its derivative way of thinking, including that of cybernetics, describes linear 
processes thereby making a system deterministic and hence predictable (i.e. the example of the thermostat). 
However, von Bertalanffy (1968) recognised that the second law of thermodynamics would not apply to 
living systems since they are unavoidable subject to an increase of entropy as the friction between the model 
and its environment changes. Hence, living systems are to be regarded as open system: “living systems are 
basically open systems. An open system is defined as a system in exchange of matter with its environment, 
presenting import and export, building up and breaking down of its material components…Closed systems 
are systems which are considered to be isolated from their environment” (p. 141). Accordingly, open systems 
can exchange energy, information and material with its environment (see figure 2.5).  
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Figure 2.5: Open system capable to exchange energy, information and matter with its environment. 
 
Open systems are characterised by non-linear feedback controls. Whereas negative feedback focuses on 
creating stable conditions by its stabilising adjustment in response to disturbances, positive feedback is 
responsible for change, growth and self-organisation by amplifying disturbances (Holland, 1995; Capra, 
1996; Heylighen and Joslyn, 2001). These principles can be described as the dynamic behaviour of complex 
systems. The modelling of this dynamic behaviour (i.e. relationships between the various subsystems) is 
known as systems dynamics (Forrester, 1961). 
Table 2.2 presents an overview of the main elements of systems thinking. 
Table 2.2: Main elements of systems thinking. 
Concept Definition References 
Systems thinking A system is formed around various distinct sub-systems. 
Conversely, a system is to be part of a larger supra-system. 
Barnard (1938) 
McCulloch and Pitts (1943) 
Holism The behaviour of the whole system cannot be understood 
by examining the individual sub-systems. 
Scott (1961) 
Hierarchy Since a system is composed of sub-systems of a lower 
order and is also part of a supra-system there is a hierarchy 
within the system. 
Kast and Rosenzweig (1972) 
Boundaries Systems have boundaries that separate them from their 
environment. Hence, we can distinguish between isolated, 
closed and open systems. 
Barnard (1938) 
Wiener (1948) 
Von Bertalanffy (1968) 
Isolated system Isolated systems cannot exchange energy, information or 
material with its environment. 
Barnard (1938) 
Boulding (1956) 
Closed system Closed systems can exchange energy with its environment 
which allows for interaction with its environment 
Wiener, (1948) 
Beer (1967) 
Open system Open systems can exchange energy, information and 
material with its environment. 
Von Bertalanffy (1968) 
Prigogine (1997)  
Negative feedback Negative feedback focuses on creating stable conditions by 





Positive feedback Positive feedback is responsible for change, growth and 









Stabilisation operations can be understood as a system that is formed around various distinct sub-systems 
which interact in a non-linear manner, in turn influencing a system’s condition from inside the system’s 
boundary (i.e. influenced by the internal organisation). Interactions in a non-linear fashion are defined as 
“complex” (Perrow, 1972; Waldrop, 1992; Capra, 1997). Thus, stabilisation operations can be viewed as 
complex systems. Moreover, stabilisation operations take place in a highly complex environment from 
which they cannot be isolated, thereby influencing a system’s condition from outside the system’s boundary 
(i.e. influenced by the external environment). Accordingly, we study stabilisation operations as complex 
open systems impacted by both its complex internal organisation and external environment. 
 
2.3.4 Complex Adaptive Systems 
 
As we have seen above, a complex open system is capable to exchange energy, information and matter with 
its environment. Through the processes of emergence and self-organisation, complex systems can adapt to 
disturbances or changes from their environment. Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) are a very specific type 
of complex systems as they are able to transform the process of adaptation in a continuous one. To put it 
differently, a CAS adapts to disturbances from the environmental conditions and then respond to these 
adaptations themselves and so on (Gell-Mann, 1994; Holland, 1995). The dynamics of CAS are explained 
by a relatively new stream, namely complexity theory (Waldrop, 1992; Kaufmann, 1995) which is becoming 
more important in organisational thinking (Mingers and White, 2009). 
Whereas at the introduction of the field many scholars applied complexity theory to the natural sciences 
(e.g. biology, computer simulation, mathematics, physics and chemistry), it emerged at a later stage in the 
various fields of the social sciences (Prigogine & Stengers 1984; Varela & Maturana 1992; Gell-Mann, 1994; 
Mitleton-Kelly, 2002). According to Mitleton-Kelly (2005), from a social science perspective, complexity 
theory is a useful explanatory framework for understanding human behaviour since it provides ground to 
explain: “how individuals and organisations interact, relate and evolve within a larger social ecosystem. 
Complexity also explains why interventions may have un-anticipated consequences. The intricate inter-
relationships of elements within a complex system give rise to multiple chains of dependencies. Change 
happens in the context of this intricate intertwining at all scales. We become aware of change only when a 
different pattern becomes discernible” (p. 2). This definition illustrates our argument for studying 
stabilisation operations as complex system. However, to have a better understanding of complexity theory 
we will now describe its core characteristics in more detail. 
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To define complexity, Gell-Mann (1994) reflects on its etymology. Complexus stands for braided together and 
is derived from plexus meaning entwined or braided. This reference can be found back in Moffat’s’ definition 
of complexity: “intricate intertwining or interconnectivity of elements within a system, and between a system 
and its environment” (p. 68). In other words, the non-linear interactions that characterise a complex system 
can also be defined as a network. According to Bousquet (2009) “the network form implies a decentralised, 
open, and adaptable form of organisation, naturally best suited to adjusting to a rapidly changing 
environment through self-organising and emergent properties of the network (p. 205). However, the 
network organisational structure is not necessarily decentralised. Generally speaking, a network can be 
centralised, decentralised or distributed (Baran, 1964). Figure 2.6 presents an illustration of the three 
network organisational structures. 
 
Figure 2.6: A network can be centralised, decentralised or distributed. Source: adapted from Baran (1964). 
 
The definition provided by Bousquet highlights two central concepts of complex systems, namely self-
organisation and emergence. First, self-organisation is defined by Capra (1997) as “the spontaneous 
emergence of new structures and new forms of behaviour in open systems far from equilibrium, 
characterised by internal feedback loops and described mathematically by non-linear equations” (p. 85). 
Hence, the actors within a complex system interact with each other by exploring new paths and processes 
without external control mechanisms. Since these stimuli are characterised by their non-linearity, output 
derived from self-organisation is highly unpredictable and subject to change (Checkland, 1981). The concept 
of self-organisation is derived from biological living systems where it is known as autopoiesis which explains 
the way each of the individual sub-systems is affecting the transformation of others and consequently the 
53
whole system. In other words, a complex open living system is able to reproduce itself (Maturana and Varela, 
1980; Walby, 2003). 
Second, Goldstein (1999) defines emergence as “the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and 
properties during the process of self-organization in complex systems” (p. 49). More specifically, emergence 
is the outcome of the autonomous interactions of individual entities in a relationship which leads to self-
organisation: “emergent properties, qualities, patterns, or structures, arise from the interaction of individual 
elements; they are greater than the sum of the parts and may be difficult to predict by studying the individual 
elements. Emergence is the process that creates new order together with self-organisation” (Mitleton-Kelly 
2005, p. 19). Emergence is an inherently non-linear process since interactions can take place between two 
particular sub-systems and perhaps not between others. Hence, whereas the Newtonian paradigm was based 
upon linear thinking (i.e. principles of proportionality and superposition), the interactions in complex 
systems are non-proportional and hence non-linear (Waldrop, 1992; Gell-Mann, 1994). Capra (1992) 
connects the network and notions of non-linearity in these terms: “the first and most obvious property of 
any network is its non-linearity – it goes in all directions. Thus, the relationships in a network pattern are 
non-linear relationships. Particularly an influence, or message, may travel along a cyclical path, which may 
become a feedback loop. The concept of feedback is intimately connected with the network pattern (p. 82). 
Thus, complex systems can operate in stable equilibrium through negative feedback controls (i.e. the 
thermostat) or far from equilibrium through positive feedback. Because of this non-linearity, complex 
systems are highly sensitive to their initial conditions (Holland, 1995; Stewart, 2000). This phenomenon can 
be best explained through the non-proportionality of the cause and effect relationships (i.e. asymmetrical 
input to output) that characterise open systems. In other words, even the smallest changes to a system’s 
initial condition may result in large-scale alterations in its future way of behaving. A system’s sensitive 
dependence on the initial conditions is popularly known as the “butterfly effect” which is a metaphor for 
the question whether “the flap of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil doe set off a tornado in Texas” to illustrate 
the complexity and unpredictability of weather systems (Lorenz, 1972, p. 181). In addition, open systems 
allow for certain results that potentially could be achieved from alternative initial conditions as well as 
alternative ways as these differences can be amplified through positive feedback controls. This is known as 
the equifinality of open systems (Prigogine, 1985; Gleick, 1987).  
Table 2.3: Key concepts of CAS. 
Concept Definition References 
Emergence The arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and 
properties during the process of self-organization in complex 
systems. 
Goldstein (1999) 
Self-organisation The spontaneous emergence of new structures and new forms 
of behaviour in open systems far from equilibrium, 
characterised by internal feedback loops and described 
mathematically by non-linear equations. 
Capra (1997) 
Non-linearity When the change of the output is not proportional to the 





dependence on the 
initial conditions 
Small changes to a system’s initial condition may result in 
large-scale alterations in its future way of behaving. 
Holland (1995) 
Lorenz (1971) 
Equifinality Results that potentially could be achieved from alternative 
initial conditions as well as alternative ways as these differences 
can be amplified through positive feedback controls. 
Prigogine (1985)  
Gleick (1987) 
 
As we have seen above, a complex open system is capable to exchange energy, information and matter with 
its environment. Through the processes of emergence and self-organisation complex systems can adapt to 
disturbances or changes from their environment. Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) are a very specific type 
of complex systems as they are able to transform the process of adaptation in a continuous one. To put it 
differently, a CAS adapts to disturbances from the environmental conditions and then respond to these 
adaptations themselves and so on (Gell-Mann, 1994; Holland, 1995). In the language of CAS this is called 
co-evolution (Heylighen, 1996). According to Gell-Mann (1994) the co-evolution of CAS takes place 
through the mechanisms of information processing, distribution and exchange: “a complex adaptive system 
acquires information about its environment and its own interaction with that environment, identifying 
regularities in that information, condensing those regularities into a kind of “schema” or model, and acting 
in the real world on the basis of that schema, and the results of that action in the real world feed-back to 
influence competition among these schemata” (p. 17). Hence, schemata consist of identified patters and 
correlations which allows for a CAS to either predict events that take place outside the system boundary 
(i.e. its environment) or create prescriptions for its own behaviour within the system’s boundary and in 
relationship to its environment. This needs to be regarded as a continuous cycle in which these schemata 
are continuously being analysed, adjusted and reconstructed as the CAS receives new information through 
interaction with its environment and subsequently co-evolves (Gell-Mann, 1994; Holland, 1995; Moffat, 
2003). Figure 2.7 illustrates the way a CAS co-evolves through the process of schemata. 
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Figure 2.7: The way a CAS evolves using schemata. Source: adapted from Gell-Mann (1994). 
 
The process of co-evolution is closely related to the phenomenon of bifurcation which explains for the 
splitting of a main body into two parts. According to Urry (2003) “systems reach points of bifurcation when 
their behaviour and future pathways become unpredictable and new higher order, more differentiated, 
structures may emerge” (p. 28). More specifically explained: from the perspective of control values, a system 
will respond to all disturbances with a stabilising adjustment in order to establish ordered conditions. Once 
control values reach a level where the first bifurcation takes place, two alternative ordered conditions will 
be developed. Depending on the disturbance encountered, the system will settle in one of these alternative 
states. This is a continuous process in which the possible states are constantly multiplied until it reaches a 
point where a system will establish chaotic conditions. According to the theory, it is at this turning point, 
where the bifurcation process is at its greatest state and a system is still settled in the ordered conditions, 
that flexibility and adaptability is maximised (see figure 2.8).  
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Figure 2.8: Bifurcation diagram of a complex system. Source: adapted from Beckerman (1999). 
 
Waldrop (1992) defines the state in which co-evolution is the most effective as “complexity”, and can be 
found balancing between order and chaos: “right between the two extremes [order and chaos], at a kind of 
abstract phase transition called “the edge of chaos”, you also find complexity: a class of behaviours in which 
the components of the system never quite lock into place, yet never quite dissolve into turbulence, either. 
These are the systems that are both stable enough to store information, and yet evanescent enough to 
transmit it. These are the systems that can be organised to perform complex computations, to react to the 
world, to be spontaneous, adaptive, and alive” (p. 293). Gell-Mann (1994) connects complexity and the 
development of schemata as follows: systems that are settled in highly ordered conditions show stable 
behaviour and hence would be characterised by low information content (i.e. the schemata can only be 
expressed in very few ordered conditions). By contrast, after multiple bifurcations chaotic conditions are 
established and hence information content would be absent. Consequently, information content is greatest 
in between order and chaos. 
In sum, by looking at the attributes of complex systems many analytical challenges and implications to model 
or simulate such a model appear. In contrast to the Newtonian paradigm, which traditionally focused on 
gaining a full and comprehensive understanding of a system, complexity theory allows for a more qualitative 
understanding of the cognitive processes and recognising information processing as the key operating 
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process through which these systems (i.e. organisations) adapt and self-organise their organisational 
resources and ultimately co-evolve using schemata.  
Additionally, now we have introduced systems theory and more specifically complexity theory, we have 
learned that a specialised functional area of an organisation is recognised as a sub-system. Strategic 
management theories view an organisation (i.e. system) as a collection of organisational resources and 
competencies, each with different capabilities (Wernerfelt 1984; Barney, 1991; Dyer and Singh, 1998). Thus, 
strategic management theories view the sub-systems as sets of organisational resources. According to Nevo 
and Wade (2010) “the recognition that some organisational resources are systems - that is, organisational 
subsystems - implies that the key concepts of systems theory and the resource based view (RBV) are 
isomorphic, and that a synthesis of the theories is meaningful” (p. 174). Thus, whereas organisational 
resources and competencies are the final stage of systems theory, they are the starting point of strategic 
management theories.   
 
2.4 RESOURCE BASED VIEW 
 
An influential strand in the strategic management is the resource based view (RBV), which offers an 
analytical framework regarding the use of organisational resources. According to the RBV, each organisation 
consists of organisational resources and competencies, each with different capabilities (Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Barney, 1991). Hence, the RBV emphasises the heterogeneity of organisations. The RBV finds its basis in 
economic theories focusing on monopolism and imperfect competition (Chamberlin, 1933; Robinson, 
1933). These theories propose that diversity amongst various organisations and hence imperfect competition 
are the enabling conditions to enhance their strategic potential. Penrose (1959) argues that the ‘whole 
organisation’ needs to be considered as a collection of organisational resources. Different combinations of 
organisational resources derived from these collections is what results in firm heterogeneity and hence a 
monopolistic position. The speed of the accumulation and assimilation of organisational resources is what 
results in organisational growth. Penrose (1959) further suggest that organisations do not benefit from the 
organisational resources themselves but from the services derived from them.  
Various scholars have provided definitions for organisational resources, competencies and capabilities. 
According to Amit and Schoemaker (1993) organisational resources are “stocks of available factors that are 
owned or controlled by the firm” (p. 35). This definition implies that an organisation has a sense of 
ownership and control over their organisational resources. Competencies relate to “a firm’s capacity to 
deploy resources, usually in combination, using organisational processes, to effect a desired end” (p. 35) and 
thus according to Hamel and Prahalad (1994) represent “…a bundle of skills and technologies rather than 
a single, discrete skill or technology” (p. 202). Capabilities, in turn, refers to the use and deployment of these 
competencies to attain the organisational objectives (McGrath et al., 1995; Teece et al., 1997). 
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We now have come to the point where we have described that a system is formed around various distinct 
sub-systems and is part of a greater sub-system. Moreover, by introducing the literature on strategic 
management we have learned that a system is the equivalent of an organisation which commonly consist of 
various specialised functional departments. More importantly, we have learned through the lens of strategic 
management theory that a sub-system (i.e. a specialised functional department) and its overall system (i.e. 
an organisation) can be viewed as an organisational resource or a collection of organisational resources 
respectively. Connecting these findings to the literature on complex systems we understand information 
processing as the key operating process through which these systems (i.e. organisations) adapt and self-
organise their organisational resources and ultimately co-evolve using schemata. However, the 
conceptualisation of information processing as the key operating process remains quite abstract this far. To 
have a better understanding of this we will now delve deeper into the literature on information processing, 
distribution and exchange. 
 
2.5 INFORMATION PROCESSING THEORY 
 
Information processing includes the collection, interpreting and synthesising of information (Tusman and 
Nadler, 1978). By information processing, organisations can utilise information in daily operations while 
simultaneously reducing their information requirements for future planning. These requirements are based 
upon the complexities of an organisation’s task and environment in which it operates (Daft and Lengel, 
1986). Hence, in order to achieve organisational performance, environmental conditions and organisational 
design features should be transformed into information processing capabilities (Rietjens et al., 2007). These 
processes are inherently important for organisations that encounter strategic and environmental conditions 
that are uncertain or ambiguous. According to Galbraith (1973) “the greater the uncertainty of the task, the 
greater the amount of information that has to be processed between decision-makers during the execution 
of the task. If the task is well understood prior to performing it, much of the activity can be pre-planned. If 
it is not understood, then during the actual task execution more knowledge is acquired which leads to 
changes in resource allocations, schedules and priorities. All these changes require information processing 
during task performance” (p. 28). Consequently, the degree of uncertainty determines an organisation’s 
ability for preventatively planning and decision-making. Following information processing theory, the 
degree of uncertainty and the volume of information which needs to be distributed are regarded as a cause 
and effect relationship. Thus, organisations that face considerable uncertainty require considerable amounts 
of information to be processed. Connecting Galbraith’s argument to stabilisation operations, we can expect 
that the extent to which the environmental conditions impact the predictability of stabilisation operations 
as complex systems are thus depending on information processing. Since stabilisation operations are 
characterised by an environment which is highly uncertain and ambiguous, large amounts of information 
needs to be processed between the various sub-systems as well as between multiple complex systems as part 
of the supra-system.  
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Organisations that are characterised by their strong hierarchical structure find difficulty in processing such 
large amounts of information (Rietjens, et al., 2007). Consequently, new design strategies are to be adopted 
to effectively coordinate daily operations. Galbraith (1973) introduced two organisation design strategies to 
better deal with uncertainty. First, an organisation can act with the intent of reducing the amount of 
information being processed. Conversely, they may act with the intent to increase its capacity to process 
information. Figure 2.9 illustrates the two organisation design strategies and their processes.   
 
Figure 2.9: Organisation design strategies. Source: adapted from Galbraith (1973). 
 
The amount of information being processed can be reduced through the creation of slack resources which 
in turn decrease the level of interdependence between sub-systems (March and Simon, 1985; Cyert and 
March, 1963). Slack resources ensure that the required amount of information remains inside the overall 
process storage of the whole organisation. Another method to lower the volume of information which needs 
to be distributed is by changing sub-system grouping from input-to output-based by providing the individual 
sub-systems with the organisational resources that are needed to provide the output. In other words, 
information processing is ensured through a clear division of labour and the creation of small autonomous 
groups. 
By contrast, information processing can be increased by investing in vertical information systems which 
subsequently allows for an increase in information processing capacity without creating an information 
overload the centralised (i.e. hierarchical) communication channels. The second method for increasing 
information processing is by establishing lateral relationships that cross-cut the centralised lines of 
bureaucracy. An important difference with the creation of self-contained tasks is that this method does not 
reorganises an organisation into self-contained groups (i.e. differentiation).  
 
2.6 CHAPTER SYNOPSIS 
 
In this chapter, we consecutively introduced the literature on stabilisation operations and systems thinking 
to illustrate the desirability to view stabilisation operations as complex systems. We subsequently presented 
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the literature on strategic management theory to illustrate the implications of systems thinking regarding the 
use of organisational resources, competencies and capabilities. Finally, the literature on information 
processing theory was presented to explain the function of information processing, distribution and 
exchange in organisations that are dealing with complex environmental conditions.  
In short, the answers presented in this chapter illustrate the knowledge gap for the strategic modelling of 
stabilisation operations and raise the need for an alternative with complex systems thinking to bridge the 
gap. The findings of this literature study form the foundation of the development of the initial conceptual 






Initial conceptual model 
 
“We realise, however, that all scientific laws merely represent abstractions and 
idealisations expressing certain aspects of reality. Every science means a 
schematised picture of reality, in the sense that a certain conceptual construct is 
unequivocally related to certain features of order in reality”. 





The literature review offered a more detailed insight of the theoretical constructs which form the fundament 
of the initial conceptual model. This model is used to structure the empirical part of this study. This chapter 
is organised as follows: after this introduction, we present the initial conceptual model. We then discuss the 
relevant theories which provide some background to the constructs, provide their definitions and conclude 
with the presentation of the preliminary propositions.  
 
3.2 THE FUNCTION OF THE INITIAL CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
As defined by Bacharach (1989), a theory “may be viewed as a system of constructs and variables” (p. 498). 
Theoretical constructs are more abstract and unobservable units, while variables, derived from the 
constructs, are observable units which can be operationalised through empirical research and measurement. 





Figure 3.1: Propositions and hypothesis. Source: adapted from Bacharach (1989). 
 
3.3 PRESENTING THE INITIAL CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
  
By presenting the initial conceptual model we illustrate the shift from linear thought processes towards 
complex systems thinking as an alternative for the strategic modelling of stabilisation operations. This 
alternative is to cope more effectively with the complexity of multi-actor interaction and supporting the 
debate over how much integration is feasible and desirable. Accordingly, the initial conceptual model is 
based upon complex systems modelling tools. More specifically, the initial conceptual model is based upon 
system dynamics theory which focuses on a system’s behaviour patterns and the underlying causal 
mechanisms, in contrast to discrete simulation which focuses on individual events. System dynamics finds 
its origin in the idea that non-linear behaviour of a complex system is a consequence of non-linear feedback 
controls (i.e. positive and negative feedback) (Forrester, 1961). These non-linear feedback controls can be 
the result of intentional choice (i.e. design) or determined by environmental demands. Moreover, system 
behaviour is found to be the result of the non-linear interaction between different feedback loops (Sterman, 
2000). By developing the final conceptual model following the principles of system dynamics we provide 
insight into the overall behaviour patterns of stabilisation operation as well as the possible manners by which 
their non-linear behaviour could be influenced.  
The conceptual model illustrates the impact of the complexity of the internal organisation and external 
environment on stabilisation operations as complex systems. The nature of these environmental conditions 
is constantly changing as well as its impact on the multi-actor interaction, thereby making it almost 
impossible for a single actor to comprehend the entire field of environmental conditions and ultimately their 
impact on the overalls system’s condition. Consequently, we view these systems as complex open systems 
with environmental conditions that are essentially non-linear and presenting one problem after another. In 
such complex open systems, each actor can display, independently, three alternative states of behaviour (i.e. 
stable, instable, or bounded instable) in response to these non-linear dynamics (Stacey, 1995). These states 
of behaviour, in turn, impact a system’s condition. 
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The non-linear feedback controls are argued to influence a system’s ability to respond to disturbances with 
a stabilising adjustment in order to guide or return a system to its desired state (i.e. negative feedback), or to 
amplify disturbances and thus move it further away from its point of origin (i.e. positive feedback). The 
decision to utilise one mechanism or the other is either the outcome of intentional choice (i.e. by design) or 
determined by environmental demands (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). In other words, non-linear feedback 
controls are the result of responses to uncertainty derived from the environmental conditions. 
A system’s response to uncertainty derived from the environmental conditions is inherently depending on 
the mechanism of information processing, distribution and exchange (Galbraith, 1974), thereby making 
information feedback the key organising concept through which these systems differentiate and integrate. 
A system’s self-organising ability to differentiate and integrate its sub-systems, organisational resources and 
competencies influences the development of condition-dependent capabilities: whereas sub-system 
capabilities are those derived from a state of differentiation within a single system (i.e. a single sub-system 
effort), system capabilities are those derived from a state of integration within a single system (i.e. a single 
system effort), while supra-system capabilities are derived from a state of integration within the supra-system 
(i.e. efforts from two or more systems in a relationship).  
A system’s self-organising ability to develop condition-dependent capabilities positively influences the 
attainment of outcomes since we expect that self-organisation (i.e. the decision to utilise one mechanism or 
the other) fits best to the uncertainty derived from the environmental conditions. The initial conceptual 





Figure 3.2: The initial conceptual model. 
 
3.4 THE CONSTRUCTS AND THEIR DEFINITIONS 
  
In this part, we describe the theoretical foundations of the initial conceptual model. The theoretical 
foundation has a multi-disciplinary character and includes systems theory, complexity theory, strategic 
management theory and information processing theory. The literature on complexity and systems theory 
explains how the environmental conditions impact a system’s condition. The combination of literature on 
complex systems, strategic management literature and information processing theory is to support the 
conceptualisation of a systems self-organising ability to use differentiation and integration to develop 
condition-dependent capabilities. These capabilities, in turn, potentially can positively support the 
attainment of outcomes. We will now briefly discuss and provide definitions of the constructs of the 
conceptual model. 
3.4.1 Uncertainty and the impact on a system’s condition 
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In this study, we focus on the complexity and uncertainty derived from the environmental conditions and 
their impact on a system’s condition. The internal organisation explains a system’s internal processes, thus, 
impacting its condition from inside the system boundary. By contrast, the external environment consists of 
external factors that impact a system from outside the system boundary (North, 1990; Meyer, 1994; Lee et 
al., 2006; Hutzschenreuter and Israel, 2009; Carney and Gedajlovic, 2011). Hence, we study the impact of 
the uncertainty derived from the environmental conditions on a system’s condition as a cause and effect 
relationship. 
3.4.2 Self-organisation through differentiation and integration 
A system’s required ability to react to the impact and rate of change of the uncertainty derived from the 
environmental conditions is depending on mechanisms of information processing, distribution and 
exchange (Galbraith, 1974). As a result, we propose information feedback as the key organising concept 
through which these systems differentiate and integrate their subsystems, organisational resources and 
competencies (i.e. changing conditions trigger organisational adaptations). However, differentiation and 
integration might not be observed without the support of enabling conditions. First, a system must consist 
of sub-systems that are compatible, that is the feasibility of the relationship. Second, in order to integrate, 
actors must display an integration effort. That is, the desirability of the relationship. We argue that 
compatibility and integration efforts are determined by non-linear feedback mechanisms that will result in 
unpredictable emergent behaviour.  
3.4.3 Condition-dependent capabilities 
In this study, we introduce the development of sub-system, system and supra-system capabilities through 
self-organisation as condition-dependent capabilities (i.e. new organisational forms emerge and adapt). Sub-
system capabilities are the high-level practices which belong to the organisational resources and 
competencies of a single sub-system. In other words, a single system is differentiated into several distinct 
sub-systems. System capabilities are the high-level routines (or a collection of routines) that are formed 
through the relationships between the organisational resources and competencies of multiple sub-systems. 
Hence, a single system is integrated. Supra-system capabilities are the high-level routines (or a collection of 
routines) that are formed through the relationships between organisational resources and competencies 
from two or more systems, that is, they are integrated. 
3.4.4 Outcomes 
We differentiate between two types of outcomes that could be obtained by condition-dependent capabilities, 
namely strategic or operational (Subramani, 2004; Graighead et al., 2006). However, stabilisation operations 
often deal with ‘wicked problems’ (Rietjens and De Waard, 2017). Rittel and Weber (1973) define ‘wicked 
problems’ as “problems that are ill-defined, several, conflicting criteria for solution definition, solutions 
which create further problems and no obvious indications of when enough has been achieved (p. 155). 
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Thus, although we argue that condition-dependent capabilities positively impact the generated outcomes, 
they will be ill-defined and difficult to measure. The definition of each construct is presented in table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Constructs and their definitions. 
 Construct  Definition References 
Internal organisation Factors inside a system’s boundary that 
impact its condition. 
Duncan, 1972; Draft et al., 1988; 
Worley and Lawler, 2010 
External environment Factors outside a system’s boundary that 
impact its condition. 
Duncan, 1972; Draft et al., 1988; 
Worley and Lawler, 2010 
A system’s condition The class of behaviours in which actors 





A system’s ability to apply the factors of 
differentiation and integration as a 
response to the environmental conditions. 
Goldstein (1999) 
Ability to differentiate The state in which the organisational 
system is differentiated into sub-systems, 
each of which displaying particular 
behaviour in relationship to the 
environmental conditions. 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) 
Ability to integrate The state in which the organisational 
system is integrated and displaying 
particular behaviour in relationship to its 
environmental conditions. 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) 
Condition-dependent 
capabilities 
High-level routines that are formed 
through the self-organising ability of a 
system to differentiate or integrate. 
Amit and Schoemaker (1993) 
Hamel and Prahalad, 1994) 
Teece et al., (1997) 
Orlikowski (2000) 
Nevo and Wade (2011) 
Outcomes The outcomes generated from the 
deployment of condition-dependent 
capabilities. 
Subramani, 2004;  
Graighead et al., 2006 
 
 
3.5 PRELIMINARY PROPOSITIONS  
 
This section presents the propositions which are based on the relationships between the constructs (table 
3.1) as illustrated in the initial conceptual model (figure 3.2)  
 
3.5.1 Uncertainty and the impact on a system’s condition 
Most of the literature on organisation design argues that complexity, unpredictability, and instability of the 
external environment seems to have outpaced traditional organisation design approaches and concepts 
(Duncan, 1972; Draft et al., 1988; Worley and Lawler, 2010). Indeed, stabilisation operations take place in a 
highly complex, dynamic and uncertain environment from which it cannot be isolated, thereby influencing 
a system’s condition from outside the system’s boundary (i.e. the external environment). However, as we 
have learned throughout this study, stabilisation operations require a highly differentiated as well as 
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integrated organisational system with interaction between the actors of its sub-systems. These interactions 
relate to a broad range of issues, take place under complex and uncertain conditions, with each interaction 
following its own pace dictated by its specific conditions. Hence, stabilisation operations can be thought of 
as complex systems formed around various distinct sub-systems that are interacting in a non-linear way, in 
turn influencing a system’s condition from inside the system’s boundary (i.e. the internal organisation). Thus, 
stabilisation operations are heavily impacted by the uncertainty derived from the environmental conditions. 
In this study, we define internal and external uncertainty as the lack of complete information in regards to 
what exists and what developments may occur in the environmental conditions, and their subsequent impact 
on a system’s condition. In other words, the impact of uncertainty on the predictability of a system’s 
condition can be seen as a cause and effect relationship. 
Internal and external uncertainty can be divided in two categories, namely complexity and change. Internal 
and external complexity relate to the number of issues to which stabilisation operations must attend and the 
degree to which they are interconnected. Internal and external change relate to the degree of discontinuous 
unintentional change that occurs within a stabilisation operation and in its environment. Furthermore, 
internal and external uncertainty can be categorised in four distinct domains (Duncan, 1972). Figure 3.3 
illustrates the four dimensions and corresponding levels of internal and external uncertainty. 
 
Figure 3.3: Internal and external uncertainty (Duncan, 1972). 
 
To provide a more detailed conceptualisation of a system’s condition we apply the Cynefin framework 
(Snowden, 2002). The framework (see figure 3.4) consists of three main domains (i.e. ordered, unordered 
and disordered) that reflect the different relationships between causes and effects and derivative ways of 
practices. For every domain, the framework presents a different form of behaviour which then implies for 
different forms of connections.  
The ordered domain distinguishes two types of situations. First, it describes a situation in which the cause 
and effect relationship is “simple” for systems. In other words, cause and effect relationships are self-evident 
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and systems should be able to use them to forecast. According to the Cynefin framework, the expected 
approach to this situation is that of Sense – Categorise – Respond (SCR) followed by the application of best 
practices with their strong central connections and weak distributed ones. Second, it describes a situation in 
which cause and effect are “complicated”. Thus, with sufficient time, information and resources, actors 
should be able to comprehend cause and effect and apply it to forecasting. An expected approach in this 
situation is to Sense – Analyse – Respond (SAR), followed by the application of good practices characterised 
by both strong central and distributed connections. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Cynefin framework (Snowden, 2002). 
 
The unordered domain distinguishes in two types of situation as well. In the “complex” situation, it is not 
feasible to determine cause and effect ex-ante. However, as events evolve actors may be able to understand 
how they were initiated, that is, ex-post. Consequently, such situation requires a Probe – Sense – Respond 
(PSR) approach which allows for the development of emergent practices characterised by their weak central 
and strong distributed connections. Second, the “chaotic” situation illustrates a situation in which it is not 
feasible to determine cause and effect at all, nor can the actors fully explain what happened even after a 
major event took place. Thus, central and distributed connections are expected to be both weak and thus 
result in a state of isolation. By taking Act – Sense – Respond (ASR) as an approach so-called novel practices 
are discovered.  
The last domain of the Cynefin framework is that of disorder and describes a system’s condition as 
destructive. Hence, any form of practice is inapplicable. According to Snowden (2002) this is a potentially 
dangerous situation which requires immediate action: “while problems may legitimately be allowed to exist 
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in the other four domains if approached with suitable solutions, those in states of disorder are normally 
harmful and should be guided into one of the other domains” (p. 8).  
Taken together we suggest that: 
Proposition 1a:   
The uncertainty derived from the internal organisation impacts the predictability of a system’s condition. 
Proposition 1b:    
The uncertainty derived from the external environment impacts the predictability of a system’s condition. 
 
3.5.2 Self-organisation through integration and differentiation 
In complex closed systems, in a state of being isolated from its environment and operating deterministically, 
actors follow the non-linear feedback loops and, therefore, can decide to either conform to (compliance), 
vary or ignore (resistance) to uncertainty derived from the internal organisation  (Wiener, 1948; von 
Bertalanffy, 1968; Lee et al., 2006). The result of an actor’s individual decision, however, is inter-related with 
those of others in the system. Actors that follow the negative feedback loop demonstrate stable behaviour 
and subsequently comply with uncertainty derived from the internal organisation. This results in a system 
that evolves into the ordered conditions. Conversely, in a system where actors follow the positive feedback 
loop, they demonstrate instable behaviour by deciding to vary or even ignore uncertainty derived from the 
internal organisation. Consequently, the system will settle down into unordered or, more dangerously, 
disordered conditions (Wiener, 1948; Ashby, 1956; von Bertalanffy, 1968).  
For complex open systems, characterised by a certain degree of interaction with its external environment 
and operating at most probabilistically, the actors either conform to (compliance), vary or ignore (resistance) 
to uncertainty derived from the internal organisation as well as the external environment (Capra, 1992; Gell-
Mann, 1994; Holland, 1995; Kauffman, 1995). Moreover, uncertainty derived from the external 
environment can have an impact on the nature and change of uncertainty derived from the internal 
organisation (Hutzschenreuter and Israel, 2009). Uncertainty derived from the internal organisation can 
potentially be controlled by management or other means. By contrast, uncertainty derived from the external 
environment comes from outside the system’s boundary and is uncontrollable (Epstein et al., 2012). As a 
result, the behaviour of the actors can be stable, instable or both. Stacey (1995) defines this type of behaviour 
as bounded instability. Systems that demonstrate bounded instable behaviour utilise both positive and 
negative feedback simultaneously, alternating autonomously from one to the other. According to Bousquet 
(2009) this type of systems have “a sensitive dependency on initial conditions, that is the non-proportionality 
of cause to effect or input to output” (p. 171). To summarise, the actors in a complex closed system can 
either demonstrate stable (compliance) or instable (resistance) behaviour, in turn, settling a system into an 
ordered or unordered condition respectively. Thus, we could say that the predictability of the actors’ 
behaviour (stable or instable) leads to determined (ordered or unordered) outcomes. For complex open 
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systems, the actors’ behaviour is bounded instable (both stable and unstable), in turn impacting a system’s 
condition in a non-linear manner.  
As highlighted by Bousquet (2009) systems which demonstrate bounded instable behaviour by utilising non-
linear feedback controls have a sensitive dependency on initial conditions. This specifically applies to the 
element of time since an actor’s decision to either demonstrate stable (compliance) or instable (resistance) 
behaviour has a sensitive dependence to the time it requires for an actor to react to the uncertainty derived 
from the internal organisation as well as the external environment (Capra, 1992; Gell-Mann, 1994; Holland, 
1995; Kauffman, 1995). Following the literature on complexity theory and information processing theory, 
it becomes clear that the longer it takes for a stabilisation operation to acquire information from either 
outside the system boundary (i.e. external environment) or from its own behaviour within the system’s 
boundary (i.e. internal organisation) and in relationship to its environment, the more likely the information 
becomes obsolete (Gell-Mann, 1994; Holland, 1995; Heylighen, 1996; Moffat, 2003). Figure 3.5 illustrates a 
system’s sensitive dependence to the element of time in regards to its response to the uncertainty derived 
from the environmental conditions. 
 
Figure 3.5: A system’s sensitive dependence to the element of time in regards to its response to the uncertainty 
derived from the environmental conditions. 
 
To summarise, stabilisation operations are understood as complex open systems composed of multiple sub-
systems that interact in a non-linear fashion, in turn impacting a system’s condition from inside the system’s 
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boundary. Furthermore, stabilisation operations take place in a highly complex, dynamic and uncertain 
environment from which it cannot be isolated, thus impacting a system’s condition from outside the 
system’s boundary. Moreover, the highly complex, dynamic and uncertain environment impacts the nature 
and change of the internal organisation. Therefore, we expect that the systems demonstrate bounded 
instable behaviour (i.e. non-linear feedback mechanism) resulting in the dynamic equilibrium of a system’s 
condition. This behaviour is partly the outcome of intentional choice (i.e. design) and partly determined by 
environmental conditions. 
Therefore, we propose that:  
Proposition 2:   
The dynamic equilibrium of a system’s condition is expected to positively impact its required self-organising 
ability. 
 
From an organisational perspective, complex systems consist of formal and informal organisations. To 
better understand the self-organising ability of complex open systems, we need to make a distinction 
between these two types of organisations. A formal organisation focuses on executing daily operations as 
efficiently as possible in order to attain the organisation’s goals. Therefore, a formal organisation operates 
according to well-defined command and control structures (Gulati and Puranam, 2009). To sustain its 
interest of efficiency, a formal system is meant to resist change (Stacey, 1995). As a result, a formal 
organisation can be found in the ordered conditions of “simple” and “complicated”. An informal 
organisation is best described as an organisation formed within the formal organisation as a network of 
interpersonal relationships focusing on norms, values and beliefs (Chan, 2002). Both organisations are thus 
driven by negative feedback controls which generates stable and predictable behaviour. In other words, the 
formal and informal organisation reinforce each other so that the whole system will settle into ordered 
conditions. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) explain this phenomenon as the powerful factor of integration 
“which is the process of achieving unity of effort among the various sub-systems in the accomplishment of 
the organisation’s task” (p. 4).  
Simultaneous from a complex open system’s behaviour to settle into the ordered conditions, the powerful 
factor of differentiation pulls the system in a state of segmentation in which the various sub-systems develop 
specific (behavioural) characteristics in relationship to its environmental conditions (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967). Differentiation is thus driven by positive feedback behaviour (Argyris, 1990). Differentiation that 
impacts the formal system could potentially lead to unordered conditions (Miller, 1990). However, the 
impact of differentiation is much greater on the informal system as Stacey (1995) explains: “informal systems 
are a vehicle not only for securing conformity but also for satisfying human desires for excitement and 
innovation, isolation from their environment, aggression, and individuality (p. 485). Informal systems 
demonstrating such behaviour could potentially settle the whole system into disordered conditions.   
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According to Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) an organisation could be seen as “a system of interrelated 
behaviours of people who are performing a task that has been differentiated into several distinct sub-
systems, each sub-system performing a portion of the task, and the efforts of each being integrated to 
achieve effective performance of the system” (p. 3). Thus, the behaviour of a system should simultaneously 
be driven by positive and negative feedback mechanisms, resulting in ordered and unordered conditions. 
Waldrop (1992) defines conditions that balance between order and disorder as complexity: “right between 
the two extremes [of order and chaos], at a kind of abstract phase transition called “the edge of chaos”, you 
also find complexity: a class of behaviours in which the components of a system never quite lock into place, 
yet never quite dissolve into turbulence, either. These are the systems that are both stable enough to store 
information, and yet evanescent enough to transmit it. These are the systems that can be organised to 
perform complex computations, to react to the world, to be spontaneous, adaptive, and alive” (p. 293). This 
definition of complexity supports the information processing theory from Galbraith (1973) which claims 
that the degree of uncertainty combined with amount of information to be distributed are to be regarded as 
a non-linear cause and effect relationship.  
To summarise, from an organisational perspective, the formal organisation needs to demonstrate stable 
behaviour, securing conformity to the well-defined hierarchical structures, rules and procedures in order to 
conduct daily operations (i.e. driven by negative feedback). Conversely, the informal organisation can 
potentially demonstrate instable behaviour, promoting change and adaptation to uncertainty derived from 
the environmental conditions (i.e. driven by positive feedback). In sum, for a system to be changeable it 
needs to operate in a state of bounded instability driven by non-linear feedback controls.  
Connecting these theoretical findings to the Cynefin framework (Snowden, 2002) and the two organisation 
design strategies presented by Galbraith (1973), we expect that systems that find themselves in the ordered 
situation of “simple” are mainly driven by negative feedback controls within both the formal and informal 
organisation. As a result, a single system is expected to be integrated (i.e. strongly centralised) whilst the 
supra-system will be differentiated (i.e. weakly distributed). Moreover, due to the low-level of uncertainty 
systems are required to process small amounts of information. Hence, we expect an organisation to act 
according to strict governance procedures (i.e. low uncertainty). In the situation of “complicated” we 
propose to find systems whose formal organisation is mainly driven by negative feedback controls while 
their informal organisation is expected to be mainly driven by positive feedback controls. Hence, we expect 
to find a single system to be integrated (i.e. strongly centralised) as well as integration within the supra-
system (i.e. strongly distributed). In addition, we expect that more information is required to be processed 
since cause and effect relationships are “complicated”, which means that with sufficient time, information 
and resources, actors should be able to understand these relationships and use them to forecast. Therefore, 
we expect to find both an increase in information processing capacity through the investment in vertical 
information systems (i.e. strong centralised) as through the creation of lateral relationships (i.e. strong 
distributed).  
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Those systems that find themselves in the unordered situation (i.e. far from equilibrium) of “complex” are 
expected to be mainly driven by positive feedback controls and hence are expected to be integrated with 
other systems as part of the supra-system (i.e. weak centralised and strong distributed). Moreover, large 
amounts of information need to be processed to deal with the high degree of uncertainty and rate of change 
by which the “complex” situation is characterised. Thus, we expect to find an increase in information 
processing capacity through the creation of lateral relations (i.e. strong distributed). For systems who find 
themselves in the “chaotic” situation the Cynefin framework argues for both weak centralised and 
distributed connections. Therefore, we expect that both the formal and informal organisation are driven by 
chaotic feedback controls and focus on novel practices. Thus, the systems are expected to be isolated from 
each other. In order to deal with the high-level uncertainty (i.e. unclear cause and effect relationships) we 
expect to find systems that focus either on the reduction of information processing needs or on an increase 
in information processing capacity.  
The systems that are facing the disordered domain are expected to remain the status quo until they are pushed 
into one of the other domains by self-organisation or management efforts. 
Taken together, we suggest that: 
Proposition 3:  
A system in dynamic equilibrium is expected to be mainly driven by non-linear feedback controls, thereby 
enabling its required self-organising ability to either differentiate or integrate. 
 
Figure 3.6 offers an illustration of the above propositions added to the Cynefin framework. 
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Figure 3.6: Proposition 2 and 3 added to the Cynefin framework. 
  
3.5.3 Condition-dependent capabilities 
At the core of the conceptual model presented in section 3.2 lies the concept of a system’s self-organising 
ability to either differentiate or integrate its sub-systems, organisational resources and competencies, 
subsequently resulting in the development of condition-dependent capabilities (i.e. new organisational forms 
which emerge and adapt). Amit and Schoemaker (1993) define organisational resources as “stocks of 
available factors that are owned or controlled by the firm” (p. 35). Competencies refer to “a firm’s capacity 
to deploy resources, usually in combination, using organisational processes, to effect a desired end” (p. 35) 
and are therefore defined as “…a bundle of skills and technologies rather than a single, discrete skill or 
technology” (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994, p. 202). Capabilities, in turn, refer the use and deployment of these 
competencies in order to attain organisational objectives (McGrath et al., 1995; Teece et al., 1997).  
Condition-dependent capabilities include sub-system, system and supra-system capabilities. Sub-system 
capabilities are the high-level routines that are formed through the relationships between the organisational 
resources and competencies from a single sub-system. System capabilities are the high-level routines (or a 
collection of routines) that are formed through the relationships between the organisational resources and 
competencies of multiple sub-systems. Supra-system capabilities are the high-level routines (or a collection 
of routines) comprised of two or more organisational resources and competencies in a relationship. From a 
system’s perspective, supra-system capabilities are intentionally developed (i.e. by design) or emergent 
capabilities (i.e. emergence and self-organisation) that are possessed by neither one of the contributing 
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systems in isolation, nor already existing capabilities with previously unattainable values (Nevo and Wade, 
2010). 
The outcomes derived from the development of supra-system capabilities can be negative, neutral, or 
positive (Orlikowski, 2000). This is actor dependent (Churchman, 1971). In other words, supra-system 
capabilities can serve the purpose of a certain actor (i.e. positive) while failing to do so for another actor (i.e. 
negative). Nevo and Wade (2011) suggest that the development of emergent capabilities are determined by 
a system’s goal. Ackoff (1971) defines a system’s goal as “a preferred outcome that can be obtained within 
a specific time period” (p. 666). Since we expect that the various systems share the common goal of 
stabilisation and recovery, we consider the development of emergent capabilities as positive emergent 
capabilities. However, although the systems share the common goal of stabilisation, the development of 
emergent capabilities could be hampered when the ex-ante assessment indicates that interaction is either not 
feasible or desirable, or both. This results in the development of system capabilities or even sub-system 
capabilities when the relationships within a single system are neither feasible nor desirable, or both.  
Hence, we propose the following: 
Proposition 4:   
A system’s self-organising ability to differentiate and integrate positively impacts the development of 
condition-dependent capabilities.  
 
3.5.4 Outcomes 
We differentiate between two types of outcomes that could be obtained by condition-dependent capabilities, 
namely strategic or operational (Subramani, 2004; Graighead et al., 2006). However, stabilisation operations 
often deal with ‘ill-structured’ problems (Rietjens and De Waard, 2017), as opposed to ‘structured problems’ 
(Dunn, 2012). Rittel and Weber (1973) made the distinction between ‘tame’ and ‘wicked problems’, whereas 
the latter are “problems that are ill-defined, several, conflicting criteria for solution definition, solutions 
which create further problems and no obvious indications of when enough has been achieved (p. 155). 
‘Wicked problems’ are characterised by the number of actors involved. While actors share a common goal, 
they often must cope with extreme cultural differences causing daily friction and behave strategically to 
maximise their own interests and subscribe to different priorities (Enserink et al., 2010). Consequently, the 
many actors involved may not agree on what the main problem is, may subscribe to different priorities and 
preferences for particular solutions. Moreover, any one of these multiple actors may change its views over 
time. Thus, although we argue that condition-dependent capabilities positively impact the generated 
outcomes they will be ill-defined, impacts will be difficult to measure and actor dependent. 
Proposition 5: 
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The development of condition-dependent capabilities positively impact the attainment of outcomes, yet, 
policy impacts will be difficult to measure and actor dependent. 
3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
The insights gained from the presentation of the initial conceptual model enables us to better structure the 
empirical part of this study. By identifying the constructs that are relevant for this study, providing their 
definitions and concluding with the presentation and justification of the initial propositions we offer an 
initial design to cope more effectively with the complexity of multi-actor interaction during stabilisation 
operations. 
As described in chapter 1, this study combines two research methods of solution-orientated research, namely 
design science (Romme, 2003; Hevner et al., 2004) and case study research (Yin, 2014). Design science has 
the goal of creating knowledge (i.e. design artefact) that practitioners can apply to gain understanding of 
real-world problems and their potential solutions (Hevner et al., 2004). Moreover, since this process is 
iterative it should be repeated several times. Hence, the evaluation of the design artefact is realised through 
the application of the initial conceptual model to two case studies. Each case study is considered a single 
iteration including the analysis of the identified problem, application of the conceptual model to the 
respective case, generate findings and recommendations for design improvement. Ultimately, the conceptual 
model will be finalised and introduces complex systems thinking as an alternative for the strategic modelling 
of stabilisation operations to cope more effectively with the complexity of multi-actor interaction and 
supporting the debate over the extent to which integration is feasible and desirable. 
Before we can examine the findings from the two real-world case studies it is essential to take a detailed 
look into the research methodology and design applied to analyse the conceptual model. The combination 






“All I’m armed with is research”. 





In chapter 3 we introduced the initial conceptual model for this study and presented the preliminary 
propositions. The aim of this chapter is to offer a detailed insight of the research method applied to evaluate 
the initial conceptual model. By describing the research method, readers can read through the narrative of 
the research method and thereby offering the potential to recreate this study. In addition, this chapter also 
describes the methodological justification of the research methodology selected for this study.  
This chapter will continue as follows. In 4.2 we provide an overview of the research design and explain its 
relationship to complexity and systems theory as well as information systems (IS) research. The outline of 
the empirical part of this dissertation, namely the data collection and analysis of the two case studies, is 
described in section 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. We conclude in section 4.5 by explaining the research quality 
of this research. 
 
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
4.2.1 Design science research 
Research paradigms. The field of systems theory and IS research can be characterised by two main 
paradigms, namely behavioural science and design science. Behavioural science is focused on adding value 
to the human or organisational behaviour knowledge base through the development and verification of 
theories. As described by Hevner et al. (2004) design science goes a step further and seeks “to extend the 
boundaries of human and organisational boundaries by creating new and innovative artefacts” (p. 75). Both 
research paradigms are closely related to complexity and systems theory as well as IS research since the field 
is a conflux of people, organisations and technology and are illustrated in figure 4.1. However, an important 
distinction needs to be made. Behavioural science is aims to explain or predict certain phenomena in 
relationship to the research gap. Design science takes a different approach by seeking to fulfil the research 
gap by the building and designing of artefacts. In other words, whereas the goal of the former is ‘seeking 
the truth’, the goal of the latter is utility. According to Hevner et al. (2004) design science is particularly 
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relevant in studies which address so-called ‘wicked problems’ which are “problems that are ill-defined, 
several, conflicting criteria for solution definition, solutions which create further problems and no obvious 
indications of when enough has been achieved (Rittel and Weber, p. 155). Hence, we selected the design 
science paradigm for this study by which we aim to gain a better insight of the identified research objectives 
and their potential solutions through the development and evaluation of the design artefact, namely the 
initial conceptual model which we have described in the previous chapter.  
 
Figure 4.1: Information Systems Research Framework. Source: adapted from Hevner et al. (2004). 
 
Design process. Design science consists of two main elements, namely a process (evaluation) and a product 
(conceptual model) (Walls et al., 1992; Romme, 2003; Hevner et al., 2004). The process can be regarded as 
an expert activity or sets of expert activities that aims at developing the product, namely the design artefact. 
By constantly alternating between processes and artefact, design science supports complex problem solving. 
In other words, once the artefact is designed it will provide information feedback over both the artefact 
itself as well as the process. This process can be viewed of as circular and should be repeated several times 
in order to enable the development of the final model (Markus et al., 2002). 
Following March and Smith (1995) two distinct processes, namely development and evaluation can be 
distinguished Design artefacts are built to solve the identified problem and subsequently evaluated in 
relationship to the utility provided by the design artefact as solution to the respected problem. Additionally, 
four design artefacts, namely constructs, models, methods and instantiations were identified. Problems and 
solutions are defined and explained by using constructs (Schön, 1983), whereas conceptual models intent to 
represent the research problem as well as its potential solution as a ‘real world’ situation (Simon, 1996). 
Methods are used to offer guidelines for exploring the solution space in order to solve the problem. Finally, 
instantiations are illustrating the feasibility of a design artefact by enabling an ex-post assessment of the design 
artefacts utility (Hevner et al., 2004). In this study, we applied design science for a very specific and unique 
purpose, namely defining and evaluating a theory for multi-actor interaction during stabilisation operations. 
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By defining a set of ground rules we intend to facilitate a focused discussion about the strategic modelling 
of stabilisation operations from a complex systems perspective. 
Guidelines for design science. By now we understand that design science is a process that aims for 
problem-solving. In order to support these processes, Hevner et al. (2004) presented seven guidelines that 
are fundamentally inter-related to “the knowledge and understanding of a design problem and its solution 
that are acquired in the building and application of an artefact (p. 82). Table 4.1 illustrates the seven 
guidelines and offers a description for each of them. 
Table 4.1: Design science research guidelines. Source: adapted from Hevner et al. (2004). 
Guideline Description 
Design as an artefact Design science research must produce a viable artefact in the form of a construct, a 
model, a method, or an instantiation.  
Problem relevance The objective of design science research is to develop technology-based solutions to 
important and relevant business problems. 
Design evaluation The utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artefact must be rigorously 
demonstrated via well-executed evaluation methods. 
Research contributions Effective design science research must provide clear and verifiable contributions in 
the areas of the design artefact, design foundations, and/or design methodologies. 
Research rigor Design science research relies upon the application of rigorous methods in both the 
construction and evaluation of the design artefact. 
Design as search process The search for an effective artefact requires utilising available means to reach 
desired ends while satisfying laws in the problem environment. 
 
 
4.2.2 Case study research 
The explorative character of this research is best supported by a qualitative research design. This type of 
research design can offer insights of the behaviour of actors and the way their inter-relationships emerge 
and evolve (Teijlingen, 2014). These phenomena are descriptive in nature and hence difficult to quantify 
(Hove and Anda, 2005; Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). Moreover, a qualitative research strategy is argued to 
help better understand detailed and contextual data (van der Kuijt, 2013). Since we view stabilisation 
operations as complex open systems characterised by its uncertain environmental conditions, we propose a 
qualitative research design as best suitable for this specific research objective.  
In line with the qualitative research design, an appropriate research method needs to be developed. 
According to Yin (2014) there are 4 conditions that offer an indication if case study research is a suitable 
design: 
1. The research is characterised by a research question that can be defined as “how” or “why” 
question; 
2. It is not feasible to manipulate the behaviour of the participants; 
3. The contextual characteristics of the research are very relevant; 
4. One deals with unclear boundaries between the context and phenomena. 
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This study aims at the analysis of the conceptual model and therefore should be conducted in the context 
where it operates. In other words, this study does not require to control the environment and thus can be 
conducted in a non-contrived setting. Hence, selecting real-world case studies is best suited to match this 
criteria. For this study, case study research is the primary source to collect empirical evidence that enables 
us to evaluate the initial conceptual model. Following design science research, it is important to select 
suitable case studies that will correspond with the research objective of this study (Baxter and Jack, 2008). 
With respect to presenting complexity and systems thinking as an alternative for the strategic modelling of 
stabilisation operations, the case studies are explanatory and descriptive. When applied to the case studies, 
the conceptual model explores and describes how to cope more effectively with the complexity of multi-
actor interaction during stabilisation operations and supports the debate over the extent to which integration 
is feasible and desirable. 
Following Yin (2014), we adopted a multiple case study design that enables researchers to identify 
differences within and between different cases. For the purpose of literal replication (i.e. generalisability), 
we applied the conceptual model to two cases. By exploring complex systems thinking as an alternative for 
the strategic modelling in different cases enables us to compare different settings and gaps in the conceptual 
model. 
4.2.3 Unit of analysis 
When applying systems theory, it is important to be precise in determining the system boundaries as well as 
the level of analysis. According to Kast and Rosenzweig (1972) “there is a tendency for writers in 
organisational theory to accept general systems theory and then move indiscriminately across systems 
boundaries and between levels of systems without being very precise” (p. 455). The need for the clear 
delineation of the level of analysis when applying systems theory is further stressed by Miller (1965) “it is 
important to follow one procedural rule in systems theory in order to avoid confusion. Every discussion 
should begin with an identification of the level of reference, and the discourse should not change to another 
level without a specific statement that this is occurring” (p. 216). 
In this study we defined the complex system as the primary unit of analysis in this study. In other words, 
the complex interactions of the many actors involved in stabilisation operations whose efforts are to be 
integrated in order to achieve unity of effort. As we learned in chapter 2, a complex system is formed around 
various distinct sub-systems. Conversely, a complex system is to be part of a larger supra-system (Scott, 
1961; Simon, 1969; Banathy, 1992). 
In this study we view stabilisation operations as complex systems differentiated into various sub-systems 
and part of a supra-system. Hence, the unit of analysis is twofold: first, we focus on the multi-actor 
interaction between the sub-systems of a stabilisation operation (i.e. within a single system). Second, we 
study the multi-actor interaction between a stabilisation operation and the other systems as part of the 
greater supra-system. 
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4.3 DATA COLLECTION 
 
4.3.1 Case study: Task Force Uruzgan 
The objective for the first case study is twofold. First, it serves as the first analysis of the initial conceptual 
model. Additionally, the results derived from the content analysis are used to complement the theoretical 
understanding of the preliminary propositions which illustrate the causal relationships between the 
constructs. Following Yin’s (2014) case study approach, we applied the initial conceptual model to the first 
case study of multi-actor interaction and information processing, namely within the Task Force Uruzgan 
(TFU) a sub-component of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and between the TFU and 
actors involved in Afghanistan. Out of the great number of stabilisation operations conducted at the time 
of this study, we selected the TFU mission because it included a large coalition and had a clear integrated 
and comprehensive approach as organisational design (NATO, 2008). The TFU mission was operational 
between 2006 and 2010.  
The characteristics of the case study were: 
 Presenting a general analysis of the conceptual model; 
 The interviewees should have been actively engaged in the TFU; 
 The interviewees should be familiar with the organisational design and information processing of 
the TFU. 
The characteristics of the TFU case study are presented in table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Characteristics of the TFU case study. 
Case study Distinctive feature 
of case study 
Participating 
sub-system 




































To develop a comprehensive understanding of the phenomena investigated, data collection relied on 
multiple sources (see table 4.3). First, various documents including operations orders, after action reviews, 
daily and weekly TFU Headquarters (TFU HQ) reports, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) project 
information and liaison reports with detailed information on the TFU were studied. This provided us some 
greater insight into the environmental conditions of the mission.  
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Subsequently the interview protocol was developed. Interview data is a common source in qualitative case 
study research (Sekeran and Bougie, 2013; Yin, 2014). Such data is considered valuable since it includes the 
experiences (i.e. stories, opinions and actions) of the respondents. Hence, interview data and particularly 
when collected during a field trip is regarded as a rich and unique form of qualitative data (Hove and Anda, 
2005). When conducting interviews, it is critical to understand that collecting the data is a mere interpretation 
of the respondent’s vision of the real world (Yin, 2014). Hence, the data collected could be characterised by 
a certain level of response bias. To reduce the risk of bias entering the data triangulation is used. The 
application of triangulation will be discussed in section 4.5. 
In this study, we used semi-structured interviews that typically include many open questions (Hove and 
Anda, 2005). The purpose of an interview protocol is to give some form of structure and direction to the 
interview. However, since we were interested to hear the experiences of the respondents, semi-structured 
interviews were applied the TFU case study. We conducted the interviews in isolation, that is, they were 
taken place in a situation where both the interviewer and the interviewee were solely present in one physical 
location. The interviews were audio-recorded and held in English. 
An important aspect of research is source protection. This is particularly relevant when studying stabilisation 
operations that are known for their high-level of confidentiality. Therefore, we try to keep the respondents 
as anonymous as possible. Consequently, quotes are solely traceable back to the respective sub-system and 
a functional position, not an individual. Source protection is also applied in the data analyses. We labelled 
each respondent by its given job description which was then used as the primary identification factor in the 
coding process. 
The interview questions were developed upon the insights gained from the literature review and document 
analysis, and were derived to the preliminary propositions of the initial conceptual model. Thus, we applied 
a relatively tight, more deductive approach by working with well-delineated constructs with the purpose of 
providing clarity and focus (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Shields and Rangarajan, 2013). Conversely, while 
conducting the semi-structured interviews we developed new insights into the domain of study which were 
highly valuable for explanation building. Those insights were added to the development of the conceptual 
model (i.e. derived from the environment) which materialised slowly but surely in the course of this study. 
In other words, we applied a more semi-structured, grounded theory approach to the data collection (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994. This intermediate approach, which combines a pre-structured as well as a loose and 
emergent approach is known as abduction (Richardson and Kramer, 2006). 
After reviewing and testing the initial version of the interview protocol several improvements were made. 
The final version of the interview protocol can be found in appendix A2. We conducted a total of 25 in-
depth interviews with representatives of the TFU’s sub-systems (appendix A1). The participants were 
selected based on their seniority and the nature of their responsibilities in the various sub-systems of the 
TFU. The interviews were held in the period from November 2014 and October 2015 and took place in the 
Netherlands, Germany and France. 
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Table 4.3: Data collection 
Source of data collection Expected output 
 
 
Semi-structured interviews with representatives of the 
TFU’s sub-systems 
- Cause and effect relationships of the uncertainty 
derived from the environmental conditions 
- Specifics of a system’s predictability 
- Information processing  
- Condition-dependent capabilities  
 
Operational documentation (e.g. operations orders, after 
action reviews, daily and weekly TFU HQ reports) 
- General inter-relationships perspective 
- Specifics of a system’s predictability 




PRT project information and liaison reports 
- Information processing 
- General inter-relationships perspective 




4.3.2 Case study: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali 
 Design science can be viewed of as circular and should be repeated several times in order to enable the 
development of the final model (Markus et al., 2002). Therefore, the second case study, the United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (UN MINUSMA), elaborates on the first case 
study by presenting a second analysis of the conceptual model in order to further shape it as potential 
solution to the respected problem. Moreover, a study that aims at investigating the complexity of multi-
actor interaction during stabilisation operations should be undertaken in the operating environment where 
the mission itself is conducted and needs to get as close (in both time and space) to the dynamic events that 
take place in the operating environment. Therefore, data should be collected in the field. An important 
aspect to consider hereby is the difficulty of accessibility to the respected area. My employer, the Ministry 
of Defence of the Netherlands, offered me a unique opportunity to collect field data and study the 
complexity of multi-actor interaction during stabilisation operations in more detail. The data was collected 
during an extensive fieldtrip in northern Mali from December 2015 until April 2016 and took place on the 
UN camps in Gao and Kidal. It provided us with unique insights in the complexity of multi-actor interaction 
during stabilisation operations, observed through the eyes of a very unique group of practitioners. The 
fieldtrip was characterised by a highly instable security situation in which several attacks were executed on 
the UN troops while patrolling the area as well as more complex attacks against the UN camp in Kidal. 
Hence, from the perspective of complexity theory one could truly say that the data collection took place at 
‘the edge of chaos’. 
The characteristics of the case study were: 
 Presenting a general analysis of the conceptual model; 
 The interviewees should have been actively engaged in UN MINUSMA; 
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 The interviewees should be familiar with the organisational design and information processing of 
UN MINSUMA. 
The characteristics of the UN MINUSMA case study are presented in table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Characteristics of the selected case study. 
Case study Distinctive feature 
of case study 
Participating 
sub-systems 














General analyses of the 
conceptual model 
 




UN military staff 
 
 
UN police force 
staff 
Stabilisation and 
recovery; rule of law; 
Human Rights. 
 
Security; Advise and 
assist in reconstruction 
 
Mentoring and joint 
patrolling with the 












We first studied various operations orders, CIMIC reports as well as other UN MINUSMA documentation 
to create a more general insight of the UN MINUSMA mission. This provided us insight in the 
organisational structure of UN MINUSMA which in turn enabled us to select the ideal participants for the 
interviews. What followed was the development of the measurement instrument which followed the same 
structure as applied in the TFU case study, namely an abduction (Richardson and Kramer, 2006). Hence, 
the interview protocol was developed upon the insights gained from the first case study. Additionally, while 
conducting the semi-structured interviews we developed new insights into the domain of study which were 
highly valuable for explanation building. Those insights were added to the development of the conceptual 
model which materialised slowly but surely in the course of this study. In other words, we applied a more 
semi-structured, grounded theory approach to the data collection. After reviewing and testing the initial 
version of the interview protocol several improvements were made. The final version of the protocol can 
be found in appendix A4.  
Shortly after the finalisation of the measurement instrument we started the field work. Upon arrival in Mali, 
we first identified the potential participants and scheduled appointments for the interviews. Additionally, 
we arranged permission to participate, as an observer, in the various meetings of the sub-systems. In sum, 
the data collection consisted of 25 semi-structured interviews, participative and direct observation during 
civil-military activities, daily staff meetings, security- and development coordination meetings as well as 
informal talks with the members of the sub-systems of UN MINUSMA (see table 4.5). Senior members of 
UN MINUMSA while being deployed into northern Mali participated to the interviews (see appendix A3). 
Each interviewee represents a sub-system of the mission, namely UN civilian staff, UN military staff and 
UN police force staff. 
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Table 4.5: Data collection. 
Source of data collection Expected output 
 
 
Semi-structured interviews with representatives of UN 
MINUSMA sub-systems 
- Cause and effect relationships of the uncertainty 
derived from the environmental conditions 
- Specifics of a system’s predictability 
- Information processing  
- Condition-dependent capabilities  
 
Operational documentation (e.g. operations orders, after 
action reviews, daily and weekly UN MINUSMA reports) 
- General inter-relationships perspective 
- Specifics of a system’s predictability 




CIMIC project information and liaison reports 
- Information processing 
- General inter-relationships perspective 
- Organisational resources, competencies and 
capabilities 
 
Daily participative and direct observations during security- 
and development coordination meetings of members of 
the sub-systems 
- Cause and effect relationships of the uncertainty 
derived from the environmental conditions 
- Specifics of a system’s predictability 
- Information processing  
- Condition-dependent capabilities 
 
 
4.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The interview protocols for the semi-structured interviews served as measurement instruments for the 
analysis of the conceptual model. To demonstrate how values are measured and determined, 
operationalisation of the constructs is essential (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 1999). The constructs are 
converted into operational variables to achieve the desired level of detail (Bacharach, 1989). Finally, we 
converted the operational variables into a number of indicators which could be measured (Segers and 
Hagenaars, 1990). Hence, the measurable indicators are most concrete and offer a detailed understanding 
of the constructs and are were therefore critical for the development of the measurement instrument. We 
used the findings from the literature study (i.e. definitions and operationalisations) to develop the 
measurable indicators (Zmud and Boynton, 1991).  
While conducting the semi-structured interviews, we were able to develop new insights into the domain of 
study which were highly valuable for explanation building. Those insights were added to the development 
of the conceptual model (i.e. derived from the environment) but were not initially included in the interview 
protocol. The richness of initial conceptual model (including constructs, operational variables and 
measurable indicators) and the insights gained while conducting the semi-structured interviews perfectly 
illustrates the essence of design science, namely alternating between the knowledge base and environment. 
Table 4.6 presents an overview of this process.   
Table 4.6: Characteristics of the measurement instrument. 
















1. Business strategy (WAYS) 
2. Organisational strategy 
(MEANS) 
3. Information strategy (WAYS 
+ MEANS) 
 
1. Time orientation 
2. Interpersonal orientation 




Kurtz and Snowden (2003) 
 
 
Williams and O’Reilly 
(1998) 














1. Rate of change in 
environmental conditions 
2. Certainty of information at a 
given time about the 
environment 
3. Time span of definitive 
























































1. Degree of centralised 
control 
2. Degree of self-organisation 
3. Information processing 
capacity 
4. Type of practice 
 
1. Degree of centralised 
control 
2. Degree of self-organisation 
3. Information processing 
capacity 
4. Type of practice 
 
1. Degree of centralised 
control 
2. Degree of self-organisation 
3. Information processing 
capacity 
4. Type of practice 
 
1. Degree of centralised 
control 
2. Degree of self-organisation 
3. Information processing 
capacity 
4. Type of practice 
 
1. Degree of centralised 
control 
2. Degree of self-organisation 
3. Information processing 
capacity 

















Kurtz and Snowden (2003) 
Galbraith (1974) 










2. Integration effort 
 
1. Compatibility 



























Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967) 
Orlikowski (2000) 














Craighead et al. (2006) 
Rittel and Weber (1973) 
 
Once the interviews were transcribed (see Appendix A6), the data analysis took place. Data analysis is best 
understood as the process of examining the empirical evidence so that the findings can be presented (Yin, 
2014). Following Yin (2014), four strategies for data analysis in case studies can be distinguished, namely 
relying on theoretical propositions, working with data from the ground up, developing a case description 
and examining plausible rival explanations. For this research, we applied the strategy of relying on theoretical 
propositions that are presented in the conceptual model (chapter 3). This strategy provides an inductive 
approach for data analyses and suits best the explorative character of this study. A suitable method for 
implementing such an approach is content analysis.  
Content analysis allows for several sub-sequent steps to take in order to present the empirical finding. First, 
the interview transcripts are divided into smaller manageable categories (e.g. words, sentences and themes). 
These smaller manageable categories are subsequently analysed by using conceptual analysis, which in turn 
identifies the occurrence of either explicit or implicit concepts within the text. When presenting the results 
of our findings in chapter 5 and 6 respectively, aggregated coding data derived from the content analysis is 
combined with individual responses in the form of quotes. This was subsequently compared with the 
theoretical preliminary propositions presented in chapter 3, thereby embedding this research in practice by 
providing rich set of narratives and data for cross-case synthesis and explanation building. 
We subsequently compared the smaller manageable categories from the respondents of the TFU with those 
of UN MINUSMA. We devoted particular attention to the commonalities between the participants of both 
case studies involved extensive tagging for each construct (one or more quotes) of interview data, using the 
interviewees’ responses. The purpose of this comparison was to support the cross-case analysis which is 
presented in chapter 7 and aims at presenting the commonalities across the participants. By combining 
within- and across-case analysis we intended to enable the process of intuiting which relates to the 
identification and thorough reflection of the smaller manageable categories (i.e. particularly themes) that 
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could be found in the responses of multiple respondents (Swanson et al., 1988). The cross-case analysis, in 
turn, serves the purpose of literal replication (i.e. generalisability).  
Since design science can be viewed of as circular and should be repeated several times in order to enable the 
development of the final model (Markus et al., 2002), we presented the final conceptual model to 5 senior 
members of the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (see appendix A5). 
One could consider this an ex-post analysis of the conceptual model to provide the final information feedback 
over both the model itself as well as the process for explanation building. 
 
4.5 RESEARCH QUALITY 
 
An important challenge in case study research is to manage the tension between the realisation of the 
richness that characterises this study, and conforming to the standards of unbiased and rigorous research 
(Ahrens & Chapman, 2006; Lillis, 2008; Yin, 2014). Such a balance can be achieved through a thorough 
research design and conformation to several research criteria, namely validity, reliability and usability (Yin, 
2014). First, validity is related to the operationalisation of theoretical constructs and variables, the way their 
propositions and hypothesis are evaluated, and to which the research is generalisable to theory and practice. 
Second, reliability contains those actions taken by the researcher to minimise error and bias in the research. 
Third and finally, usability reflects the applied research character of this study and addresses how 
practitioners can use the results of this study in practice (Lillis, 2008; Yin, 2014). We undertook several 
actions to increase the validity, reliability and usability of this research. 
In order to increase the construct validity of this study we applied data triangulation during the data 
collection phase. Data triangulation involves the usage of several distinct sources (Mathison, 1988; Sekaran 
and Bougie, 2013). Yin (2014) argues that in almost every case study the results are “likely to be more 
convincing and accurate if [they] are based on several different sources of information” (p. 116). In this 
study, data collection included semi-structured interviews, participative observation and document analysis. 
By carefully documenting the empirical evidence which was collected during the field work, we should be 
able to allow readers to connect the research aim and questions to the conclusions and vice-versa. 
Investigator triangulation was applied throughout the data analysis phase that strengthen the internal validity 
of this study. Two additional experienced researchers (i.e. a full professor and a PhD researcher, both 
employed by Tilburg University) coded in an iterative manner, the data collected, thereby providing a validity 
check on the data (Yin, 2014). We applied theme coding (Gioia and Thomas, 1996) for the operationalisation 
of the constructs. This pertains to the broad constructs that are converted into operational variables and 
subsequently measurable indicators (Bacharach, 1989; Segers and Hagenaars, 1990) by grouping them in a 
data matrix (see appendix A7). Coding was applied by tagging each construct (i.e. quotes) of interview data, 
using the interviewees’ responses. In table 4.7 we illustrate an example of a construct that is converted into 
an operational variable and subsequently measurable indicator and its corresponding quotes. 
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Table 4.7: Example of coding strategy. 
Construct Operational 
variable 


























































“Of course some are saying it’s 
taking too long, there’s some critique 
which says slow impact project 
because the funding comes slowly. 
So for them it’s never going fast 
enough and from their perspective 
they are asking the local government 
why it is taking so long”. 
 
“Another problem is the fact that 
most UN civilian employees work 
with minimal a two year contract and 
sometimes try to be here for three 
years depending on their mission. So 
there’s not an urgency and they can 
take a long slow development 
approach to it and unfortunately 
since my focus area is security and 
helping the security of the force it 
creates conflict since the two go 
hand in hand”. 






Interpersonal orientation  
“Some international NGO’s who 
according to their raison d’être are 
humanitarian and therefore should 
not be seen anywhere near someone 
in uniform or an organization that is 
involved with the military”. 
 
“They don’t understand the security 
situation changes and if we don’t 
react now the situation can go out of 
control. They don’t change their 
paths and are not very flexible unless 
the SRSG steps in and says we need 
to change focus”. 











“The Force Commander puts out his 
quarterly guidance and the C-SHQ-E 
adjusts it then for his region. I take 
that adjusted guidance, specifically 
the CIMIC guidelines for me to 
follow and I develop a plan, which is 
usually a plan with four lines of 
operation. The first line is CIMIC 
operations like QIP’s and projects in 
areas of interest, the second one is 
coordination with civilians, and the 
third one is information operations. 
The last one is education.  
 
“Then the goals which are basically 
the objectives of the mission, almost 
50 to 60 % can’t be implemented 




Typically, stabilisation operations are characterised by their differences in terms of their physical 
environment (e.g. terrain, weather) as well as cultural aspects, thereby limiting the external validity of this 
research. In an attempt to increase the external validity we selected a multiple case study design which 
enables literal replication. For example, not only did we study the self-organising ability of a stabilisation 
operation to differentiate and integrate its resources within a NATO context, but we also studied this 
phenomenon in a UN context.  
In addition to the two types of triangulation, a case study protocol was developed describing the 
measurement instrument, procedures and general rules which were followed during this research. The 
protocols acted as a road map during the research process and increased the reliability of this study (Yin, 
2014). Moreover, to establish a coherent approach the process we applied the same structure to both 
interview protocol as well as content analysis. 
Nevertheless, investigator bias remains a critical element in this study. As a military officer, I am an active 
member of a sub-system of study and in that role was part of both the TFU and UN MINUSMA mission. 
A comparable situation can be found with embedded journalist Joeri Boom while reporting about the TFU. 
In his book, Boom (2010) describes his situation as: “…my identification with the team undermines my 
position as an independent reporter step by step” (p. 136). Boom decided to simply accept the bias because 
there was no other option. The security situation in Uruzgan was so fragile that he could simply not travel 
without the protection of a military unit.  
Discussion takes place amongst scholars whether or not researchers can act as an unbiased tool (Schwartz 
and Green-Swartz, 1955; DeWalt et al., 1998; Boeije, 2010). Since I was a military officer who participated 
in both missions personally, most interviewees ‘labelled’ me at least an ‘accepted marginal member’ (Foster, 
1996). As a result, a lot of non-research related talks took place which increased the quality of the data. 
Some interviewees stated that they would never let the researcher participate in their daily coordination 
meetings, security briefings and the regular day-to-day work if they did not know the researcher for so long 
and trusted him. However, according to DeWalt et al. (1998) being an ‘accepted marginal member’ leads to 
a paradox: “yes you want to understand the natives, but you do not want to go native” (p. 263).  
I believe that my personal circumstances, to some extent, have influenced the reliability of this study due to 
the insider – outsider perspective. As a result, over-reporting (i.e. observer bias), selective perception and 
selective recall may have influenced the data collection and analysis. To reduce investigator bias and thereby 
enhance the reliability I have tried to be critical by identifying, analysing and describing a situation without 
qualifying it as good or bad. Moreover, to the interviewees I often mentioned that although I am a military 
officer myself, for the purpose of this study I am an independent researcher affiliated to Tilburg University 
and the Netherlands Defence Academy. 
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Finally, this study has been conducted in accordance with the code of ethics for research (Tilburg University, 
2018). This includes methodology and protection of data and privacy of participants. In short, all data is 
anonymised for privacy purposes of the participants. Furthermore, the complete dataset is stored through 
the Research Data Office of Tilburg University in a protected digital environment. According to the policy 
for research data management of Tilburg University3, the complete dataset is stored at Tilburg University 
and will be kept for a minimum of ten years. The PhD supervisor affiliated to Tilburg University, Head of 
the Department for Information Management of Tilburg University and the researcher have access to the 
data. After that period the data will be securely removed from Tilburg University’s database.  
In table 4.8 we present a brief overview of the research design including the case study protocols and 


















3 Regeling Onderzoeksdatamanagement. https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/nl/intranet/informatie-
voor/wetenschappers/onderzoek/onderzoeksdata/dtabeleid/download-regeling-onderzoeksdtamanagement/ 
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Table 4.8: Summary of research design. 
Step Activity Measures 
 
 
The start of the 
journey 
- Define research objectives and research 
questions 
- Selection and analyses of relevant 
constructs 
- Formulation of preliminary 
propositions 
- Section 1.3 
 
- Figure 3.1 and 3.2 
 




- Specific target audience 
 
- Theoretical, not random sampling 
- Stabilisation operations with an 
integrated and comprehensive design 
- Aim on interesting cases with 
accessibility for data collection 
Planning and 
developing of the 
TFU case study 
- Multiple data collection methods 
 
- Qualitative data 
- Semi-structured interviews 
- Document analyses 
- Aim on qualitative reasoning 
 
The field work 
 
- Combination of data collection and 
analysis 
 
- Conducting interviews 
- Observations 
- Reading documents 
- Interpreting data 
Data analyses - Content analyses.  
- Relying on theoretical propositions 
- Evaluating constructs 
- Preliminary proposition analysis 
Planning and 
developing the UN 
MINUSMA case 
study  
- Multiple methods for collecting 
empirical data 
 
- Qualitative data 
- Semi-structured interviews 
- Document analysis 








- Studying documents 
- Data interpretation 
Data analyses - Content analyses 
- Relying on theoretical propositions 
- Evaluating constructs 
- Preliminary proposition analysis 
Connecting literature - Comparison with conflicting literature - Continuously 
Almost at the end of 
the journey 
- Theoretical and empirical saturation 
when possible 
- If the findings from the case studies 







Case study 1: Task Force Uruzgan4 
 
“The future is uncertain… but this uncertainty is at the very heart of human 
creativity”. 





By now we have come to a point where we introduced the initial conceptual model and its derived 
preliminary propositions. Moreover, we have presented the research design most suitable to this study. 
Hence, we should shift to the empirical part of this study by presenting the results of the first iteration of 
the design science process. The aim of this iteration is to deepen our insight of how the uncertainty of the 
environmental conditions impacts the predictability of stabilisation operations as a complex systems, its 
subsequent influence on the system’s required self-organising ability to differentiate and integrate its sub-
systems, organisational resources and competencies, followed by the development of condition-dependent 
capabilities.  
This chapter is organised as follows: we first provide a brief overview of the case study. What follows is the 
chronological analysis of the conceptual model: in section 5.3 we describe uncertainty and the impact on a 
system’s condition followed by the illustration of a system’s required self-organising ability in section 5.4. In 
section 5.5 we offer an illustration of how systems use information to self-organise the differentiation and 
integration of their sub-systems, organisational resources and competencies into condition-dependent 
capabilities. The outcomes gained from condition-dependent capabilities are described in section 5.6. In the 
final section of this chapter we briefly discuss the main findings of the first iteration. 
 
5.2 CASE STUDY 
 
5.2.1 Historical background 
4 Parts of this chapter have been appeared in the following peer reviewed conference proceedings as: 
Gans, B. and Rutkowski, A-F. (2015). Social Consciousness in Post-Conflict Reconstruction. In proceedings of the 
International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation, GDN 2015. Outlooks and Insights on Group Decision 
and Negotiation, LNBIP 218, 31-45. 
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The great wars of the 20th century were known as symmetrical wars. That is, there is a symmetry between 
(commonly two) opponents’ will and means. According to Smith (2005) in such symmetrical conflicts “both 
sides had the will and the means to regenerate lost armies and navies, no single battle or campaign could 
defeat one or the other side” (p. 6). Symmetrical warfare is also known as attrition warfare which is 
characterised as a military strategy that aims to win a war by continuously wearing down the opponent to 
the point of physical collapse through losses in personnel and material until the physical will to wage war 
finally brakes (Van Crefeld, 1986). Contemporary conflicts, including Afghanistan, are known as 
asymmetrical conflicts. Asymmetrical conflicts are defined by Manwaring (2012) as “population-centric non-
traditional warfare waged between a military superior power and one or more inferior powers which 
encompasses all of the following aspects: evaluating and defeating asymmetric threat, conducting 
asymmetric operations, understanding cultural asymmetry and evaluating asymmetric cost” (p. 12). In 
asymmetrical conflicts one actor typically has great means but limited will since the conflict is commonly 
not in the direct vicinity of the home country and thus not posing an immediate threat. Conversely, the 
other side has limited means but great will. Moreover, asymmetrical conflicts include many other actors such 
as IOs, NGOs, local actors (both state and non-state) and the private sector (Smith, 2005). As a result, 
asymmetries in terms of both means and will occur. 
The conflict in Afghanistan illustrates one of asymmetry. Shortly after 9/11 the international coalition 
exploited their advantage in military capabilities by using US air power which forced the Opposing Military 
Forces (OMF) to flee from their defensive positions that protected key cities and infrastructure. Unable to 
compete with the international coalition, however, the OMF exploited their advantage by blending in with 
the local population and preparing for a long-lasting insurgency directed at the psychological attrition of the 
coalition’s will, specifically, the public consensus supporting the conflict (Farrell et al., 2013). Consequently, 
the coalition was facing a population-centric conflict.  
5.2.2 Case description 
In this chapter, we applied the conceptual model to a single case study: the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF). Out of the great number of stabilisation operations conducted at the time of this study, we 
selected the ISAF mission. We used three selection criteria for selecting this case. First, the ISAF mission 
was “branded” by NATO and the individual member states as an operation characterised by its high-level 
of comprehensive design (Baumann, 2009). Indeed, at its height, ISAF consisted of approximately 130,000 
personnel, coming from 51 NATO and partner nations (NATO, 2017). Moreover, a great number of IOs 
(i.e. UNICEF, UN OCHA, UNHCR etc.), NGOs, local actors both state and non-state as well as the private 
sector were actively operating in Afghanistan. Second, the operation was subject to heavy debate between 
military and non-military organisations over clarification and delineation of their respective roles and spheres 
of responsibility (Teuten, 2010). Third and finally, accessibility to sources in order to collect the required 
data was another important selection criteria. Only when it became clear that we had access to the identified 
sources the case was selected.   
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The ISAF mission was established by NATO in 2001 shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Its mission 
was to assist the legitimate Afghan authorities with providing security and stability as well as facilitating 
development cooperation. The mission statement was presented as follows:  
“ISAF, in support of GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan], conducts operations in 
Afghanistan to reduce the capability and the will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability 
of the Afghan National Security Factors (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and 
socioeconomic development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is 
observable to the population” (ISAF Mission Statement, 2015).  
This case study focuses in particular on the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) that was part of NATO’s ISAF 
mission in Afghanistan and provides an analysis of the four year (2006 – 2010) mission in Uruzgan province 
(see appendix A8). The TFU is exemplary for the normative framework (i.e. international efforts to establish 
an integrated and comprehensive approach between the many military and civilian actors involved), designed 
by Western governments and IOs to respond to the increasingly complex situations that characterise post-
conflict zones such as Afghanistan (Watkin, 2009). We study the TFU as a complex system that is 
characterised as a whole-of-government-approach in which the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Affairs and 
Development Cooperation of the Netherlands applied the so-called 3D-concept (i.e. Defence, Diplomacy 
and Development). A whole-of-government-approach refers to “an approach that integrates the 
collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of a government to achieve unity of effort toward a 
shared goal” (United States Institute of Peace, 2009). 
The TFU consisted of approximately 1,400 personnel and included 3 main sub-systems: the TFU 
Headquarters (TFU HQ), Battle Group (BG) and Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). TFU HQ 
consisted of military staff personnel and accounted for the governance of the operation, particularly since 
the Netherlands was appointed by NATO as “Lead Nation” and several other NATO-members (i.e. 
Australia, France and the US) were operating in the province as well. The BG consisted of military combat 
troops and were responsible for providing security throughout the province, supporting the activities of the 
PRT and monitoring the Afghan National Security Factors (ANSF). The PRT consisted of advisors from 
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation of the Netherlands as well as a specialised 
military unit commonly known as Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) that was responsible for the 
interaction with the civilian actors in the province. The PRT’s main responsibilities were to facilitate 
reconstruction and development activities as well as to promote ‘good governance’. Next to these three 
main sub-systems, the TFU included an Air Task Force (ATF), Special Operations Forces (SOF), 
Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) as well as several support units (i.e. Military Police 
(MP) and Logistical Support Detachment (LSD)).  
Additionally, several other organisations such as UN agencies, NGOs, host nation government, local actors 
as well as the private sector were active in Uruzgan province. In this study, we view these organisations as 
complex systems themselves with which the TFU could interact. All these systems together formed a greater 
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supra-system that focused on the stabilisation and recovery of the province. Referring back to the whole-
of-government-approach we argue that when the Dutch government decided on deploying the TFU it 
automatically became part of a supra-system (e.g. various IOs, NGOs, local actors both state and non-state 
as well as the private sector) with non-linear dynamics due to an increase of the impact of uncertainty derived 
from the environmental conditions. Accordingly, the focus of this chapter is twofold: first, we focus on the 
interaction and information processing between the sub-systems of the TFU (i.e. within a single system). 
Second, we study the interaction and information processing between the TFU and the other systems within 
the supra-system. In sum, this chapter performs a general analysis of the multi-actor interaction and 
information processing that took place in Uruzgan province in the period 2006 - 2010. Figure 5.1 presents 
an overview of the TFU, its sub-systems and representation within the supra-system. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: The TFU, its sub-systems and representation within the supra-system. 
 
5.3 UNCERTAINTY AND THE IMPACT ON A SYSTEM’S CONDITION 
 
The first iteration of the initial conceptual model enabled us to identify different types of uncertainty which 
impact the predictability of the TFU’s condition, in turn influencing the multi-actor interaction during the 
mission. We connected these different types of uncertainty to the literature on complex systems thinking 
and defined them accordingly as impact uncertainty (i.e. sensitive dependence on initial conditions and 
equifinality), modelling uncertainty (imprecise knowledge on how to control input), uncertainty about 
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relations between actors, environmental uncertainty (i.e. unpredictable events and factors beyond control) 
and uncertainty about outcomes (see figure 5.2). 
 
Figure 5.2: Types of uncertainties that impacted the predictability of a TFU’s condition. 
 
Impact uncertainty, modelling uncertainty, uncertainty about relations between actors and uncertainty about 
outcomes were found to be caused by two distinct factors, namely the TFU’s strategic model and its system 
diversity. Environmental uncertainty were found to be caused by the operating environment. Since we found 
that the factors selected influenced each other in various points in time we describe them interchangeable.  
5.3.1 Strategic model 
One of the most mentioned factors in the interviews that caused impact uncertainty, modelling uncertainty, 
uncertainty about relations between actors and uncertainty about outcomes is summarised here as the 
strategic model applied by the Dutch government to support the Afghan government to establish security 
and stability as well as facilitating post-conflict reconstruction throughout the country. 
Strategy finds its origin in the military where it refers to the achievement of desired political ENDS (i.e. a 
desired situation in terms of objectives), through the choice of suitable strategic WAYS (i.e. the ‘how’ in the 
form of a concept), employing largely the military MEANS (i.e. policy instruments to pursue the desired 
ENDS). Gray (2015) defines grand strategy as “the direction and use made of any or all of the assets of a 
security community.  (...)  In  order  to  be grand,  strategy  needs  to  be  capable  of  mobilising  any  of  a  
community's  assets” (p. 86). Grand strategy is considered ‘grand’ because both its theoretical and practical 
scope need to be understood in a comprehensive manner. In sum, a grand strategy integrates the purposeful 
activities of a state together by connecting (political) ENDS to WAYS and MEANS, thereby enabling a 
whole-of-government-approach. However, the government is only one of the many actors involved in 
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stabilisation operations. Thus, from the perspective of stabilisation operations a grand strategy ideally 
integrates the purposeful activities of all the participating actors from the various systems as part of the 
supra-system (i.e. whole-of-society-approach). We should take note that a whole-of-government-approach 
or whole-of-society-approach itself must never be mistaken for strategy. By this logic, it would result in 
simply applying all the purposeful activities of all participating actors from the various systems (the MEANS) 
to whatever the problem may be. In other words, by mistaken a whole-of-government-approach or whole-
of-society-approach for strategy would result in a diagram showing each purposeful activity as a line of 
effort without determining its feasibility or desirability in relationship to the desired situation (ENDS). 
From a business perspective, strategy is defined by Porter (1980) as “the broad formula for how an 
organisation is going to compete, what its goals should be, and what policies will be needed to carry out 
those goals” and the “...combination of the ENDS (goals) for which the organisation is striving and the 
MEANS (policies) by which it is seeking to get there” (p. 24). Typically for stabilisation operations, a 
strategic model aims to define boundaries on what they should accomplish – or in military jargon – defining 
a clear ‘end-state’ (ENDS) (Ramalingam and Mitchell, 2014). Therefore, a strategic model starts by 
formulating a mission statement which is “a clear and compelling statement that unifies an organisation’s 
effort and describes what the organisation is all about (i.e. its purpose)” (Pearlson and Saunders, 2013, p. 
26). Such a mission statement is typically known as the intended strategy (Mintzberg, 1978). To achieve its 
mission, an organisation should set measurable objectives and performance targets. Then, an organisational 
strategy and information strategy should be developed to complement the business strategy. An 
organisational strategy refers to the design, as well as a description how to command, control and coordinate 
its processes. An information strategy is the plan how an organisation uses Information Systems (IS) to 
support the business strategy. The alignment between the three distinct types of strategy, the so-called 
Information Systems Strategy Triangle, is presented in figure 5.3 (Pearlson and Saunders, 2013). 
 
Figure 5.3: The Information Systems Strategy Triangle (Pearlson and Saunders, 2013). 
 
Business strategy (ENDS). The TFU, as part of the greater ISAF-mission, was to support the Afghan 
government to establish security and stability as well as facilitating development cooperation. The Dutch 
government further specified this mission statement by presenting a high-level policy white paper drafted 
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by three Dutch Ministries which stated that the TFU had to focus on safety and security, governance and 
socio-economic development throughout Uruzgan Province (Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and 
Development Cooperation of the Netherlands, 2005). Reflecting on both the ISAF mission statement as 
well as the high-level policy white paper, the TFU had to deal with so-called ‘wicked problems’ which are 
“problems that are ill-defined, consist several, conflicting criteria for solution definition, solutions which 
create further problems and no obvious indications of when enough has been achieved” (Rittel and Weber, 
1973, p. 155).  
Interestingly, most interviewees found the ISAF mission statement and high-level policy white paper far too 
abstract. As a result,  a “grassroots” strategy was formed by bottom-up planning at the tactical level (i.e. 
TFU HQ) by developing what was called the ‘TFU Master Plan’ which functioned as a guideline for the 
planning and execution of the mission. A commander TFU sums it up:   
“There were no clear goals that came from the political level. Consequently, the TFU HQ wrote a Master Plan 
that was based on 4 lines of operation (Governance & Justice; Security & Stability; Development; Credible TF). 
Goals were formulated for 6 months + 2 months overlap due to the rotation rhythm. Every rotation applied 
this mechanism” (TFU HQ, R4). 
By using an Effects-based Approach to Operations (EBO)5, the ‘Master Plan’ described the overall 
effects that were critical to mission success. A detailed overview of the ‘TFU Master Plan’, its lines of 
operation and desired effects is presented in figure 5.4. As defined in the Master Plan, TFU’s mission 
was to: 
“Assist the local government in building its capacity, authority and influence and prioritising and synchronising 
reconstruction and development programmes with assisting the Afghan National Security Factors (ANSF), in 
order to set the conditions for a secure and stable Uruzgan province” (TFU masterplan, 2006).  
Reflecting on the literature on strategy (Mintzberg, 1978; Strachan, 2013), the high-level policy white 
paper drafted by the three Dutch Ministries illustrates indeed the intersection of the political domain and 
the employment of instruments of national power as part of the intended strategy. Policy was translated 
into political ENDS with the important note from the Dutch government that clear and tangible results 
could not (at least throughout the first period of the mission) be predicted (Netherlands Ministries of 
Defence, Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation of the Netherlands, 2005). In other words, the 
distinction between ENDS as a stochastic process from ENDS as a deterministic process unable to be 
predicted ex-ante perfectly illustrates the TFU’s sensitive dependence on initial conditions. Interestingly, 
and contrary to most contemporary literature on stabilisation operations (Farrell et al., 2013; Grandia, 
2015; Kitzen, 2016) and interpretation of most interviewees, we argue that the abstract ISAF mission 
statement and high-level policy whitepaper fits perfectly with the uncertainty derived from the 
environmental conditions resulting in dealing with the so-called ‘wicked problems’, in turn, providing 
5 For an in-depth analysis of an Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBO) see: Rietjens et al.: Measuring the 
Immeasurable? The effects-based approach to operations (2011). 
101
ground for an inherent order that identifies and models a system’s overall behaviour through adapted 
and acceptable WAYS. In terms of strategic management this is known as emergent strategy (Mintzberg, 
1978). 
Business strategy (WAYS). In the white paper, the Dutch government stressed that the TFU’s activities 
would differ from those displayed by the US military since these were too much focused on kinetic 
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and were part of the Counter-Terrorism Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) (Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation of the Netherlands, 
2005). The differentiation in mission focus was underlined by the Dutch government who described the 
coalition’s actions as ‘too kinetic’: “the international military presence over the past years has been directed 
at combating the Opposing Military Forces (OMF) instead of improving the living conditions of the 
population” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2005). As a result, the TFU would deploy on 
a population-centric mission which focused on reconstruction and development instead of the 
predominantly offensive methods employed by US forces as part of OEF and was in accordance with the 
central focus on stability and a broad perspective on security (Kitzen et al, 2013). This population-centric 
approach was described by then Chief of Defence Staff General Berlijn (2006) as “an operating style marked 
by knowledge of and respect for the local culture. It would not close its eyes to operational risks and would 
provide for sufficiently robust rules of engagement” (Farrell et al., 2013, p. 167). With this speech General 
Berlijn acknowledged that the stabilisation and recovery operation might entail intense fighting for force 
protection, a hard lesson of the DUTCHBAT mission in the former Yugoslavia. Again, as described by 
Korteweg (2011), these kinetic activities were not to be confused with COIN “a term that was expressly 
avoided also in parliamentary debates, for it had too much of an offensive connotation that would 
undermine public support” (p. 294).  
…the impact of the operating environment. However, as the operation developed over time it became 
clear that the ‘TFU Master Plan’ was too ambitious due to the complex operating environment impacting 
the TFU from outside the system’s boundary. To illustrate the complexity of the operating environment we 
used three criteria, namely the uncertainty derived from the environmental conditions, the situational 
awareness about the environment, and the feedback received from the environment. Although the Dutch 
government labelled and presented the TFU politically as a non-kinetic stabilisation and development 
operation, the security situation was very fragile and the TFU was often engaged in heavy kinetic activities 
against the OMF. One could argue if the TFU was in fact engaged in a COIN operation (Dimitriu and de 
Graaf, 2009). As a BG commander puts it: 
“Then we also come to the point that we can discuss whether it was a reconstruction and development or 
COIN operation? The article-100 letter stated that it was a reconstruction and development operation whilst 
everyone who came into the Province saw that it was a true COIN operation” (BG, R16). 
According to Schaeffer et al. (1988) one needs to comprehend the operating environment with its nature 
and sources of the conflict. It was the 2007 battle of Chora that turned out to be the moment where clear 
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and tangible feedback from the operating environment was provided to policy makers and politicians in The 
Hague and made them comprehend the realities on the ground in Uruzgan. The battle of Chora explicitly 
implied that the TFU was heavily engaged in kinetic activities and hence the mission gained momentum as 
a COIN mission instead of the initially proposed population-centric mission which focused on 
reconstruction and development (Klep, 2011; Ten Cate and van der Vorm, 2012). Consequently, the TFU 
experienced a lack of progress in improving the security situation throughout the province due to changes 
in environmental conditions and the low certainty of information about the environment at the start of the 
mission. Again, a perfect illustration of the TFU’s sensitive dependence on its initial conditions and evidence 
for the argument that the prediction of contemporary conflict is found to be impossible.  
Interestingly, although the impact uncertainty and environmental uncertainty imposed a limitation on the 
predictability of the TFU as complex system, it simultaneously revealed that certain ENDS could be 
achieved from alternative initial conditions as well as alternative ways (i.e. emergent strategy) as these 
differences can be amplified through positive feedback controls. This is known as the equifinality of open 
systems (Prigogine, 1985; Gleick, 1987). This characteristic of complex open systems was observed after the 
mission’s mandate in 2008 was extended with two years and a second emergent strategy, known as the Focal 
Paper, was developed. This new strategy had a narrower geographical focus (i.e. Afghan Development 
Zone’s) as well as a shift of focus in the type of activities (e.g. COIN) the TFU would conduct and was 
based upon the tache d’huile or ink spot concept, a strategy which is known in both colonial warfare as well 
as the classical COIN era (Kitzen, 2016). In the Focal Paper the new strategy was defined as follows:  
“TFU, as part of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), in cooperation with Afghan National 
Security Factors (ANSF) and in co-ordination with coalition factors is to conduct counter insurgency (COIN) 
operations resulting to the expansion of the Afghan Development Zones (Focal Areas) of Tirin Kot, Chora 
and Deh Rawod in order to neutralise insurgency influence. In order to give the different actors, such as TFU, 
GoU [Government of Uruzgan] and NGOs/IOs [International Organisations], clarity on the effects and 
milestones to accomplish, the Focal Paper translates the three Endstates [safe and secure environment; 
socioeconomic development, governance] into seven detailed Lines of Effects (LoE): (1) security apparatus, (2) 
secure areas, (3) infrastructure, (4) basic living conditions, (5) health & education, (6) economic diversity and 
(7) governance support & capacity” (TFU HQ, 2008).   
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Figure 5.4: TFU Master Plan. Source: adopted from TFU HQ (2007). 
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Finally, and after it became clear that another extension of the mandate was highly unlikely due to heavy 
National political discussion, TFU HQ designed a third emergent strategy, the Uruzgan Campaign Plan 
(UCP), which was presented mid-2009 and basically described the transfer of the TFU’s authorities to the 
Afghan authorities and a potential ISAF successor. According to the UCP:  
“The TFU is to provide a common ground for TFU and its Afghan and international partners within the 
province. In other words, the UCP is to facilitate, cooperation and to create unity of effort, which becomes 
even more important in a multinational context and with the increase of Afghan capacity and involvement in 
the mission. The TFU campaign objective, within the context of the UCP, as part of ISAF, in partnership with 
ANSF and in coordination with GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan], United Nations 
Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the International Community, is to contribute to a reliable and 
effective government that can bring the government and the people closer together, and is able to provide a 
stable and secure environment and development progress in Uruzgan, in due course without ISAF support” 
(TFU HQ, 2008). 
Like the Focal Paper, the UCP focused on three end-states, namely governance, development and security. 
Each were divided in reconstruction and development themes and were organised in an intellectual 
framework. Interestingly, this framework included several identified disablers and enablers that potentially 
hampered and enhanced goal attainment respectively. An overview of the UCP is illustrated in figure 5.5. 
As presented above, the end-states and desired effects were described in the Focal Paper and the UCP. 
However, the data indicates that the interviewees perceived to deal with abstract goals that were hardly 
measurable. Similar results were found by Rietjens et al. (2013) who indicated that “ambiguity led to a lack 
of common understanding of the goals and tasks of CIMIC among different contributing nations, rotations 
and military command levels within ISAF” (p. 345). The Dutch government stressed the abstraction-level 
of the ENDS in their high-level policy white paper due to the uncertainty of the environmental 
circumstances in Uruzgan province (Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation 
of the Netherlands, 2005).  
Indeed, organisations that must deal with ‘wicked problems’ hold important management implications 
(Tompkins, 2005) such as dealing with ambiguous, intangible and changing goals, are experiencing difficulty 
with establishing performance standards and measuring results (Wilson, 1989). This applies in particular to 
stabilisation operations where outputs often are unobservable and unmeasurable (Dobbins et al., 2005; 
Zapach, 2014). Consequently, strategic management tools are only applicable to a very limited extend 
(Davids, 2011; Muggah and Sang, 2013).  
Additionally, the data illustrates a change in strategic thinking driven by the adaptation of goals during the 
four year deployment of TFU. Kitzen et al. (2013) summarises these changes in strategy as follows: “while 
the Master Plan was designed to foster security and development in the entire province within two years, 
the Focal Paper provided a much needed adaptation to the harsh reality of campaigning in Uruzgan. The 
Focal Paper not only acknowledged that the military was not merely providing security and development 
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assistance, but actually involved in COIN, and also set some more realistic targets by focusing TFU efforts 
for the additional two years of the mission to the three main ADZs. Finally the UCP was formulated to 
arrange a smooth transfer of authority from the Dutch TFU to the local government and the ISAF 
successors” (p. 172).  
It was the Prussian general Von Clausewitz (1932) who studied strategy by looking at the nature of the 
whole. He argued that once war begun the opponents would start battling each other, and more importantly, 
so would their policies. Hence, this reciprocity creates its own dynamic which can have consequences that 
are different from the policies that were meant to be guiding it (Strachan, 2006). In other words, the strategic 
model of war, including the business, organisation and information strategy, are subject to change. 
Indeed, it was the sensitivity to the initial conditions that provided ground for an inherent order that 
identified and modelled the system’s overall behaviour through adapted and acceptable WAYS. The 
equifinality of open systems enabled the early on bottom-up emergence of strategy at the tactical level (i.e. 
TFU HQ) during the process of self-organisation. However, this emergent strategy was never truly 
recognised as the official strategy for the TFU, nor did the political level held ownership over it (Grandia, 
2015). Furthermore, initial strategic thinking of the TFU was dominated by the Dutch political climate and 
its fear for public opinion Farrell et al., 2013). Consequently, the Dutch government engendered difficulties 
in trying to communicate the purpose of the TFU to the Dutch population since the strategic narrative of 
the mission was not apprehended by the Dutch population (Farrell et al., 2013; Kitzen, 2013). Finally, the 
realities and complexity of the operating environment heavily impacted the TFU, eventually resulting in a 
distinct deviation from the initial political guidelines. 
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Figure 5.5: The Uruzgan Campaign Plan. Source: adopted from TFU HQ (2009). 
Time also played an important role in the way most interviewees perceived the mission’s strategic model. 
The initial two-year mandate was perceived by a Civilian Representative (CivRep) as a real limitation for 
credible goal-setting, especially in relation to the level of progress that had been made. 
“Reconstruction efforts are generally a long-term activity. The uncertainty about the TFU’s mandate made it 
really hard to plan for long-term development and allocate the necessary resources” (TFU HQ, R8). 
A commander TFU stated that during his deployment he did not know whether the mission’s 2-year 
mandate was going to be extended and, consequently, what his course of action would be: 
“The question was if we still had to plan for long-term reconstruction or we had to shift to a possible re-
deployment back to the Netherlands. Two important questions were ’when did the Netherlands want to hand 
over to the Afghan government and which of the NATO partners will be taking over our tasks?’ I could not 
get an answer at that time from the Netherlands”. (TFU HQ, R7).  
The importance of the combination of having clear formulated goals and determining a desired end-state is 
mentioned by many scholars (Lahneman, 2004; De Wijk, 2005; Fraticelli, 2005). However, this is 
contradictory to what we previously identified, namely that stabilisation operations often have to deal with 
‘wicked problems’. Therefore, we suggest that an end state should be defined in terms of achieving certain 
conditions instead of time. One could compare this with criminality in Western societies: we basically accept 
that it is part of our societies and have the rule of law to consolidate certain ‘acceptable’ conditions. Again, 
this requires the need for long term commitment. Scholars argue that staying committed until certain 
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conditions are achieved is the sine qua non for a successful stabilisation operation (Schmidl, 2004; Cavaleri, 
2005; Smith, 2005). From this perspective, ‘time’ can be viewed as a key resource for stabilisation operations.  
Several interviewees also indicated that there were no efforts from their side (i.e. the TFU) to synchronise 
their strategy with that of the other systems as part the supra-system. This was perceived as a major 
shortcoming since an integrated approach requires more than the participation of various government 
agencies, as a diplomat emphasised:    
“We need to partner up. The true grasp of what is happening on the ground cannot be left to Defence, 
Diplomacy, or Development alone. A true comprehensive approach requires the participation of NGOs and 
private firms. Those stakeholders need to be involved in order to be successful on the long-term. In order to 
successfully attract NGOs and private firms for an integrated approach they need to be engaged at the initial 
decision-making process. Collaborative goals need to be developed so those NGOs and private firms can 
conduct their own long-term planning and allocation of resources. Talking about the analyses, what is the 
problem, what are we going to do about it? There you have the possibility to really include the options for the 
NGOs and the private sector to take their role”. (TFU HQ, R2). 
Organisational strategy (MEANS). The TFU was tasked with a population-centric mission which 
focused on reconstruction and development activities. This mission type was relatively new for the Dutch 
since military doctrine was originally focused on enemy-centric missions. Only during the missions in the 
former-Yugoslavia and Iraq, the Dutch had gained some experience in population-centric operations. 
Therefore, the TFU and its sub-systems, initially had to deal with an unfamiliarity in regards to their roles, 
tasks and organisation. Hence, for the first months of the mission the TFU’s sub-systems pioneered their 
own approach. Once the TFU was more familiarised with its mission, the organisational strategy was 
designed on a clear division of labour with hierarchical institutionalised structures. Whereas the TFU HQ 
accounted for the governance of the operation, the PRT’s main responsibilities were to facilitate 
reconstruction and development activities as well as to promote ‘good governance’. The BG was to provide 
security assistance with the aim to establish a permissive environment which allowed for the above activities 
to take place (Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation of the Netherlands, 
2005).  
In order to achieve its mission the TFU HQ drafted a first concept of operations which contained the 
deployment of its forces (e.g. PRT and BG) to the densely populated areas of Tirin Kot and Deh Rawod. 
These two areas were designated as the starting point from where the TFU intended to improve in security 
and governance in order to enhance the relationships between the local population, the Afghan government 
and the TFU (Rietjens, 2013; Kitzen et al., 2013). Additionally, these two areas would function as a 
steppingstone for gaining control over the rest of Uruzgan province. However, von Clausewitz (1832), 
reminds us: “war is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based 
are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty” (p. 101). From a complexity and systems theory 
perspective: the TFU was inherently sensitive to its initial conditions. This clearly applied to the TFU since 
shortly after the start of the mission it was ordered to support their higher headquarters for one month 
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(Regional Command South (RC-S) with one of the BG’s three infantry companies. Moreover, the Chora 
district was also to be designated as one of the densely populated areas and to which the TFU had to deploy 
part of its forces. According to several participants, this unexpected expansion of footprint resulted in the 
overstretching of resources from the start of the mission. 
The overall management of the TFU included centralised planning and decision-making, while execution 
was decentralised. In the literature this is known as the degree of requisite integration (March and Simon, 
1958). Lawrence and Lorsch (1986) describe requisite integration as “task characteristics which make it 
possible for sub-systems in an organisation to operate independently of each other, or require continual 
collaboration in making decisions before a given sub-system may act. The greater the degree of requisite 
integration between two sub-systems the more difficult it will be to achieve integration” (p. 10). In practice 
there was room for TFU personnel to engage in a form of mixed governance with space left to negotiate 
under the supportive shadow of hierarchy. From 2006 until 2009 the decisions were taken by the military 
commander of the TFU (C-TFU). The Political Advisor (PolAd) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
functioned as a personal advisor to the C-TFU. Over time this part of the mission’s organisational strategy 
was identified as inefficient. Consequently, as of 2009 TFU HQ made a unique adjustment to its 
organisational strategy by handing over the command of the PRT from a military commander to a career 
diplomat. Moreover, with this change in command the mission came under dual-headed leadership. The 
joint decision-making process was perceived as effective since they could easily consult each other. They 
converge in planning the actions core to the mission and agreed on allocating the scarce resources. A CivRep 
sums it up:  
 “Since 2009 the TFU was set up in an integrated way. Two people were put at the head of the TFU; Defence 
and Diplomacy. The two had very different responsibilities, dual-lead in all decisions were taken by both. They 
together always discussed from both perspectives, the elements, i.e., situational context and resources, 
compared those and used an integrated approach to take the decision”. (TFU HQ, R10). 
Another important element of the TFU’s organisational strategy was that of counter-organisation of local 
forces (Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation of the Netherlands, 2005). In 
the TFU’s case this implied the organisation of local forces that would keep a permanent presence 
throughout the province (i.e. not limited to the densely populated areas of Tirin Kot, Deh Rawud and 
Chora) by manning small bases. The Dutch preferred to partner with the Afghan National Police (ANP) or 
Afghan National Army (ANA). Unfortunately, this was infeasible since these forces were only available in 
a very limited number. A possible alternative brought up by the TFU HQ, namely to partner with local 
militias was rejected due to political caveats (i.e. restrictions) imposed by the Dutch government. Ultimately, 
a creative solution was found that matched both the realities on the ground as well as that of the political 
level. The TFU would partner with the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), a tribal militia that was 
formalised as a sub-unit of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).  
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Information strategy. The TFU had difficulty to link its information strategy with its organisational 
strategy and business strategy. In our analyses, we distinguish between internal centralised information 
sharing (i.e. within the individual sub-systems of the TFU), internal distributed information sharing (i.e. 
between the sub-systems of the TFU) and external distributed information sharing (i.e. between the sub-
systems of the TFU and the other systems involved).  
First, internal centralised information sharing was considered by all interviewees as sufficiently 
institutionalised. Daily reporting through fixed reporting lines were present in all sub-systems. Most of these 
reports were sent to the TFU HQ and then merged into a centralised report.  
Second, internal distributed information sharing was hindered by the absence of a general information 
system or database with access for all the sub-systems. The TFU used three different encrypted information 
and communication systems that came originally from the Dutch military, each of which designed for a 
specific level of classification. So, within the TFU an information system is tailored to the classification. 
Based on the classifications there are in general three communication systems. Table 5.1 presents an 
overview of these systems. The exact names of the systems are replaced by fictive names due to the sensitive 
nature of those systems.  
Table 5.1: Information processing of the TFU.  
Actors Means Organisational design strategy 
TFU (internal) Encrypted ICTs 
Face to face 
Slack resources 
Investment in vertical information 
systems 
TFU > ISAF HQ Encrypted ICTs Slack resources 
Investment in vertical information 
systems 
TFU > Dutch government  Encrypted ICTs Slack resources 
Investment in vertical information 
systems 
TFU > IOs (i.e. UN 
agencies 
General ICTs (non-encrypted) 
Face to face (coordination meeting) 
Creation of lateral relationships 
TFU > NGOs General ICTs (non-encrypted) 
Face to face (coordination meeting) 
Creation of lateral relationships 
TFU > local actors (state 
and non-state) 
General ICTs (non-encrypted) 
Face to face 
Creation of lateral relationships 
TFU > private sector General ICTs (non-encrypted) 
Face to face 
Creation of lateral relationships 
TFU > OEF Face to face Creation of lateral relationships 
 
The main shortcoming of these information systems from the context of an integrated and comprehensive 
approach is that they are based upon NATO standards with standardised classifications of ‘NATO 
SECRET’. This negatively influenced the external sharing of military information since military members 
of the TFU were unable to share most military information with their civilian members of the TFU HQ and 
PRT (e.g. employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation) who did not have 
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these systems at their disposal which hampered internal distributed information sharing (i.e. within the TFU 
itself). A CivRep explains: 
“There was this very awkward situation where […] and I sat in the same office but were not able to share each 
other’s information since our systems were not compatible”. (TFU HQ, R9). 
Fortunately, difficulties were mostly overcome since they could get access to the systems through their 
military counterpart.  
Third, external distributed information sharing between the TFU and the other actors involved was done 
by telephone, email or in a face to face manner (see table 5.1). However, sharing classified information 
through these communication systems was not permitted. Rietjens et al. (2013) found similar constraints in 
the sharing of information between CIMIC units in ISAF and external actors: “to be able to share CIMIC 
information products with external actors, they usually had to be declassified. However, most other 
information sources of ISAF remained classified and it was frequently unclear to what extent these were 
allowed to be shared with external actors” (p. 347). 
Stabilisation operations typically encounter difficulty with the proper functioning of technological channels 
such as telephone and e-mail (Rietjens et al., 2013). Our data supports these findings since both the quality 
as well as the quantity of external information processing was hindered by the lack of an integrated 
information and communication system. Consequently, the supra-system had to deal with an information 
asymmetry. Fortunately, the TFU HQ as well as the commander PRT organised daily and weekly meetings 
and briefings in which actors from the other systems could participate in order to communicate with each 
other, share information and identify opportunities for integration. In other words, the TFU HQ invested 
in increasing the information processing capacity through the creation of lateral relations. An information 
manager sums it up: 
“Regarding information sharing outside the task force…it always must be unclassified information, you cannot 
do anything else than work on non-classified networks. As we are accustomed at the MoD to work with 
classified information, they [NGOs] are not. So, you must declassify the information first or make sure that is 
already unclassified. And if it is classified information, then you should not share it in a network but possibly 
face to face, depending on the urgency”. (TFU HQ, R12). 
The absence of a joint ICT system was perceived by all interviewees as a huge shortcoming.  Moreover, 
several respondents mentioned that the development of such a system is one of high importance. As a 
commander TFU stated: 
“There was no joint information system. Therefore, we had weekly meetings where all stakeholders participated 
in. However, there is a need for an integrated information management system. This needs to be developed. 
There are some obstacles on both the governmental site and the NGOs / IOs that need to be taken”. (TFU 
HQ, R4). 
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The final issue that hampered external distributed information sharing is related to cultural differences. In 
the literature, cultural differences are typically described as an important reason for hampering the sharing 
of information between civilian and military organisations during stabilisation operations (Duffey, 2000; 
Scheltinga et al., 2005; Rietjens, et al., 2013; Holmes-Eber, 2016). This final issue will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section (i.e. system diversity). 
In sum, the strategic model of the TFU perfectly fits with the complex systems modelling tools derived 
from complexity theory. Policy was translated into political ENDS with the important note from the Dutch 
government that clear and tangible results could not (at least throughout the first period of the mission) be 
predicted (Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation of the Netherlands, 2005). 
Hence, the distinction between ENDS as a stochastic process from ENDS as a deterministic process unable 
to be predicted ex-ante perfectly illustrates the TFU’s sensitive dependence on its initial condition. 
Interestingly, these findings are contrary to most contemporary literature on stabilisation operations (Farrell 
et al., 2013; Grandia, 2015; Kitzen, 2016) as well as the interpretation of most interviewees, we argue that 
the abstract ISAF mission statement and high-level policy whitepaper fits perfectly with the complexity, 
dynamic and uncertainty of the environmental conditions resulting in the so-called ‘wicked problems’, in 
turn, providing ground for an inherent order that identifies and models a system’s overall behaviour through 
adapted and acceptable WAYS. 
Interestingly, although the impact uncertainty and environmental uncertainty imposed a limitation on the 
predictability of the TFU as complex system, it simultaneously revealed that certain ENDS may be the result 
of WAYS that started from different initial conditions as these differences could be amplified through 
positive feedback controls. This characteristic of complex open systems was observed after the mission’s 
mandate in 2008 was extended with two years and a second “grassroots” strategy, known as the Focal Paper, 
was developed.  
Finally, several issues negatively influenced the information strategy. Fortunately, in most situations the TFU 
turned out to display adaptive behaviour by adjusting its working processes, hierarchical structures and ways 
of communicating in order to successfully respond to the changing environmental conditions. Hence, most 
difficulties were overcome by adaptive complex adaptive behaviour at the tactical level (i.e. TFU HQ) during 
the process of self-organisation. Unfortunately, this emergent bottom up planning was never truly 
recognised as the official strategy for the TFU, nor did the political level held ownership over it (Grandia, 
2015). However, the definition of ENDS and allocate the appropriate MEANS is the responsibility of the 
political level (Clark, 2001; Grandia, 2015). Smith (2005) also reminds us of the importance of a clear 
strategy: “it must always be remembered that the political objective and the military strategic objective are 
not the same, and never are the same: the military strategic objective is achieved by military force whilst the 
political objective is achieved as a result of the military success” (p. 12). Thus, to cope more effectively with 
the uncertainty that characterises stabilisation operations, strategic modelling should be conducted by both 
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policy makers as well as practitioners and needs a constant reassessment to maintain the right balance 
between political level and those who are in the field. 
Representations of the Cynefin framework. Reflecting on the Cynefin framework we suggest that the 
business strategy of the TFU was balancing between the “chaotic” situation of the unordered domain and 
“complicated” situation of the ordered domain. On the one hand, as the business strategy and derived goals 
were developed by the Dutch government (i.e. high-level white paper) we suggest that from their perspective 
the business strategy was found in the “complicated” situation of the ordered domain with the characteristic 
of cause and effect relationships that required some deeper analyses. This view is supported by the high-
level white paper in they issued the important note that clear and tangible results could not (at least 
throughout the first period of the mission) be predicted (Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Defence 
Development Cooperation of the Netherlands, 2005). On the other hand, most interviewees found the 
ISAF mission statement and high-level policy white paper far too abstract. As a result,  a “grassroots” 
strategy was formed by bottom-up planning at the tactical level (i.e. TFU HQ) by developing a what was 
called ‘initial strategy’ defined as the ‘TFU Master Plan’ which functioned as a guideline for the planning 
and execution of the mission. The distinction between ENDS as a stochastic process from ENDS as a 
deterministic process unable to be predicted ex-ante perfectly illustrates the TFU’s sensitive dependence on 
its initial conditions. Therefore, we argue that the abstract ISAF mission statement and high-level policy 
whitepaper fits perfectly with the uncertainty derived from the environmental conditions, in turn, providing 
ground for an inherent order that identifies and models a system’s overall behaviour through adapted and 
acceptable WAYS. However, since this view on the TFU’s strategic model was not supported by that of the 
participants we suggest that for them the business strategy was found in the “complex” situation of the 
unordered domain. 
The TFU was characterised by a heterogeneous system consisting of multiple sub-systems and part of a 
bigger supra-system including IOs, NGOs, local actors and the private sector. As a result, the TFU was able 
to implement most of its organisational strategy, however, cause and effect relationships of the connections 
required some deeper analyses. This is best illustrated by the fact that the TFU, shortly after the start of the 
mission, was ordered to support their higher headquarters for one month (Regional Command South (RC-
S) with one of the BG’s three infantry companies. Moreover, the Chora district was also to be designated 
as one of the densely populated areas and to which the TFU had to deploy part of its forces. This unexpected 
expansion of footprint resulted in the overstretching of resources from the start of the mission. 
Moreover, the overall management of the TFU included centralised planning and decision-making, while 
execution was decentralised. From 2006 until 2009 the decisions were taken by the military commander of 
the TFU (C-TFU). The Political Advisor (PolAd) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs functioned as a personal 
advisor to the C-TFU. Over time this part of the mission’s organisational strategy was identified as 
inefficient. Consequently, as of 2009 TFU HQ made a unique adjustment to its organisational strategy by 
handing over the command of the PRT from a military commander to a career diplomat. Moreover, with 
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this change in command the mission came under dual-headed leadership. The joint decision-making process 
was perceived as effective since they could easily consult each other.  
Another important element of the TFU’s organisational strategy was that of counter-organisation of local 
forces (Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs Development Cooperation of the Netherlands, 2005). In the 
TFU’s case this implied the organisation of local forces that would keep a permanent presence throughout 
the province (i.e. not limited to the densely populated areas of Tirin Kot, Deh Rawud and Chora) by 
manning small bases. The Dutch preferred to partner with the Afghan National Police (ANP) or Afghan 
National Army (ANA). Unfortunately, this was infeasible since these forces were only available in a very 
limited number. A possible alternative brought up by the TFU HQ, namely to partner with local militias 
was rejected due to political caveats (i.e. restrictions) imposed by the Dutch government. Ultimately, a 
creative solution was found that matched both the realities on the ground as well as that of the political 
level. The TFU would partner with the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), a tribal militia that was 
formalised as a sub-unit of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Hence, we suggest the 
organisational strategy of the TFU was balancing between the “complicated” situation of the ordered 
domain and the “chaotic” situation of the unordered domain.  
The TFU’s information strategy suggests a comparable situation. While the TFU was sharing information 
with each other through encrypted ICT assets, most other actors (e.g. IOs; NGOs; local actors both state 
and non-state as well as the private sector) did not receive this information. Conversely, the information 
collected by the latter could only be communicated to the former through unsecure general ICT assets or 
wasn’t shared at all, thereby making cause and effect relationships unclear. Consequently, both the quality 
and quantity of information sharing is very poor, ultimately resulting in an information asymmetry. 
Fortunately, the investments that were made in increasing the information processing capacity through the 
face to face meetings such as the coordination and security meeting proved to be an effective mechanism 
for countering the poor presence of interoperable ICTs. Accordingly, we suggest that the TFU’s information 
strategy was balancing between the “complex” and “chaotic” situation of the unordered domain. 
5.3.2 System diversity 
Uncertainty about relations between actors and uncertainty on how to control INPUT is found to be caused 
by system diversity. Indeed, in the context of stabilisation operations, actors often have to cope with extreme 
cultural differences causing daily friction (Wislow, 2002; Bollen, 2002; Abiew, 2006; Holmes-Eber, 2016), 
and behave strategically in order to maximise their own interests (Williams, 2011). We found that most 
interviewees often experienced tension between the various sub-systems and systems, in turn, impacting to 
the complexities and uncertainties of their interaction. Furthermore, organisations that have to deal with 
ambiguous, intangible and changing goals are experiencing difficulty with establishing performance 
standards and measuring results (Wilson, 1989). This also applies to stabilisation operations where outputs 
often are unobservable and unmeasurable (Dobbins et al., 2005; Zapach, 2014). Consequently, strategic 
management tools are only applicable to a very limited extend (Davids, 2011; Muggah and Sang, 2013).  
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The TFU’s mission required interaction with several other systems (i.e. other coalition factors, IOs, NGOs, 
host nation government and private firms) as part of the supra-system. According to the linear way of 
thinking of an integrated approach, effective collaboration is a key element to success because actions are 
expected to be interdependent (De Coning and Friis, 2011; Zelizer et al., 2013; Lucius and Rietjens, 2016). 
According to the literature, such cross-functional work groups, in regards to the capabilities they provide, 
may outperform individuals in terms of quality decision-making (Ilgen, 1999; Argote et al., 2000). These 
differences of providing information and expertise to the group is known as informational diversity (Homan 
et al., 2007). Informational diversity often comes together with other diversity types such as surface-level or 
demographic (age, gender, ethnicity) and deep-level (differences in personal values and organisational 
culture) diversity (Jackson et al., 1992; Triandis et al., 1993; Williams and O’Reilly, 1998; van Knippenberg 
and Schippers, 2006). Social identity theory explains that humans view themselves in the context of group 
memberships (Tajfel, 1978). Researchers found evidence suggesting that both surface- and deep-level 
diversity influence individual group members’ experiences as well group outcomes (Jackson et al., 1992; 
Milliken & Martins, 1996; Harrison et al., 1998). In particular, surface-level diversity is found to be related 
to inter-relationship conflict (Pelled, 1996; Thatcher et al., 2003). However, we know little about the way 
individual characteristics relate (under what conditions) to group dynamics (Tsui et al., 1992; Williams & 
O’Reilly, 1998).    
Converting these different diversity types can enable the emergence of so-called diversity fault lines that 
may strengthen sub-group categorisation (i.e. “us and them”) (Lau and Murnighan, 1998; van Knippenberg 
et al., 2004). As result of sub-group categorisation, group members can be less willing or trusting to interact 
with each other and hence display less commitment to the group as well as reducing their communication 
(Earley and Mosakowski, 2000; Li and Hambrick, 2005). Thus, diversity may positively influence the 
performance of cross-functional work groups through information processing. Conversely, it may disrupt 
cross-functional group performance due to inter-relationship conflict and when combined with elements 
from surface- and deep-level diversity enable sub-group categorisation.  
Diversity was found to be an important factor that impacted the predictability of the TFU as complex 
system. We differentiate between surface-level and deep-level diversity. Two mainstream types of diversity 
which we be discussed below. 
Surface-level diversity. Surface-level or demographic diversity is an umbrella term which indicates group 
heterogeneity formed through elements such as gender, age, ethnic background and profession (Tsui et al., 
1995; Lawrence, 1997). While people can easily categorise themselves in various ways, denying demographic 
attributes is more difficult (Mohammed and Angell, 2004). Empirical evidence indicates that the creation of 
an initial perception of each other highly depends on surface-level characteristics (McCann et al., 1998). 
According to Pelled (1996) the visibility-level of a specific characteristic and the impact on inter-group 
conflict are causally related. Previous studies found that that heterogeneity on gender and ethnicity increase 
inter-group conflict (Thatcher et al., 2003). Within stabilisation operations, therefore, actor’s demographic 
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characteristics may influence one’s attitude toward other actors. Moreover, it could serve as a potential 
source of the formation of sub-groups within a particular sub-system. The TFU is characterised by its 
multidisciplinary organisation and intentions to meet cooperation and coordination among other actors 
involved.  
Deep-level diversity. Research on group dynamics is mostly concerned with the impact of surface-level 
diversity (Tsui et al., 1995; Milliken and Martins, 1996; Williams and O’Reilly, 1998). Some studies, however, 
have assessed the influence of less observable aspects such as norms, values, beliefs and culture (Jackson et 
al., 1992; Jehn et al., 1999). Due to their less observable character, these differences are considered deep-
level diversity (Harrison et al., 1998). 
Deep-level diversity is often described in literature as an important cause of problems in civil–military 
cooperation (Manning, 2003; Rathmell, 2005; Paris, 2009). Moreover, divide in culture does not only affect 
civil-military cooperation but causes difficulties between the international- and the local actors as well 
(Bollen, 2002; Abiew, 2006; Autesserre, 2014; Holmes-Elber, 2016). Such differences in culture could 
potentially escalate into hostile and violent behaviour from one actor to another (Bordin, 2011).  
Friction was observed between several distinct systems, namely the TFU, the local population, local Afghan 
government and NGOs. More interestingly, friction was found between the sub-systems of the TFU itself 
(i.e. the TFU and BG). This friction was due to differences in organisational culture between the actors 
involved. Schein (1988) defines an organisational culture as “1) a pattern of basic assumptions, 2) invented, 
discovered, or developed by a given group. 3) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation 
and internal integration, 4) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore 5) is to be 
taught to new members as the 6) correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (p. 
7). The purpose of an organisational culture is to refer to the organisation’s core values and beliefs that an 
organisation develops to pursue its mission. We found that the TFU had to cope with differences in 
organisational culture (e.g. interpersonal orientation; time orientation; goal orientation) between its sub-
systems and between the TFU and other complex systems causing daily friction. As a commander TFU puts 
it: 
“The various Ministries as well as these Ministries and NGOs were not often on the same page. It was not 
really easy to have them all on the same sheet of paper. In the best case, we could prevent conflict of interest. 
This is not always easy to operationalise because we come from different organisations, have different working 
cultures and strongly differ in perspective”. (TFU HQ, R1). 
According to Baumann (2009), an organisational culture, however, “not only informs the nature of 
templates, routines and standard practices that a given organisation develops in the pursuit of its mission; it 
is also reflected in the choice of resources and capabilities deemed worth acquiring or maintaining by the 
organisation” (p.72). Thus, organisational culture is used by organisations to identify problems and 
mechanisms to solve them, as well as to define their interests and prioritise them. Finally, organisational 
culture is used to define an organisation’s environment in terms of value and meaning. Despite differences 
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in organisational culture, actors involved in stabilisation operations need to understand the importance of 
establishing some level of inter-relationships since they could need each other’s support (Ashdown, 2003). 
A commander PRT perfectly describes this inevitable paradox: 
“There was always tension, it never became smooth. It is not bad because if we have development and military 
going hand in hand in an operation and there is no struggle something is wrong. Our ultimate goals are maybe 
the same, but the ways we achieve them are fundamentally different. In the military, it is about employing the 
force, we are willing employing the force in order to “subjugate” our opponent, the development people try to 
get the people engage in their economy, so they do not fight anymore, so that is a different mechanic. We need 
each other. You cannot create stability without security, you cannot create security without stability so it goes 
hand in hand”. (PRT, R20). 
The U.S. military units deployed into Uruzgan province under the mandate of Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF). The C-TFU had received orders from his leadership in the Netherlands not to collaborate, but to 
“only support in extremis”. Thus, interaction was hampered by political constraints. There was neither a 
functional relationship nor institutionalised structure between them. In practice this meant that both the C-
TFU and the leadership of the OEF units in the Province informed each other about their intentions with 
the purpose of deconfliction. An exception were the activities from the US Special Operation Factors (US 
SOF) of which the C-TFU was not informed due to sensitivity of their activities. 
“Only remark were the operations conducted by US SOF in the area. We simply didn’t know what they did and 
what possible effects they created in the province”. (TFU HQ, R4). 
This lack of deconfliction with the C-TFU, who was appointed “battlespace owner”, potentially settled the 
system in unordered conditions since the US SOF operations could create contradictory effects to those of 
the TFU. A C-PRT explains: 
“We were developing projects related to education, infrastructure and healthcare for example. We invested in 
strengthening the relationships with the local population. Then at night a raid has been conducted by the US 
SOF units. Obviously, without anyone knowing about this. This creates friction in the relationships between 
us. More importantly, it jeopardised our relationships with the locals since they all see us as Western factors”. 
(PRT, R22).  
Communication and collaboration with IOs and NGOs took place through the PRT. There was no 
functional relationship between the C-PRT and the IOs and NGOs. The institutionalised structure was non-
hierarchical (i.e. mutual influence) and agreements were achieved through bargaining or arguing. However, 
only a very limited number of UN agencies were present in Uruzgan Province. It took until 2009 that the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) started operating in the Province. This 
applied for the NGOs as well, since there were only six international NGOs present at the start of the TFU 
in 2006. However, over time their presents was greatly enhanced with almost fifty by the end of 2010. 
Several NGOs were very reluctant to be associated with the TFU due to fundamental principles (i.e. 
humanitarian principles, independence and neutrality). Conversely, it is military personnel who typically are 
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frustrated to work with partner organisations such as NGOs “whose social and organisational structures are 
much more fluid, egalitarian and (from a military perspective) ill-defined (Holmes-Eber, 2016, p.196). Other 
NGOs acted more pragmatic and stood open for some form of interaction due to instrumental motives 
(e.g. government funding). Other reasons for hampering interaction were differences in organisational 
culture (i.e. time vision; organisational structure). A CivRep sums it up: 
“There was a mutual tension between the NGOs and us, therefore, collaboration took place based on inter-
personal relationships. However, the security situation throughout the province was very fragile, making it very 
difficult for them to operate outside the ADZ’s. What we have learned is that if you want the development 
activities to be sustainable, and to reach out to the local people, you need to do it with the IOs and NGOs, the 
TFU could not do that alone. NGOs can do their work when the area is secure enough. There you see the 
potential cooperation between the civilian and the military that could lead to concrete results”. (TFU HQ, R8). 
The interaction with the local Afghan actors also took place through the PRT. Both the C-TFU and CivRep 
had their own relationships with government officials such as the governor of Uruzgan province. The 
institutional structure for this interaction was non-hierarchical (i.e. mutual influence). The mode of 
communication was agreement by bargaining or arguing. The underlying motives were both instrumental 
and relational. The TFU had to support the local Afghan government with stabilising and reconstructing 
Uruzgan province. Accordingly, the Dutch intended to establish ‘an Afghan face’ to their operations in 
order to enhance the credibility of the Afghan government. Although this illustrate the Dutch their 
awareness in regard to the importance and long-term effectiveness through local ownership, they failed to 
understand that the local authorities selected were contested by the local population (Grandia, 2015). This 
may have complicated the interaction between the TFU and the local population even more. One could 
argue if this was not the result of ineffective Dutch high level politics which was aimed at shaping the 
operating environment with the intent to create favourable conditions for the TFU in which it could achieve 
its goals. This argument is formed around the fact that the Dutch government (as described above) upon 
agreeing on the TFU mission successfully secured the removal of Jan Mohamed Khan as official Governor 
of Uruzgan province. The Dutch subsequently negotiated the removal of the provincial chief of police Rozi 
Khan, who as a member of the Jan Mohamed Khan government, was considered a potential risk to the 
interaction between the TFU and the local population (Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and 
Development Cooperation of the Netherlands, 2005). According to Kitzen (2016) this high level diplomacy 
“could be understood from the perspective of long-term state building, which requires independent 
institutions free of local influences, its short-term ramifications in Uruzgan were devastating for the fragile 
counterbalance against Jan Mohammed Khan’s network; the sacking of Rozi Khan left Matiullah Khan’s 
Afghan Highway Police (AHP) – which was not touched by Dutch diplomacy – as the only capable force 
in the province and thereby seriously weakened the position of Governor Munib (p. 379). Hence, these 
decisions were primarily based upon poor intelligence over the local context of Uruzgan province and 
resulted in an increase of OMF activities and a subsequent deteriorated security situation (Green, 2012). 
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The role of experts and particularly of the tribal advisor was recognised as key to supporting this interaction 
since the TFU severely lacked an understanding over the local context. Interestingly, to better understand 
the local-context of Uruzgan Province, a so-called civil-assessment of the province was conducted by an 
Afghan NGO, The Liaison Office (TLO) through the Dutch Embassy in Kabul. One could describe the 
civil-assessment as a method for actor analysis, commonly known in strategic management literature as 
stakeholder analysis (Grimble and Chan, 1995; Bryson, 2004). In short the civil-assessment consisted of 
ethnographic fieldwork and was conducted between May and June 2006. The findings of the assessment 
were used by the embassy to develop a context analyses that outlined how to strategically engage 
communities through development activities (TLO, 2006; Royal Netherlands Embassy in Kabul, 2006; 
Grandia, 2015; Kitzen, 2016). Although the civil-assessment seemed a solid initiative from the Dutch to 
enhance their understanding over the local context. Although this report was sent by TLO to the Dutch 
Embassy in July 2006 it only became available to the TFU in August 2006 and the mission had already 
started. Consequently, the outcomes of the civil assessment arrived too late to have an impact on the TFU’s 
initial planning. 
Some of the private firms involved were an element of the TFU itself. There were for example private firms 
which contributed to the security of TFU’s compound by deploying Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAV). 
There were also firms responsible for part of the logistics such as food and water. The relationship between 
the C-TFU and the personnel of these private firms was functional, since they had established a contract. 
The collaboration motives were instrumental since the Dutch government hired them for several reasons. 
First, they had unique resources which can be deployed quickly. Second, their services were cheaper. The 
private firms, obviously collaborated with the TFU to make profit. This typical entanglement of maximising 
wealth of private firms and the requirements to involve a range of stakeholders from Uruzgan province as 
well as from the Dutch government in the interaction, is challenging. Other private firms with whom the 
TFU interacted focused on deploying resources and activities into the actual province. One private firm 
supporting the “saffron project” - meant to support the Afghan farmers replacing their agriculture activities 
from poppy into saffron - was mentioned several times. Through this business model they intended to make 
profit and at the same time create a better situation for the Afghan people. As described by a CIMIC officer: 
“Promoting the growth of saffron instead of poppy. Saffron will ultimately provide more revenues for the 
farmers themselves. The starting cost was paid by the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs. For these projects the 
TFU used civilian entrepreneurs from the Netherlands to support the education of local Afghan entrepreneurs. 
These projects are part of the tasks the International Development of Entrepreneurial Activities (IDEA) had. 
Their projects involved socio-economic development and entrepreneurial activities through providing micro 
credit to local Afghan entrepreneurs. It was a partly commercial project, and the training was done through the 
PRT”. (PRT, R25). 
Therefore, we suggest that the diversity amongst the various sub-systems of the TFU and between the 
mission and the other systems involved are scattered over the three domains of the Cynefin framework. An 
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overview of the analyses of uncertainty and the predictability of the TFU’s condition as complex system 
while applying the framework is presented in figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.6: The predictability of the TFU’s condition as complex system applied to the Cynefin framework. 
 
To summarise, the TFU can be understood as complex system that is heavily impacted by different types 
of uncertainty derived from its internal organisation as well as the external environment. The impact 
uncertainty (i.e. sensitive dependence on initial conditions and equifinality), modelling uncertainty (imprecise 
knowledge on how to control input), uncertainty about relations between actors, environmental uncertainty 
(i.e. unpredictable events and factors beyond control) and uncertainty about outcomes can be divided in 
two dimensions, namely complexity and change. Internal and external complexity relates to a number of 
issues to which the TFU had to attend and the degree to which they were interconnected. Internal and 
external change relates to the degree of discontinues change that occurred within the TFU. Furthermore, 
internal and external uncertainty can be categorised in four distinct domains (Duncan, 1972). Figure 3.3 
illustrates the four dimensions and corresponding levels of internal and external uncertainty. Hence, we 
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conclude that the complexity and discontinuous change that characterised the strategic model and system 
diversity of the TFU as well as the operating environment resulted in a high level of both internal and 
external uncertainty.  
Accordingly, proposition 1a and 1b are supported by the case study: 
Proposition 1a:   
The uncertainty derived from the internal organisation impacts the predictability of a system’s condition. 
Proposition 1b:    
The uncertainty derived from the external environment impacts the predictability of a system’s condition. 
 
In the next section, we will discuss how the TFU acquired information from the environmental conditions, 
and interaction with its environment to describe the need for emergent behaviour and self-organisation to 
cope with this uncertainty. 
 
5.4 SELF-ORGANISATION AND THE FACTORS OF DIFFERENTIATION 
AND INTEGRATION 
 
The logic behind complex systems is that new ideas and concepts must be explored and formulated in 
response to stimuli from inside or outside the system’s boundary by developing schemata (Gell-Mann, 
1994). Moreover, Taylor argues that “if the input of the so-called real world cannot be effectively processed, 
the schema either adapts or becomes obsolete (p. 206). This logic is increasingly important in stabilisation 
operations where the real world is uncertain, ever-changing and unpredictable. As described by King (2000), 
the complex system needs to remain open to structural and behavioural change “since the system has to 
cope with unpredictable change in the environment, the development of the structure cannot be contained 
in a rigid [deterministic] programme that controls the behaviour of the system” (p. 79). Consequently, a 
system can reach points of bifurcation and new high order, more differentiated, structures may emerge 
(Urry, 2003). In the context of this study, a system’s self-organising ability to differentiate and integrate its 
sub-systems, organisational resources and competencies (i.e. bifurcation and emergence of new order and 
structures) serves as the representation of this structural and behavioural change. 
Reflecting on the strategic documents (i.e. the TFU masterplan, focal paper and UCP) that described the 
activities the TFU needed to conduct illustrates the requirement of a combination of expertise from its 
various sub-systems and other systems of the supra-system. The three ENDS (safe and secure environment; 
socioeconomic development and governance) and their seven derivative LoE (security apparatus; secure 
areas; infrastructure; basic living conditions; health & education; economic diversity and governance support 
& capacity) described in the focal paper and UCP, only one – safe and secure environment -  relied heavily 
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on the BG, whereas the others – socioeconomic development and governance – required substantive input 
from the PRT, IOs, NGOs, host nation government as well as local actors. This division of labour was 
clearly illustrated through the organisational design of the TFU (i.e. differentiation of sub-systems) 
characterised by its classic hierarchical institutionalised structures. However, as described previously, the 
fact that the Dutch government labelled and presented the TFU politically as a non-kinetic stabilisation and 
development operation was experienced differently by most interviewees. Consequently, the realities on the 
ground proved it difficult to establish neatly delineated roles and tasks of the sub-systems and other systems. 
Instead, the TFU organise and conduct in an environment that was balancing between ‘permissive’ and 
‘non-permissive’ (i.e. hostility within the operating environment) with a form of hybrid division of labour 
that requires certain relationships between sub-systems and systems. This reflects on the general assumption 
that certain preconditions in terms of security provide ground for political, social and economic 
development, or as described in a Defence White Paper (2000) “. . . An integrated approach is necessary 
also for stabilisation and reconstruction after cessation of fighting. Diplomatic, economic, humanitarian 
and, if needed, military instruments need to be deployed in an integrated fashion. . . . Defence and 
development aid go hand in hand. The military was there to set the proper conditions” (p. 25). In other 
words, the TFU experienced several points of bifurcation since foresights were unpredictable and hence 
differentiation and integration was depending on the system’s condition. One of the problems for the TFU 
was that the complexities of the relationships, due to structural and behavioural change, were difficult to 
understand, let alone predict. This situation perfectly illustrates our argument for introducing the non-linear 
sciences to cope more effectively with the realities of multi-actor interaction during stabilisation operations 
which provides ground for self-organisation through the factors of integration and differentiation. 
As discussed in the presentation of the conceptual model, self-organisation depends on the presence and 
impact of two distinct types of enabling conditions. First, systems must consist of sub-systems that are 
compatible, that is the feasibility of the relationship. Second, in order to create a unified effort, sub-systems 
must be integrated. That is, the desirability of the relationship. We argue that the compatibility and 
integration effort is determined by non-linear feedback mechanisms that will display unpredictable emergent 
behaviour. Below, we will present several distinct examples to illustrate, to a limited extend, the TFU’s self-
organising ability to differentiate or integrate its own sub-systems, organisational resources and 
competencies and with those of other systems as part of the supra-system. Representations will be presented 
by using the Cynefin framework. 
5.4.1 “Simple” situation 
According to the propositions made in chapter 3 we would expect that systems that find themselves in the 
ordered situation of “simple” are mainly driven by negative feedback controls within both the formal and 
informal organisation. As a result, a single system is expected to be integrated (i.e. strong centralised) while 
the supra-system will be differentiated (i.e. weak distributed). Additionally, since the relationship between 
cause and effect is expected to be “clear” (i.e. low-level of uncertainty) the volume of information which 
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needs to be distributed is low. Hence, the organisation design strategy is expected to be characterised by 
rules and programs, hierarchical referral and goal setting.  
According to the findings presented in the previous section, the TFU did not find itself in the ordered 
domain of “simple”. The reasoning for this is twofold. First, the TFU was unsuccessful to design and 
implement an information strategy that supported their organisational and business strategy as part of their 
strategic model. As a result, internal and distributed information processing was hampered by the absence 
of a general information system or database with access to all the TFU’s sub-systems as well as other systems 
as part of the supra-system. Moreover, external distributed information processing was hindered due to 
cultural differences causing daily friction and actors behaving strategically to maximise their own interests 
and subscribe to different priorities. As a result, the number of potential interrelationships, coalitions, issues 
and conflicts increased exponentially. Finally, the uncertainty of the operating environment prevented the 
TFU to completely understand the cause and effect relationships throughout the overall province.  
5.4.2 “Complicated” situation 
In the situation of “complicated” we proposed to find systems whose formal organisation is mainly driven 
by negative feedback controls while their informal organisation is expected to be potentially driven by 
positive feedback controls. Hence, we expected to find a single system to be integrated (i.e. strong 
centralised) as well as connections with other systems (i.e. strong distributed). In addition, we expect that 
the distribution of information will increase since cause and effect relationships are “complicated”. In other 
words, with sufficient time, information and resources, actors should be able to understand these 
relationships and use them to forecast. Therefore, we expect to find an increase in information processing 
capacity through the investment in vertical information systems (i.e. strong centralised) as through the 
creation of lateral relationships (i.e. strong distributed). These expectations are partly supported by the case 
study. The following examples are used to illustrate the application of these non-linear feedback controls 
within these interactions and their subsequent impact on the enabling conditions for differentiation and 
integration. 
Integration through environmental demands. First, integration was observed that was determined by 
environmental demands. In other words, information from outside the system’s boundary was received and 
then transformed by positive feedback controls into outputs. We illustrate this transformation of 
information and subsequent form of emergent behaviour with the following example: ‘during reconstruction 
activities in the province where the security situation was very fragile (i.e. ‘non-permissive’ environment), 
BG infantry platoons safeguarded PRT mission teams during reconstruction activities. Hence, integration 
occurred because certain capabilities of these two sub-systems matched and were in alignment and thus 
could operate as a system, that is, they were compatible. The fragile security situation hampered the PRT’s 
freedom of movement throughout the province, in turn, positively influencing the TFU’s management (i.e. 
TFU HQ, BG and PRT) to stimulate integration. Thus, the relationship was desirable. In addition, the TFU 
HQ served as a catalyst by providing the necessary facilitating conditions (e.g. providing 6 month roadmaps; 
123
holding daily meetings) to assure the two sub-systems were compatible (i.e. in accordance with the TFU’s 
goals).  
However, the relationship between the BG and PRT was tense. This was mainly due to differences in 
military background and derivative ways of operating, specifically in their focus on intelligence processes. 
The commanders of the two sub-systems typically had an infantry or engineer corps background 
respectively, hence the BG was primarily enemy-centric, by contrast, the PRT was more population-centric 
(Kitzen, 2016). Additionally, discussion took place between the two sub-systems over who became the 
leading unit, in military terminology supporting – supported. It was the responsibility of the C-TFU to define 
the tasks and roles between the two sub-systems and appoint the leading sub-system. Therefore, we 
conclude that the integration effort was a consequence of the hierarchical relationship between three sub-
systems. The relationship was thus desirable from the TFU HQ perspective.  
The compatibility and integration effort extended even further than the organisational resources and 
competencies of the BG, PRT and TFU HQ. For the same reasoning as mentioned above, namely the fragile 
security situation, this joint patrols could be complemented with helicopters from the ATF, who in turn, 
safeguarded the joint patrol from the air. Again, the organisational resources and competencies of the three 
sub-systems matched and were in alignment and hence were compatible. The integration effort was ensured 
since the integration of these three sub-systems was supported by the TFU HQ who had a hierarchical 
relationship with the sub-systems. Again, the relationship was desirable from the TFU HQ perspective. 
Integration through necessity. Second, the TFU had to deal with scarce resources for its operations, 
making resource-dependency a key motive for integration. Therefore, joining and coordinating the 
deployment of organisational resources and competencies were more efficient. As a CivRep stated: 
 “We were operating with very scarce resources. We only had so many armoured vehicles for so many things 
we could use it for. Whether an armoured vehicle was used for a certain patrolling activity that day or for a visit 
to the governor.  These types of choices were considered in terms of what was most necessary that day”. (TFU 
HQ, R8). 
Integration through emergent behaviour. A third and very specific example of integration was observed 
in a situation where information from inside the system’s boundary was received and then transformed by 
positive feedback controls into outputs: the command and control process of the TFU HQ appeared to be 
inefficient. Consequently, in 2008 the command of the TFU was partly handed over to a CivRep and thereby 
making the TFU HQ dual headed (Mollema and Matthijssen, 2008). This example perfectly illustrates that 
by following the positive feedback loop, disturbances were amplified and thus moved the TFU further away 
from its point of origin, to a point of bifurcation where a more differentiated structure emerged. This 
bifurcation was not the outcome of prior shared intentions but rather it was the result of complex 
interactions between the sub-systems (through self-organisation and emergent behaviour) in the absence of 
prior shared intentions. The unique situation in which a civilian official co-commands a military unit 
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perfectly illustrates that sub-systems must be compatible in terms of organisational resources as well as 
competencies if they are combined in such a fashion. A CivRep explains: 
“The TFU was civilian-military led by both a CivRep and a military commander. Each had very different 
responsibilities. Needless to say, it was not my task to lead the military operations but yet all decisions were 
taken by the two persons together. Whenever a decision had to be made it was discussed from both a military 
and a civilian perspective. The different perspectives were compared and then based on that integrated 
approach a decision was taken”. (TFU HQ, R9). 
The type of change in organisational structure with relatively low levels of standardisation, formalisation 
and role specialisation was also found by Lawrence and Lorsch (1973) in their study of governmental 
departments facing the highest levels of uncertainty on the one hand and lowest numbers of management 
and use of formal control system on the other.  
Differentiation through design. Conversely, differentiation was found in situations that simply not 
required integration between two or more sub-systems. In other words, there was no stimuli from either 
inside the system boundary or from outside the system’s boundary to conduct the ex-ante assessment in 
order to determine potential compatibility and integration effort. These findings perfectly match the 
organisational design strategy of the TFU which was based upon on a clear division of labour with 
hierarchical institutionalised structures (Ministries of Defence, Development Cooperation and Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, 2005). 
Differentiation through self-interest. More importantly, however, differentiation was found in situations 
where actors of a sub-system demonstrated instable behaviour by ignoring the TFU HQ’s response to 
stimuli from outside the system’s boundary, namely the unstable security situation, and thereby potentially 
settling the whole system into unordered or more dangerously disordered conditions. A commander TFU 
explains: 
“The people from the Ministry of Development Cooperation had a different agenda and therefore they looked 
completely different at the security situation in the Province. To mention an example: there was an employee 
of them who said she wanted to look in the village of Tirin Kot. There was no permission for such visit due to 
the unstable security situation at that time. There was a project of an ambulance that was restored and it could 
bring wounded Afghans to the Dutch compound if needed. One day she simply dressed into a burka and got 
in that ambulance and then went into the village. And no one knew about that trip. The moment she came back 
to the base everyone was let’s say “surprised”…”. (TFU HQ, R2). 
A complex system remains open to changes in response to information received from its environment, 
closing on themselves must be avoided at all cost (Bousquet, 2009). The fact that the TFU was politically 
framed as a stabilisation and reconstruction operation could potentially have resulted in a dangerous state if 
the TFU had indeed ignored the information received from its environment. Fortunately, the realities on 
the ground quickly made the TFU HQ and its sub-systems realise they were facing a COIN mission which 
required different operational processes, inter alia, goal-setting, decision-making and tactical procedures. 
125
Although the TFU did recognise the tension derived from the political debate back in the Netherlands 
whether it was a COIN mission or not, it perceived the situation as one of being the very condition of 
change and creativity. Thus, the TFU used information (i.e. schemata) as the key operating process through 
which the change of its behaviour and organisational structure took place. This illustrates our argument to 
view stabilisation operations as complex open system with non-linear interaction with its environmental 
conditions, receiving input, processing the input, and finally exporting outputs. Such an input – 
transformation – output model should be characterised by its non-linearity, emergent behaviour and 
ultimately self-organisation, all depending on a system’s condition. 
In sum, interactions that take place in the “complicated” domain require strong centralised and strong 
distributed connections. We expected to find that strong distributed connections would result in a single 
system to be integrated. Additionally, systems driven by positive feedback controls, were expected to 
positively impact both the compatibility and integration effort of systems to interact and hence would 
integrate with each other. Furthermore, both sub-systems and systems in the “complicated” situation were 
indeed compatible. However, regarding the integration effort an important distinction has to be made 
whether the integration effort is based on rational choice or determined by the external demands. Whereas 
the former (driven by negative feedback controls) is more likely to differentiate and the latter (driven by 
positive feedback controls) is more likely to integrate. 
5.4.3 “Complex” situation 
In the “complex” situation of the unordered domain we expect to find systems that are mainly driven by 
positive feedback controls characterised by increased levels of interaction and communication between two 
or more systems (i.e. weak centralised and strong distributed). Moreover, to cope with the high uncertainty 
by which the “complex” situation is characterised large amounts of information need to be processed. Thus, 
we expect to find an increase in information processing capacity through the creation of lateral relations (i.e. 
strong distributed). Again, these expectations are only partly supported by the case study. It was found that 
the TFU was characterised by various interactions that were found in the “complex” situation of the 
unordered domain. The following examples are used to illustrate the application of these non-linear 
feedback controls within these interactions and their subsequent impact on the enabling conditions for 
differentiation and integration. 
As described above, the instable behaviour demonstrated by actors of a sub-system could have led to 
potentially unordered or even disordered conditions. A distinction needs to be made whether this instable 
behaviour is demonstrated by the formal or informal organisation. In this particular example the instable 
behaviour was part of the formal organisation since visiting Tirin Kot was part of the daily activities of the 
TFU. However, we argue that for stabilisation operations to be effective, the formal organisation needs to 
demonstrate stable behaviour, securing ordered conditions for executing daily operations. By contrast, the 
informal system can potentially display instable behaviour, securing unordered conditions to promote 
change and adaptation to stimuli from either inside or outside the system’s boundary. Thus, for a system to 
126
be changeable it requires a state of bounded instability. An excellent example of such bounded instable 
behaviour was mentioned by some of the interviewees:  
Integration through a sense of urgency. While former governor and warlord Jan Mohammad Khan – at 
the start of the TFU in 2006 – was forced to resign as provincial governor, he still had a strong influence 
since his cousin Matiullah was the chief of the Afghan Highway Police. However, the commander TFU 
recognised that his US and Australian partners cooperated with both men. As a result, the commander 
decided (with permission of the Dutch Government) to have covert meetings with Jan Mohammad Khan 
to gain some influence as well. The commander did not participate in these meetings personally due to their 
sensitive character. Therefore, the commander of the PRT took upon this task. In sum, while the TFU’s 
formal system demonstrated stable behaviour (conducting daily operations), the informal system, in turn, 
demonstrated instable behaviour in order to integrate with Jan Mohammed Khan. Consequently, although 
the relationship was undesirable from the TFU’s point of view, integration occurred through a sense of 
urgency. 
Integration through local-ownership. A second example of integration were the micro-finance projects 
managed by the PRT (i.e. Integrated Development of Entrepreneurial Activities (IDEA)) aimed at 
stimulating socio-economic development. These projects – so-called ‘track 1’ quick and visible 
(development) projects (QVPs) were initiated by the PRT (CIMIC) and focused on local actors who wanted 
to start a small business. ‘Track 1’ QVPs were mainly conducted within the ADZs. The personnel of the 
PRT were acting as consultants to the local actors. These projects were financed through the Dutch 
Embassy in Kabul while the local actors held ownership over the project. Additionally, the NGOs could 
also participate in these projects or initiate them by themselves. Requests for funding were to be made 
through the Embassy. Interestingly, an important bifurcation was observed in regards to the integration 
between the PRT and the local NGOs and Afghan population. Parallel to the ‘track 1’ QVPs within the 
ADZs, so-called ‘track 2’ QVPs were conducted outside the TFUs oil spot. ‘Track 2’ QVPs are covert 
reconstruction activities initiated by the Dutch Embassy in Kabul and were implemented through local 
actors who were close to the local population. Due to the sensitivity of these activities and the importance 
to protect the local participants the existence of this program was not publicly known to the biggest part of 
the TFU. Consequently, the program’s activities were not included in the TFU’s campaign plan nor were 
the activities aligned with those of other units that were part of the TFU.  
Differentiation through cultural differences. As we have learned throughout this study, circumstances 
vary so enormously during stabilisation operations that a vast array of factors that determine self-
organisation need to be appreciated. Organisational culture was found to be an important factor for a state 
of differentiation between the TFU’s sub-systems and between the TFU and other complex systems. For 
example, integration between the TFU and a NGO was not realised since the TFU governmental affiliation 
and a NGOs neutral character were incompatible due to a lack of integration effort.  
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“For good collaboration, there must be the desire to collaborate and a common idea on what you collaborate 
on and what you can share with each other. That is more a political decision from the organisation of what we 
can offer and what we expect from others…These are often personal processes that also have to do with 
trusting each other, knowing each other personally and also knowing which information the other could use 
and which information can be shared”. (TFU HQ, R14). 
Other NGOs acted more pragmatically and stood open for some form of interaction due to instrumental 
motives (e.g. government funding or resource dependency) resulting in the exchange of information and 
contingency planning for potential crisis situations: 
“There are arrangements in case of emergencies and evacuations that you can find each other in such a 
situation”. (TFU HQ, R14). 
Differentiation through political constraints. Another example of incompatibility was observed between 
the U.S. military units deployed into Uruzgan province operating under the mandate of Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) and the TFU operating under the ISAF mandate. The C-TFU had received orders from 
his leadership in the Netherlands not to collaborate, but to “only support in extremis” (an example will be 
described below). Consequently, incompatibility occurred due to political constraints. In the language of 
systems theory, the values of the properties were incongruent (Orlikowski, 2000).  
5.4.4 “Chaotic” situation 
For systems who find themselves in the “chaotic” situation the Cynefin framework argues for both weak 
centralised and distributed connections. Accordingly, in these situations systems should focus on 
establishing order through a top-down approach with no time for investigation or asking for input. As a 
result, the management structure is strong centralised with weak or non-existent distributed connections 
between the various systems, without any form of connection feasible. Thus, the various systems are 
expected to be in isolation. In order to deal with the high-level uncertainty (i.e. unclear cause and effect 
relationships) we expect to find systems that focus either on the reduction of information processing needs 
or on an increase in information processing capacity.  These expectations are partly supported by our 
findings.  
During the battle of Chora, fighting occurred between coalition forces (e.g. the TFU, US military as part of 
OEF as well as the ANA) and the OMF. Both sides sought to gain control over the district of Chora which 
was of strategic value for both sides. After a few days of intensive fighting the OMF withdraw from the 
district. The fighting resulted in the tragic loss of 16 Afghan soldiers, 1 American, 2 Dutch and reportedly 
71 OMF fighters. Sadly an estimated 58 civilians lose their life as well. Hence, the TFU had to deal with 
cause and effect relationships that were very unclear and from which they could not be isolated. 
Consequently, order was established through a top-down approach centralised management structure (i.e. 
TFU HQ). Contrary to our expectations, the TFU, through its centralised management structure, was able 
to maintain strong distributed connections with other systems as part of the supra-system (e.g. IOs, NGOs 
and the US military). 
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5.4.5 Disordered domain 
The systems that are facing the disordered domain are expected to remain the status quo until they are pushed 
into one of the other domains by self-organisation or management efforts. However, the TFU did not find 
itself in the disordered domain. 
In table 5.2 we present an overview of the TFU’s self-organising ability to differentiate and integrate its 
resources through the ex-ante assessment of the enabling conditions. Representations are presented by using 
the Cynefin framework. 
Table 5.2: TFU and the factors of integration and differentiation. 





Single system to be integrated 
 
Supra-system to be differentiated 
Not supported (lack of data) 
 





Single system to be integrated 
 
 
Supra-system slightly integrated 
Compatibility supported by data  
Integration effort partly supported by data* 
 
Compatibility supported by data  
Integration effort partly supported by data* 
 
* distinction between intentional choice (i.e. 
design) and determined by the environment)  
“Complex” Supra-system to be integrated Not supported 
 
* Additional finding: integration effort 
positively impacts compatibility 
 
“Chaotic” 






“Disordered” Status quo Not supported (lack of data) 
 
We argue that the TFU should be understood as a complex open systems composed of multiple sub-systems 
that interact in a non-linear fashion, in turn impacting its condition from inside the system’s boundary. 
Furthermore, the TFU was exposed to a highly complex, dynamic and uncertain environment from which 
it could not be isolated, thus impacting its condition from outside the system’s boundary. As a result, the 
TFU demonstrated bounded instable behaviour (i.e. non-linear feedback mechanism) resulting in the 
dynamic equilibrium of its condition. This behaviour is partly the outcome of rational choice or determined 
by environmental demands. 
Accordingly, proposition 2 is supported by the case study: 
Proposition 2:   
The dynamic equilibrium of a system’s condition is expected to positively impact its required self-organising 
ability.  
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Integration occurs when either the feasibility or desirability, or both, of the ability of sub-systems or systems 
to interact is positive. By contrast, differentiation occurs when the ex-ante assessment of the ability of sub-
systems or systems to interact is negative. In other words, sub-systems require several modifications in order 
to allow for interaction. 
Therefore, proposition 3 is supported by the case study: 
Proposition 3:  
A system in dynamic equilibrium is expected to be mainly driven by non-linear feedback controls, thereby 
enabling its required self-organising ability to differentiate or integrate. 
 
5.5 CONDITION-DEPENDENT CAPABILITIES 
 
Self-organisation or co-evolution (i.e. differentiation and integration) is the result of the ex-ante assessment 
of the enabling conditions. Ideally, the systems involved share information which subsequently leads to a 
state of shared awareness amongst the supra-system and then provides ground for the identifying threats 
and opportunities, and identifying potential resource compatibility. This is known as the process of 
“schemata” (Gell-Mann, 1994). Being responsive to the outcomes of the ex-ante assessment relates to the 
planning of potential activities to the situation observed (i.e. needs, threats and opportunities) including 
those from an integrated or differentiated perspective. Having shared awareness over the operating 
environment is thus important, as a commander PRT explains: 
“If we deployed our factors into a certain area to provide security, it is very important to have a good 
understanding of what the other agencies, reconstruction teams or NGOs are doing during this military 
operation, but this also after securing part of the area. So, the importance is not only of having a successful 
military operation, but also to stress the importance of the follow on”. (PRT, R22). 
Unfortunately, as we have illustrated in section 5.3.1 the TFU did not succeed in creating a state of shared 
awareness due the absence of their information strategy. However, as presented in the previous section, it 
possessed, to a limited extent, the self-organising ability to differentiate and integrate its resources. As a 
result, sub-system capabilities were formed through the relationships between the organisational resources 
and competencies from an individual subsystem (e.g. daily activities from the TFU HQ, BG, PRT etc. in 
isolation). Additionally, system capabilities were formed through the integration of the organisational 
resources and competencies from two or more systems in a relationship (e.g. the joint patrols of the BG 
and PRT supported by the ATF or the dual-headed leadership of the TFU-HQ). Finally, supra-system 
capabilities were formed through the integration of the organisational resources and competencies of two 
or more systems (e.g. the covert talks between the C-PRT and Matiullah and (reconstruction activities of 
the PRT (including ‘track 1 and 2’ QVPs), various NGOs and local businesses funded by the TFU). 
Accordingly, proposition 4 is supported by the data. 
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Proposition 4:   
System’s self-organising ability to differentiate and integrate positively impacts the development of 




As described in section 5.3, the ISAF mission statement and high-level policy white paper were perceived 
by most interviewees as abstract the ENDS hardly measurable. Similar results were found by Rietjens et al. 
(2013) who suggested that “ambiguity led to a lack of common understanding of the goals and tasks of 
CIMIC among different contributing nations, rotations and military command levels within ISAF” (p. 345). 
We argue that this perception was caused by too much focus of the TFU on the traditional linear strategic 
model driven with its overemphasis on ENDS. The TFU attempted to translate the ISAF mission statement 
and high-level policy white paper into a strategic model which would describe the attempted achievement 
of desired political ENDS (i.e. a desired situation in terms of objectives), through the choice of suitable 
strategic WAYS (i.e. the ‘how’ in the form of a concept), employing largely the TFU’s MEANS (i.e. policy 
instruments by which some ENDS can be achieved). 
As a result, outcomes were measured by adopting Results-Based Management (RBM), a performance 
management system known in the private sector (Try & Radnor, 2007). More specifically, the TFU translated 
RBM to Effects-Based Operations (EBO) which is applied in practice through an implementation plan that 
consists of seven phases (NATO, 2006). As described in section 5.3.1, the initial TFU Master Plan was 
based on 4 lines of operation (Governance & Justice; Security & Stability; Development; Credible TF). 
Goals were formulated for 6 months + 2 months overlap due to the rotation rhythm. Every rotation applied 
this mechanism. By using an Effects-based Approach to Operations (EBO) the ‘Master Plan’ described the 
overall effects that were critical to mission success. Interestingly, the TFU applied a different framework 
than RC-S HQ and ISAF HQ respectively. Whereas the former defined 23 effects, the later defined 11 
effects. According to several respondents the exact content of these effects differed considerably. This 
situation potentially hampered the horizontal comparison between different provinces made by higher HQ’s 
and disrupted the vertical alignment between the tactical and operational level within the ISAF mission. 
Moreover, within the ISAF mission, the definition of effects served as the starting point from which each 
hierarchical level formulated seven Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) and performance (MoP) (Rietjens et 
al., 2011). Again, differences between the TFU and other sub-systems of ISAF were found. An important 
reason for these differences was the fact that each Task Force was controlled by, and held accountable to, 
their respective home countries. Another difficulty with applying EBO within the TFU was that its existence 
and application were not known throughout the Task Force.  
Moreover, in order to determine the exact outcomes one needs to identify cause and effect relationships. 
According to many respondents this was a difficult task and even when it was possible to determine a certain 
outcome, it often was impossible to identify what had caused the outcome. This is mainly due to the 
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interconnectedness and nonlinear relationships in the complex system. The interconnectedness and 
nonlinearity (it goes in all directions) is perfectly illustrated by the ‘TFU Master Plan’, its lines of operation 
and desired effects which is presented in figure 5.4.  
Finally, it is questionable if certain outcomes could be labelled “positive outcomes” due to the fact that the 
participating systems had different views of a situation and subscribed to different priorities and preferences 
for particular solutions. Moreover social complexity resulted in different options in regards to what was fair 
and just in policy making. We illustrate this with the following three examples: 
The TFU developed several projects by itself or through integration with other systems. The so-called 
“saffron project” was meant to support the Afghan farmers replacing their agriculture activities from poppy 
into saffron. This project was an integrated effort from the TFU HQ, PRT and international as well as local 
private firms. The purpose of this integrated business model was to generate alternative income for the local 
Afghan farmer while simultaneously creating a better situation for the Afghan people. A CIMIC officer 
specifies the importance of these projects:  
“Promoting the growth of saffron instead of poppy. Saffron will ultimately provide more revenues for the 
farmers themselves. The starting cost was paid by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  For these projects 
the TFU used civilian entrepreneurs from the Netherlands to support the education of local Afghan 
entrepreneurs.  These projects are part of the tasks the International Development of Entrepreneurial Activities 
(IDEA) had. Their projects involved socio-economic development and entrepreneurial activities through 
providing micro credit to local Afghan entrepreneurs. It was a partly commercial project, and the training was 
done through the PRT” (PRT, R25). 
From the TFU’s perspective, we can expect this was a positive outcome. A second project that was 
mentioned by most of the interviewees was one that focused on the production of carpets and then selling 
them. Like the saffron project, this particular project was focused on supporting small scale socioeconomic 
development through microfinance. At first hand, the project appeared to be a success since many several 
carpets were produced. However, as it turned out at a later stage, the TFU was unaware that the carpets 
were actually made by children. Hence, from the TFU’s perspective, it is questionable of this production 
process was a positive outcome. 
From the Dutch perspective it appeared that there were strategic motives for participating in the TFU 
mission that were not directly linked to the mission or Afghanistan in general. This was observable in public 
debate when several political leaders indicated that the Dutch participated in the TFU mission due to Dutch 
ambition to participate in the G20 (economic) Summit. In a high-level policy white paper (2009), the Dutch 
Embassy in Washington wrote that: “Prime Minister Balkenende understands that the Dutch were invited 
to the Pittsburgh G20 Summit because of their role in Afghanistan, where they are viewed as a serious 
partner who shoulders their international responsibilities” (p. 2). From the perspective of the Dutch 
government, thus, receiving the invitation for the G20 Summit because of their role in the TFU was a 
positive outcome. 
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The above paragraphs clearly illustrate that, as most stabilisation operations, the TFU had to deal with so-
called ‘wicked problems’ with policy outputs and impacts that were difficult to observe and measure. 
Interestingly, the Dutch government stressed the abstraction-level of the ENDS in their high-level policy 
white paper due to the uncertainty of the environmental circumstances in Uruzgan province (Ministries of 
Defence, Development Cooperation and Foreign Affairs, 2005).  
Indeed, organisations that must deal with ‘wicked problems’ hold important management implications 
(Tomkins, 2005) such as dealing with ambiguous, intangible and changing goals, are experiencing difficulty 
with establishing performance standards and measuring results (Wilson, 1989). Consequently, strategic 
management tools are only applicable to a very limited extend (Davids, 2011; Muggah and Sang, 2013). 
Therefore, and contrary to most contemporary literature on stabilisation operations (Farrell et al., 2013; 
Grandia, 2015; Kitzen, 2016) and interpretation of most interviewees, we argue that the abstract ISAF 
mission statement and high-level policy whitepaper fits perfectly with the uncertainty derived from the 
environmental conditions resulting in dealing with the so-called ‘wicked problems’, in turn, providing 
ground for an inherent order that identifies and models a system’s overall behaviour through adapted and 
acceptable WAYS. 
Indeed, TFU HQ made a change in strategic thinking driven by the change in environmental conditions 
during the four year deployment of TFU. Kitzen et al. (2013) summarises these changes in strategy as 
follows: “while the Master Plan was designed to foster security and development in the entire province 
within two years, the Focal Paper provided a much needed adaptation to the harsh reality of campaigning 
in Uruzgan. The Focal Paper not only acknowledged that the military was not merely providing security and 
development assistance, but actually involved in COIN, and also set some more realistic targets by focusing 
TFU efforts for the additional two years of the mission to the three main ADZs. Finally the UCP was 
formulated to arrange a smooth transfer of authority from the Dutch TFU to the local government and the 
ISAF successors” (p. 172).  
It was Von Clausewitz (1832) who studied strategy by looking at the looking at the nature of the whole. He 
argued that once war begun the opponents would start battling each other, and more importantly, so would 
their policies. Hence, this reciprocity creates its own dynamic which can have consequences that are different 
from the policies that were meant to be guiding it (Strachan, 2007). Hence, the strategic model of war, 
including the business, organisation and information strategy, are subject to change. 
It was the sensitivity to the initial conditions that provided ground for an inherent order that identified and 
modelled the system’s overall behaviour through adapted and acceptable WAYS. The equifinality of open 
systems enabled the early on bottom-up planning at the tactical level (i.e. TFU HQ) during the process of 
self-organisation. However, this emergent bottom up planning was never truly recognised as the official 
strategy for the TFU, nor did the political level held ownership over it (Grandia, 2015). Furthermore, initial 
strategic thinking of the TFU was dominated by the Dutch political climate and its fear for public opinion 
Farrell et al., 2013). Consequently, the Dutch government engendered difficulties in trying to communicate 
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the purpose of the TFU to the Dutch population since the strategic narrative of the mission was not 
apprehended by the Dutch population (Farrell et al., 2013; Kitzen, 2013). Finally, the realities and complexity 
of the operating environment heavily impacted the TFU, eventually resulting in a distinct deviation from 
the initial political guidelines. 
In sum, the TFU was inherently complex and as a result no fixed standards that provide a roadmap of how 
to achieve the intended objectives and end-states were available. Thus, although we argue that the condition-
dependent capabilities positively impacted the generated outcomes they remained to be ill-defined, difficult 
to measure and require more than just measurements and numerical approaches (Noordegraaf and Abma, 
2003; Rietjens, et al., 2011). More importantly, we found that in within the TFU and between the TFU and 
other systems as part of the supra-system, actors involved hold different perceptions in regards to both the 
existing or expected situation (characteristics, consequences, causes and possible solutions) and the desired 
situation or outcomes (i.e. end-states). Thus, there tends to be a difference between the perception of policy 
outputs and policy impacts among the many actors involved in stabilisation operations.  
Accordingly, proposition 5 is supported by the case study: 
Proposition 5: 
The development of condition-dependent capabilities positively impact the attainment of outcomes, yet, 




The case study described the chronological analysis of the conceptual model and presents the main findings 
regarding constructs and propositions. The main findings of the analysis are summarised in table 5.3 and 
5.4.  
The analysis revealed that different types of uncertainty, namely impact uncertainty (i.e. sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions and equifinality), modelling uncertainty (imprecise knowledge on how to 
control input), uncertainty about relations between actors, environmental uncertainty (i.e. unpredictable 
events and factors beyond control) and uncertainty about outcomes, that impacted the predictability of the 
TFU’s condition, in turn influencing the multi-actor interaction during the mission. 
Impact uncertainty (i.e. sensitive dependence on initial conditions and equifinality), modelling uncertainty 
(imprecise knowledge on how to control input), uncertainty about relations between actors and uncertainty 
about outcomes was found to be caused by two distinct factors, namely the strategic model and system 
diversity. Environmental uncertainty (i.e. unpredictable events and factors beyond control) was found to be 
caused by the operating environment.  
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Particularly, the ISAF mission statement and high-level policy whitepaper was perceived by most 
interviewees as abstract. However, when one studies stabilisation operations through the lens of complex 
systems thinking a general and abstract mission statement fits perfectly with the uncertainty of the 
environmental conditions, in turn, providing ground for an inherent order (i.e. emergent strategy) that 
identifies and models a system’s overall behaviour through adapted and acceptable WAYS. Additionally, 
although the impact uncertainty and environmental uncertainty imposed a limitation on the predictability of 
the TFU as complex system, it has simultaneously revealed that certain ENDS may be the result of WAYS 
that started from different initial conditions as these differences could be amplified through positive 
feedback controls. Finally, system diversity (e.g. interpersonal orientation; goal orientation; time orientation) 
appeared to be an important factor that created friction amongst the TFU’s sub-system’s as well as between 
the TFU and various other systems as part of the supra-system.  
To gain a better insight of the local context of Uruzgan Province, which, in turn, would support to the 
TFU’s mission planning, a so-called civil-assessment of the province was conducted by the local NGO The 
Liaison Office (TLO) through the Dutch Embassy in Kabul and seemed a solid initiative from the Dutch 
to enhance their understanding over the local context. However, although this report was sent by TLO to 
the Dutch Embassy in July 2006 it only became available to the TFU in August 2006 when the mission had 
already started. Consequently, the outcomes of the civil assessment arrived too late to have an impact on 
the TFU’s initial planning. Over time this variation in the initial condition of the TFU as complex system 
had huge influences on its long-term behaviour.  
Table 5.3: Summary of the analysis of constructs. 






Uncertainty about relations between actors 
Uncertainty about outcomes 
 
Section 5.3 
External environment Environmental uncertainty Section 5.3 





Bounded instable behaviour (i.e. non-linear feedback 
mechanisms) 
Section 5.4 
Ability to differentiate Ability of (sub-) systems to interact is caused by intentional 
choice (i.e. design) or determined by environmental conditions 
Section 5.4 
 
Ability to integrate 
Ability of (sub-) systems to interact is caused by intentional 





Depend on the state of ‘shared awareness’ amongst the actors 





Dealing with ‘wicked problems’ 
Differences between outcomes and impacts 





The TFU’s self-organising ability to differentiate and integrate its organisational resources and competencies 
was characterised by its non-linearity. Most integration was determined by environmental demands (i.e. 
‘permissive’ and ‘non-permissive’ security environment) and resulted in ordered conditions. In most 
instances, differentiation was the result of intentional choice (i.e. differences in organisational culture). 
However, differentiation was observed in situations where members of the sub-systems demonstrated 
instable behaviour by ignoring the security regulations determined by the TFU HQ which potentially settled 
the whole system in unordered and more dangerously disordered conditions.  
The TFU used information processing (i.e. schemata) as the key operating process through which the ex-
ante assessment took place. Unfortunately, information processing was hindered in both quality and quantity 
by the lack of a robust information strategy. As a result, no joint encrypted information and communication 
system was available to share information effectively, efficiently and securely amongst the TFU’s sub-
systems and between the TFU and the other systems as part of the supra-system. Moreover, the willingness 
to share information was hindered by efforts of the systems themselves and due to the classification of the 
information itself. Consequently, the absence of a robust information strategy, inter-operable ICT assets 
and inter-personal relationships between the systems involved negatively impacted the creation of a state of 
shared awareness, an essential pre-condition for emergent behaviour, self-organisation and the subsequent 
development of condition-dependent capabilities. 
Table 5.4: Summary the analysis of propositions. 
PROPOSITION TFU 
Proposition 1a: 





The uncertainty derived from the external environment impacts the predictability of 




The dynamic equilibrium of a system’s condition is expected to positively impacts its 




A system in dynamic equilibrium is expected to be mainly driven by non-linear 





A system’s self-organising ability to differentiate and integrate is expected to 




The development of condition-dependent capabilities impact the attainment of 




However, our findings indicate that the TFU developed condition-dependent capabilities. Whereas the 
development of sub-system capabilities were mostly the outcome of prior shared intentions, system and 
supra-system capabilities, by contrast, were found to be the result of emergence from complex interactions 
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between the sub-systems or systems in the absence of prior shared intentions or were determined by 
environmental demands.  
Although we argue that condition-dependent capabilities positively impact the generated outcomes, the 
TFU had to deal with so-called ‘wicked problems’ which are ill-defined and could be dealt with by applying 
multiple solutions. Additionally, these potential solutions, in turn, could generate new problems. Indeed, 
organisations that must deal with ‘wicked problems’ hold important management implications (Tompkins, 
2005) such as dealing with ambiguous, intangible and changing goals, are experiencing difficulty with 
establishing performance standards and measuring results (Wilson, 1989). This applied in particular to the 
TFU where outputs often were unobservable and unmeasurable. As a result, strategic management tools are 
only applicable to a very limited extend. Indeed, although some system capabilities or even supra-system 
capabilities were focused on direct support to the local Afghan people it is questionable if certain outcomes 
could be labelled “positive outcomes” (e.g. woman’s rights violations and child labour) due to the fact that 
the participating systems had different views of a situation and subscribed to different priorities and 
preferences for particular solutions. Moreover, certain outcomes were not even directly linked to the TFU 
mission or Afghanistan in general due to strategic motives (the G20 Summit).  
Social complexity resulted in different options in regards to what was fair and just in policy making. More 
specifically, the many actors involved had different thoughts about the situation or problem and about how 
these should be formulated and solved. Differences in problem perception typically occur when there are 
different impressions of the existing or expected situation and the desired situation. Finally, the very fact 
that the TFU had to deal with ‘wicked problems’ resulted in a situation where the TFU HQ had no clear 
indications of when certain ENDS were achieved. Hence, outcomes were, even ex-post, not determinable at 
all. 
Reflecting on linear thought processes, concepts such as stabilisation operations make it seem that 
supporting organisations such as Western IOs, NGOs and private firms have a blueprint for the stabilisation 
and recovery of a post-conflict zone. However, complex systems thinking tells us that that the output of the 
supporting organisations cannot be understood in isolation from organisations and societies such as the 
host nation and local actors who they support. In complex systems language we would say that we cannot 
explain the behaviour of the whole system by analysing its individual sub-systems. Supporting organisations, 
therefore, should focus their efforts on facilitating and supporting the overall stabilisation and recovery 
process in which the supported organisations and societies self-organise in order to enable emergent 
behaviour necessary to sustain peace. 
In sum, differences in both problem perception and the desired outcome (i.e. ENDS) perfectly illustrate the 
different types of uncertainty that impacted the predictability of the TFU’s condition, in turn influencing 
the multi-actor interaction during the mission. Particularly, impact uncertainty, modelling uncertainty, 
uncertainty about relations between actors, combined with environmental uncertainty resulted in uncertainty 
about outcomes. Most of these uncertainties only became observable once the TFU was deployed and 
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therefore automatically became part of a supra-system (e.g. IOs, NGOs, local actors and the private sector). 
As a result, we view the TFU as a complex system which was sensitive to its initial conditions and, once 
deployed part of a greater supra-system, of which the effectiveness of the strategic model depends primarily 
on its ability to respond to the changing environmental conditions. Accordingly, we propose that the 
strategic model of stabilisation operations need to make a shift from its focus on ENDS towards one which 
provides ground for an inherent order (i.e. emergent strategy) that identifies and models a system’s overall 
behaviour through adapted and acceptable WAYS to respond effectively to changing environmental 




Case study 2: UN MINUSMA6 
 
“We are in a crisis – all of us. […] have reached a turning point, a moment 
that will determine much of what happens next. In complexity theory, this is a 
very special place, when a system – whether individual or group – becomes so 
turbulent that it moves toward the “edge of chaos”, also called the place of “far 
from equilibrium” conditions”. 





The TFU case study presented the first analysis of the conceptual model. However, since design analysis is 
an iterative process it should be repeated several times in order to enable the development of the final 
conceptual model (Markus et al., 2002). Therefore, this second case study, the United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (UN MINUSMA), continues the iteration process 
by presenting a second analysis of the conceptual model in order to further shape it as potential solution to 
the respected problem.  
As the previous case study, this chapter relies on empirical data from the second qualitative case study 
discussed in chapter 4 and is organised as follows: after this introduction the case study is presented. What 
follows is the chronological analysis of the conceptual model: in section 5.3 we describe uncertainty and the 
impact on a system’s condition followed by the illustration of a system’s required self-organising ability in 
section 5.4. Section 5.5 provides an overview of a complex system uses information to self-organise the 
differentiation and integration of its sub-systems, organisational resources and competencies into condition-
dependent capabilities. The outcomes gained from condition-dependent capabilities are described in section 
5.6. We conclude with a brief discussion of the main findings of this chapter. 
 
6 Parts of this chapter have been appeared as the following peer reviewed published article: 
Gans, B. (2018). The complexity of peacekeeping intelligence. Journal of European and American Intelligence Studies 
1(1), 35-60. 
Parts of this chapter have been presented at the following peer reviewed conference: 
Gans, B. (2018). Understanding stabilisation operations as complex systems. Ninth International Conference on 
Complex Systems (ICCS), Cambridge MA, USA. 
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6.2 CASE STUDY 
 
6.2.1 Historical background 
After liberating most of North Mali from jihadist occupation in 2013, France set up a military mission 
(Operation BARKHANE) to prevent Al-Qaida affiliated terrorist groups from entrenching safe havens 
across the Sahel. In Mali, the presence of the UN enabled over 400.000 displaced people to return north. 
However, the security situation is still of concern in Northern Mali and rapidly deteriorating in Central Mali 
as well as in the border area between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Newly emerging armed (terrorist) groups 
and spreading banditry, heaving links to with terrorist groups (AQ in North Mali and ISIS in Central Mali) 
that operate internationally. The treat of terrorist characterised by small scale operations specifically targeting 
security authorities with violent attacks and vulnerable groups with extremists messages as well as 
rudimentary socio-economic benefits for recruitment purposes in order to gain support of the local 
population, before scaling up operations again. Therefore UN MINUSMA’s role in contributing to peace 
and stability in Mali is crucial. 
6.2.2 Case description 
Out of the great number of stabilisation operations conducted at the time of this study, we selected the 
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (UN MINUSMA) because it is 
one of the largest UN integrated missions in history and has a clear integrated and comprehensive character. 
The need for an integrated design is stressed by the Dutch government (as one of the troop contributing 
nations) as follows: 
“The complex and problematic situation in Mali requires an integrated and comprehensive (i.e. ‘3D’) approach. 
Efforts regarding security, rule of law, good governance, socioeconomic development and the support of 
political processes are to be regarded as an integrated whole” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). 
A second important selection criterion was accessibility, something we will describe in more detail in the 
next section.   
UN MINUSMA’s primary mission is to contribute to a broad range of security-related tasks which aim at 
stabilisation and recovery throughout the country. Moreover, by unanimously adopting resolution 2164, the 
UNSC broadened the mission with tasks related to the protection of civilians, human rights, supporting 
political processes, Security Sector Reform (SSR) as well as the Rule of Law (UN, 2017).    
UN MINUSMA was divided into three main sub-systems: the UN civilian staff (an estimate of 500 civilians), 
UN military staff (over 13,000 troops) and the UN police staff (roughly 1900 international policemen) (UN, 
2017). The mission was organised as follows: the UN MINUSMA Headquarters (UN MINUSMA HQ) was 
situated in Bamako from where the overall command and control over the three main Sector Headquarters 
(SHQs) took place. SHQ-West (SHQ-W) operated from Timbuktu, SHQ-North (SHQ-N) was in Kidal and 
SHQ-East (SHQ-E) was situated in Gao. The different sub-systems of the mission were deployed within 
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these SHQs and conducted various tasks. The UN civilian staff was responsible for reconstruction efforts 
and maintaining contact with the host nation government, local actors as well as NGOs. The UN military 
staff was to maintain security in the country. It also advised and supported activities of reconstruction. The 
UN police staff was responsible for the mentoring and joint patrolling with the Malian police force. 
Additionally, and quite unique for stabilisation operations under the authority of the UN were the All 
Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU), Special Operations Land Task Group (SOLTG) and a helicopter 
detachment (HELIDET) consisting of various helicopters. These sub-systems were augmented to UN 
MINUSMA since lessons learned from previous UN peacekeeping missions had stressed the need for the 
collection and dissemination of intelligence (Cammaert, 2003; Norheim-Martinsen and Ravndal 2011; Barry 
2012). 
UN MINUSMA, as a system, was part of the greater supra-system engaged in the stabilisation and recovery 
of Mali. The supra-system consisted of several other systems such as other coalition factors (i.e. the French 
TF BARKHANE), IOs (i.e. other UN agencies), NGOs, local actors both state and non-state as well as the 
private sector. Accordingly, we study UN MINUSMA as a complex system interacting with other systems 
as part of the greater supra-system active in northern Mali. Figure 6.1 presents an overview of UN 
MINUSMA, its sub-systems and part of the supra-system. 
 
Figure 6.1: UN MINUSMA, its sub-systems and part of the supra-system. 
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6.3 UNCERTAINTY AND THE IMPACT ON A SYSTEM’S CONDITION 
 
The findings from the case study enabled us to identify different types of uncertainty which impact the 
predictability of UN MINUSMA’s condition, in turn influencing the multi-actor interaction during the 
mission. In this study we connect these different types of uncertainty to the literature on complexity theory 
and define them accordingly as impact uncertainty (i.e. sensitive dependence on initial conditions and 
equifinality), modelling uncertainty (imprecise knowledge on how to control input), uncertainty about 
relations between actors, environmental uncertainty (i.e. unpredictable events and factors beyond control) 
and uncertainty about outcomes (see figure 6.2). 
 
Figure 6.2: Types of uncertainty that impacted the predictability of UN MINUSMA’s condition. 
 
Impact uncertainty (i.e. sensitive dependence on initial conditions and equifinality), modelling uncertainty 
(imprecise knowledge on how to control input), uncertainty about relations between actors and uncertainty 
about outcomes was found to be caused by two distinct factors, namely the strategic model and system 
diversity. Environmental uncertainty (i.e. unpredictable events and factors beyond control) was found to be 
caused by the operating environment. Since we found that the factors selected influenced each other in 
various points in time we describe them interchangeable.  
6.3.1 Strategic model 
Business strategy (ENDS). At the start of UN MINUSMA in 2013 the UNSC adopted resolution 2100 
which described the mission statement as follows:  
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“UN MINUSMA is to support political processes in Mali and carry out a number of security-related tasks. The 
mission was asked to support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilisation of the country and 
implementation of the transitional roadmap” (UNSC, 2013).  
During the mission, the UNSC adopted resolution 2164 which broadened the mission’s mandate as follows:  
“UN MINUSMA should focus on duties, such as ensuring security, stabilisation and protection of civilians, 
supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation, assisting the reestablishment of State authority, 
rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights of that country” (UNSC, 
2014).  
These resolutions describe the mission’s mandate which serves as the overarching strategy at the political 
and military strategic level. A third UNSC resolution was adopted in 2015 which then amended UN 
MINUSMA’s mandate with goals regarding:  
“The support of the ceasefire arrangement; implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in 
Mali; Good offices and reconciliation; protection of civilians and stabilisation; promotion and protection of 
human rights; humanitarian assistance and projects for stabilisation; protection, safety and security of UN 
personnel; support for cultural preservation” (UNSC, 2015).  
Apart from these resolutions, the UN has drafted the so-called ‘Mali country programme document 2015 – 
2019’. According to this document, the country programme “will help to accelerate progress towards 
achieving national objectives, particularly in terms of equitable coverage of essential social services, 
improvements in the governance and efficiency in each sector” (p. 4). Reflecting on the three UNSC 
resolutions as well as the goals defined in the ‘Mali country programme document 2015 – 2019, UN 
MINUSMA had to deal with so-called; wicked problems’ which are “problems that are ill-defined, consist 
several conflicting criteria for solution definition, solutions which create further problems and no obvious 
indications of when enough has been achieved” (Rittel and Weber, 1973, p. 155). 
The UNSC resolutions as well as the ‘Mali country programme document 2015 2019’ served as the starting 
point from where further formulation of measurable objectives and performance targets at UN MINUSMA 
Headquarters (UN MINUSMA HQ) could take place. At UN MINUSMA HQ, the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and the Force Commander (FCOM) set operational goals in their quarterly 
guidance and which they sent to the Heads of Office (HoO) of the respective SHQs and military 
commanders that were under the direct command of the FCOM. The goals as defined in the quarterly 
guidance were by most interviewees perceived as clear and tangible. However, time orientation played an 
important role in goal attainment. Three indicators of time orientation were identified from the data: the 
uncertainty of the conditions in the environment over time, the time span of bureaucratic processes, and 
actors’ personal time orientation in relationship to their deployment time. A CIMIC officer explains: 
“To get to the point where we are conducting a Quick Impact Project (QIP) and doing studies beforehand to 
see how things went before we did it and then study it six months after to find out what true impact that had 
on the community, positive or negative… So, in quarterly guidance too, it can change the focus area. I do for 
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example a QIP in a certain area because that’s the focus area, then the next quarterly guidance comes out, and 
they shift focus, we’re stuck in that region on that project because it may take upwards almost a year to get it 
through the whole process. This can create some issues on CIMIC engagement… [Another problem] is the 
fact that most UN civilian employees work with minimal a two-year contract and sometimes try to be here for 
three years depending on their mission. So, there’s not an urgency and they can take a long slow development 
approach to it”. (UN military staff, R11). 
The impact uncertainty derived from the abstract UNSC resolutions and goals defined in the ‘Mali country 
programme document 2015 – 2019, clearly illustrate the sensitive dependence on initial conditions of UN 
MINUSMA as complex system. Furthermore, the three indicators of time orientation fit perfectly with the 
uncertainty of the environmental conditions and illustrate the equifinality of open systems which allow for 
certain ENDS to be the result of WAYS that started from different initial conditions as these differences 
could be amplified through positive feedback controls. 
Organisational strategy (MEANS). UN MINUSMA’s multidimensional and integrated character 
required interaction between the sub-systems of UN MINUSMA as well as between UN MINUSMA and 
the other systems embedded in the supra-system (see figure 6.1). However, UN MINUSMA’s organisational 
structure was characterised by its high level of formalisation and strong hierarchical culture with decision-
making authority centralised at the FHQ. Formal and hierarchical organisations are typically finding 
difficulty in establishing effective collaborative process design, process management and facilitation due to 
their lack of flexibility and open communication (Willem and Buelens, 2007). In the case of UN MINUSMA, 
the formal and hierarchical organisation led to several problems with regard to its multidimensional and 
integrated character. An excellent example of such problems can be found in the organisational disposition 
of the ASIFU and the dedicated intelligence cell of the FCOM in UN MINUSMA’s organisational structure. 
Whereas the former (consisting of more than 70 highly trained personnel) formally had to be directed by 
the latter (consisting of 15 personnel with little experience) friction was observed since both sub-systems 
believed to have ownership over the control of UN MINUSMA’s intelligence activities. Another excellent 
example of such problems is related to the information strategy and will be discussed in the next section. 
…the impact of the operating environment. To illustrate the environmental uncertainty we applied three 
criteria, namely the uncertainty derived from the environmental conditions, the situational awareness about 
the environment, and the feedback received from the environment. The security situation in the operating 
environment was considered an important external determinant for impacting UN MINUSMA’s strategic 
model and specifically the organisational strategy of SHQ-N. A stabilisation and recovery officer described 
the security situation in SHQ-E as ‘relatively stable’ which resulted in a heterogeneous supra-system 
consisting of most systems mentioned above:  
“And even if security… we are feeling a bit of a slide back over the last couple of months, but regardless of 
that most actors still want to come to Gao because we are here and they see things are moving forward” (UN 
civilian staff, R3). 
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By contrast, SHQ-N was characterised by a highly instable security situation in which several attacks were 
executed on the UN troops while patrolling the area as well as more complex attacks against the UN camps 
in northern Mali. The following two examples sadly illustrates this fragile security situation: 
“Friday 12 February at 7 am, MINUSMA camp in Kidal was the target of a complex attack which, according 
to a provisional toll, has killed three peacekeepers and wounded 30 others. My duty, on behalf of the Secretary-
General, is to express our outrage over this hateful an irresponsible act occurring a week after the local 
arrangements between CMA and Platform, and 48 hours after my visit to Kidal. This serious act reflects the 
disarray of the enemies of peace since it comes at a time when the implementation of the Peace Agreement 
increasingly becomes a reality in Mali” (Source: adapted from SRSG for Mali, Mr. Mahamat Saleh Annadif, in 
UN MINUSMA press release, 2016). 
“Monday 18 April 2016 a demonstration took place this morning in Kidal. At around 10 am, demonstrators 
broke into the airport compound – a restricted area – ransacking and setting fire to security facilities. Kidal’s 
airstrip is essential for supply of humanitarian aid, support for local communities, as well as operations for 
MINUSMA and its partners” (Source: adapted from UN MINUSMA press release, 2016). 
Consequently, the HoO of SHQ-N, in close coordination with the SRSG and the Designated Official (DO) 
at the UN Headquarters (UNHQ), made the decision to substantially downsize the UN civilian staff in 
northern Mali. Moreover, the incidents resulted in a loss of key facilities such as the camp’s hospital, the 
military operations room from a UN military unit as well as the airport itself. Consequently, SHQ-N turned 
out to be a comparatively small and homogenous system. According to the HoO: 
 “The problem here in Kidal is that there are not many other organisations present. The UN is far from 
complete. Our PIO office for example has been closed for a very long time. Not many UN agencies are present 
here. That also applies for the NGOs. Only the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and some 
local NGOs are present. The private sector is only here because we brought them here. This is of course due 
to the poor security situation in Kidal and the debate around development vs. security”. (UN civilian staff, R2). 
More importantly, almost all interviewees perceived the situation in SHQ-N as severely problematic since 
the implementation of the strategic model and mandate required the involvement of State authority:  
“The challenge in Kidal, and it is very specific and unique, the legitimate authorities have been kicked out of 
the region. So, since May 2014 we have no legal counterpart, recognised by the international community. This 
means that the biggest part of the mandate cannot be implemented because we do not have such a counterpart”. 
(UN civilian staff, R2). 
As a result, UN MINUSMA experienced a lack of progress in improving the security and humanitarian 
situation throughout SHQ-N due to changes in the environmental conditions and the high uncertainty of 
information about the environment. Again, a perfect illustration of UN MINUSMA’s sensitive dependence 
to its initial conditions and evidence that prediction of contemporary conflict is found to be impossible. 
Interestingly, although the impact uncertainty and environmental uncertainty imposed a severe limitation 
on the predictability of UN MINUSMA as complex system, it simultaneously revealed that certain ENDS 
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may be the result of WAYS that started from different initial conditions as these differences could be 
amplified through positive feedback controls. 
Information strategy. UN MINUSMA failed to link its information strategy with its organisational strategy 
and business strategy. Generally, this was due to insufficient mechanisms, processes, and resources such as 
interoperable Information and Communications Technology (ICTs). We need to make a distinction here 
between internal centralised information sharing (i.e. within the individual sub-systems of UN MINUSMA), 
internal distributed information sharing (i.e. between the sub-systems of UN MINUSMA) and external 
distributed information sharing (i.e. between the sub-systems of UN MINUSMA and the other systems 
involved).  
Internal centralised information sharing was considered by all interviewees as sufficiently institutionalised. 
Daily reporting through fixed reporting lines were present in all sub-systems. Most of these reports were 
sent to UN MINUSMA HQ and then merged into a centralised report. However, the low quality of the data 
connection hindered the speed of information processing (Rietjens and Baudet, 2017). When asked if these 
communications took place through a secured system, some UN civilian staff respondents stated that within 
the UN communications usually takes place through unsecure general e-mail since many UN accounts were 
not active and most interviewees considered MINUSMA’s general information system to have no 
classification at all.  
Internal distributed information sharing was hampered by the absence of a general information system or 
database with access for all the sub-systems. Moreover, some African units (e.g. Chad and Niger) hardly 
possessed any IT equipment, and even when they did possess ICT capabilities their heterogeneity impeded 
interoperability. The Dutch contingent within UN MINUSMA introduced the Theatre Independent Tactical 
Army and Air Force Network (TITAAN), an encrypted ICT platform for secure data communications 
between the Dutch Contingent Command, SOLTG, HELIDET and ASIFU. Interestingly, the Dutch 
granted personnel from Western (i.e. European) Nations that were part of ASIFU access (and if required 
training) to the system as well. Hence, secured information sharing between these sub-systems was 
guaranteed. By using these systems, the classification of the information being processed through these 
systems was labelled as “SECRET”, and thus not releasable outside this secure environment.  
“The main shortcoming is that all the information systems we have are based upon NATO standards” (UN 
military staff, R19). 
The military units that were not part of this selected community as well as the UN civilian staff and police 
force staff did not have access to this encrypted ICTs. According to Rietjens and Baudet (2017) this divide 
“was often referred to as information sharing between the “skiing countries” (i.e., European countries that 
enjoy skiing in their winter holidays) and the “non-skiing countries” (mostly African countries)” (p. 208). 
From a military perspective, classified information needs to be processed through encrypted ICTs. 
Consequently, the military units that did have access to such systems did not share classified information 
with those who were not authorised. Hence, an information asymmetry between sub-systems with and 
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without TITAAN was created. The absence of a joint information and communication system and database, 
with a certain level of encryption was by most interviewees perceived as a huge shortcoming: 
“The information exchange will probably be limited to e-mail or word documents or perhaps via SMS or 
whatever. There is no joint system for the civilian side that are compatible to ours. These are military only 
which is a huge shortcoming” (UN military staff, R13).  
These finding are supported by previous research of Snabilie (2014 who found that:  
“National sharing versus international sharing is a big issue…. According to several informants, there was a 
relation between the fact that there were no clear and discrete levels of classification valid with the UN and the 
willingness to share information. Allegedly, when countries had so little control as to who would receive 
information and who would not, they often chose to share it only nationally or with fellow NATO member 
state officers in their network (p. 62).   
In the absence of a joint system most information with a certain level of classification was exchanged during 
face to face meetings which of course hindered the speed of information processing and hence creating 
shared awareness. However, information processing capacity was increased in SHQ-E by organising a 
weekly coordination meeting between the sub-systems of UN MINUSMA and the other UN agencies 
present in the region (i.e. creation of lateral relations). During these meetings, representatives from the UN 
MINUSMA sub-systems as well as UN agencies could participate in order to communicate with each other, 
share information and identify opportunities for cooperation. In SHQ-E, these weekly meetings were found 
effective: 
“There you exchange information, there you exchange information about the areas where we [the mission] do 
not operate…That is actually a kind of platform for the exchange of information and there you also coordinate”. 
(UN civilian staff, R2). 
Again, due to the instable security situation in SHQ-N this meeting was not institutionalised by the HoO 
due to the absence of most of the actors in the region: 
“In a normal context, there is a coordination meeting between MINUSMA and the other UN agencies. This 
means within the UN itself. This is called UN Regional Team (RT) but is not in place in Kidal since you can’t 
coordinate with yourself”. (UN civilian staff, R22). 
In both SHQs a weekly security meeting was organised. All the UN actors who had a responsibility towards 
security were invited and additionally some representatives from the French TF BARKHANE were 
attending as well. All decisions regarding regional security were made in this meeting. Interestingly, in order 
to increase information processing capacity (i.e. investment in vertical information systems) a second 
hierarchical line of reporting was identified since the outcomes of these meetings were sent directly to the 
UNHQ in New York: 
“Regarding security, I am the area security coordinator. There is basically another hierarchical line which run 
parallel to the political line. Here I report directly to the Designated Official (DO) who reports to the Secretary 
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General. This means it’s a very short line for decision-making. In this process, we are advised by the DSS which 
is the UN Department for Security and Safety.” (UN civilian staff, R2).  
The examples above all describe security and confidentiality issues in relation to the lack of a joint ICT 
system within UN MINSUMA. A second issue that hampered internal distributed information sharing is 
related to the organisational structure of the mission. According to Yang and Maxwell (2011) information 
sharing between different departments can be hindered due to differences in mandates, processes and 
expectations. Moreover, in bureaucratic organisations such as UN MINUSMA, authority is typically 
centralised at the higher levels of an organisation. As a result, (the speed of) information sharing could be 
impeded since decision rights are held at the top of an organisation, a characteristic which relates closely to 
the formal system of an organisation (Kim and Lee, 2006). A formal organisation focuses on executing daily 
operations as efficiently as possible in order to attain the organisation’s goals. Therefore, a formal 
organisation operates according to clearly defined hierarchical organisational structures and processes 
(Gulati and Puranam, 2009). To sustain its interest of efficiency, a formal system is meant to resist change 
(Stacey, 1995). Formal systems experience difficulty in the sharing of information since they typically lack 
flexibility and an open communication culture (Willems and Buelens, 2007). Indeed, as described by Bar-
Yam and Minai, 2003) hierarchical structures are found to be less efficient in conditions that are 
characterised by high complexity: “hierarchical command systems are designed for the largest scale impacts 
and thus relatively simple warfare. Indeed, traditional military forces and related command, control and 
planning, were designed for conventional large scale conflicts. Distributed control systems, when properly 
designed, can enhance the ability to meet complex challenges” (p. 1). 
Another problem of the formal organisation with regard to information sharing is related to the national 
command and control lines. Although UN MINUSMA had a clear, supranational organizational structure, 
some countries did not share valuable through the official chain of command (i.e. UN MINUSMA) but did 
this only through their national lines (Rietjens and Baudet, 2017). As a result, UN MINUSMA HQ, the 
SHQs or the ASIFU did not receive the information at all.  
External distributed information sharing was depending on the classification of the information. That 
information that could be disclosed without restrictions was released through conventional email. However, 
this wasn’t sufficient since not all the local actors were using the internet. Alternatively, a lot of 
communication was either done over the phone and by text message or key actors had to allocate resources 
physically to counter the poor presence of ICT and to exercise and practice communications in a face to 
face manner which was experienced as very costly and ineffective. As a stabilisation and recovery officer 
puts it: 
“Meetings face to face can be difficult if you are dealing with the mayor of Ansongo or Bourem. So, if you want 
to meet that person face to face it requires for me, for instance, a security escort obviously. So, I went to 
Ansongo recently and had nearly 30 – 40 people with me, three Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), that’s 
one mechanized platoon, one EOD section following at the back, there was my vehicle with a driver and a 2nd 
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vehicle with close protection. So, when I move I move with around 40 people in order to facilitate the 
movement from point A to B safely. This is a huge drain on the resources, the military resources of the mission 
because this is just me.” (UN civilian staff, R3). 
Regarding the sharing of information between UN MINSUMA and NGOs, the United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) was responsible for this task. UN OCHA organised 
weekly meetings with the NGOs that were active in the region. The goal of these meetings was to coordinate 
the activities of the NGOs and UN MINUSMA. During those meetings information was exchanged 
between different NGOs and between NGOs, UN MINUSMA and other UN agencies. This perfectly 
illustrates an increase in information processing capacity through the creation of lateral relations. According 
to a CIMIC officer: 
“A NGO employee cannot access an UN-system, those are separate computers and a separate network. So, the 
information goes to UN OCHA, there we exchange that information with NGOs. There you exchange 
information about the areas where we [the mission] do not operates. That is actually a kind of platform for the 
exchange of information and there you also coordinate”. (UN military staff, R11). 
Table 6.1 shows an overview on how the information processing between the various actors took place.  
Table 6.1: Information processing of UN MINUSMA. Based on Galbraith (1973): Designing Complex 
Organisations 
Actors Means Organisation design strategy 
UN civilian staff (internal) General ICTs (non-encrypted) 
UN internal e-mail 
Face to face 
Creation of self-contained tasks 
UN police staff (internal) General ICTs (non-encrypted) 
Face to face 
Creation of self-contained tasks 
UN military (NATO members) Encrypted ICTs 
Face to face 
Creation of self-contained tasks 
UN military (non-NATO member) General ICTs (non-encrypted) 
Face to face 
Creation of lateral relations 
UN military (NATO member – 
non-NATO member) 
General ICTs (non-encrypted) 
Security meeting 
Slack resources 
Creation of lateral relations 
UN MINUSMA > UN agencies General ICTs (non-encrypted) 
UN internal e-mail 
Face to face (coordination 
meeting) 
Slack resources 
Creation of lateral relations 
UN MINUSMA > NGOs General ICTs (non-encrypted) 
Face to face (coordination 
meeting) 
Creation of lateral relations 
UN MINUSMA > local actors 
(state and non-state) 
General ICTs (non-encrypted) 
Face to face 
Creation of lateral relations 
UN MINUSMA > private sector General ICTs (non-encrypted) 
Face to face 
Creation of lateral relations 
UN MINUSMA > TF 
BARKHANE 
Face to face Creation of lateral relations 
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To summarise, although there was a strategic model for the mission which described most of UN 
MINUSMA’s goals, differences in time orientation between UN MINUSMA HQ and the SHQs played an 
important role why most interviewees perceived this strategy and derived goals as difficult to attain. More 
importantly, the presence of the legitimate authorities was essential in order to actually implement the 
mandate. Unfortunately, in SHQ-N a unique situation was observed in which the Malian authorities were 
absent. Hence, the biggest part of the mandate could not be implemented in that SHQ. The related 
organisational strategy required interaction between UN MINUSMA, UN agencies and other actors 
involved (e.g. NGOs, local actors and the private sector). The instable security situation in SHQ-N resulted 
in the absence of many of these actors thereby forcing the personnel of UN MINUSMA to operate in 
isolation. For both SHQs, UN MINUSMA failed to formulate and implement an information strategy in 
support of the organisational strategy and business strategy. This was mainly due to insufficient mechanisms, 
processes, and resources. Consequently, a lot of communication between the many actors involved took 
place through face to face meetings. This pulled a huge drain on the already scarce organisational resources, 
hindered the speed of information processing and prevented the creation of a state of shared awareness 
within the individual systems as well as within the supra-system.  
Reflecting on the above, we can point out that UN MINUSMA’s strategic model perfectly fits with complex 
systems thinking. UN policy was translated into UN SC resolutions which presented an abstract mission 
statement (ENDS). Moreover, the environmental uncertainty increased the sensitive dependence on initial 
conditions. Interestingly, the same uncertain environmental conditions provided ground for an inherent 
order that identified and modelled the system’s overall behaviour through adapted and acceptable WAYS. 
In other word, UN MINUSMA’s strategic model was subject to change. 
Representations of the Cynefin framework. Reflecting on the Cynefin framework we suggest that the 
business strategy of UN MINUSMA was balancing between the “chaotic” situation of the unordered 
domain and “complicated” situation of the ordered domain. On the one hand, as the business strategy and 
derived goals were developed at the FHQ we suggest that from their perspective it can be found in the 
“simple” situation because cause and effect relationships were clear. On the other hand, the differences in 
time orientation required further analyses of cause and effect from the staff of the SHQs, vertical 
coordination with the FHQ as well as horizontal coordination between the sub-systems of the respective 
SHQs. However, due to the absence of the legitimate authorities in SHQ-N the biggest part of the mandate 
could not be implemented. In other words, there was no relationship between cause and effect. Therefore, 
we suggest that for UN MINUSMA HQ and SHQ-N the business strategy was found in the “chaotic” 
situation of the unordered domain. Since this unique situation did not apply for SHQ-E we suggest that for 
them the business strategy was found in the “complicated” situation of the ordered domain. 
SHQ-E was characterised by a heterogeneous system consisting of the sub-systems of UN MINUSMA, 
other UN agencies, NGOs, local actors both state and non-state as well as the private sector. As a result, 
SHQ-E was able to implement most of its organisational strategy, however, cause and effect relationships 
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of the connections required some deeper analyses. Hence, we argue that the organisational strategy of SHQ-
E was found in the “complicated” situation of the ordered domain. By contrast, SHQ-N could not 
implement most of its organisational strategy due to the absence of many actors resulting in cause and effect 
relationships that were unclear. Therefore, we suggest that the organisational strategy of SHQ-N was found 
in the “chaotic” situation of the unordered domain. 
UN MINUSMA’s information strategy suggests a unique but nonetheless sad situation. While the military 
units which where NATO member were sharing information with each other through encrypted ICT assets 
most other military units, the police force staff as well as the UN civilian staff did not receive this 
information. Conversely, the information collected by the latter could only be communicated to the former 
through unsecure general ICT assets or wasn’t shared at all, thereby making cause and effect relationships 
unclear. Consequently, both the quality and quantity of information sharing is very poor, ultimately resulting 
in an information asymmetry. Fortunately, the investments that were made in increasing the information 
processing capacity through the face to face meetings such as the coordination and security meeting proved 
to be an effective mechanism for countering the poor presence of interoperable ICTs. Accordingly, we 
suggest that UN MINSUMA’s information strategy was balancing between the “complex” and “chaotic” 
situation of the unordered domain. 
6.3.2 System Diversity     
One of the characteristics of UN MINUSMA was its multidimensional and integrated character. As 
described in the section 6.2, the mission included over 15,000 civilian and military personnel from roughly 
40 countries (UN, 2017). As a result, UN MINUSMA was characterised by its heterogeneity. Furthermore, 
several UN agencies (i.e. UNICEF, WFP, UNDP, UNHCR and UN OCHA), international and local NGOs, 
local actors both state and non-state, international military factors (i.e. the French TF BARKHANE) as well 
as the private sector were active in in Mali. In this study, we view all these actors as complex systems 
themselves with whom UN MINUSMA could potentially interact.  
One of the key elements of network effectiveness is to promote shared mental models among the actors 
involved in order to prompt cohesion in both behaviour and interaction (Bigley and Roberts, 2001; 
Moynihan, 2009). This was sometimes highly challenging due to the institutional character and 
organisational culture of certain actors: 
“What I mentioned previously, for good collaboration first there must be the desire to collaborate and also a 
common idea on what you collaborate on and what you can share with each other. That is more a political 
decision from the organization of what we can offer and what we expect from others…”. (UN civilian staff, 
R3). 
According to Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) “sub-system members in their inter-personal relationships will 
be primarily concerned with either task accomplishment or with social relationships” (p. 7). According to 
several interviewees, the heterogeneity that characterised SHQ-E created disagreements about what to do 
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and who was to do it between its sub-systems. The very same difficulties between UN MINUSMA and 
NGO’s were mentioned by almost all interviewees. A civil affairs officer explains: 
“Then there are also the NGOs who are, in some cases, very reluctant to be seen with the UN. You are talking 
about unity again, divergent philosophies, divergent views, because you have the humanitarian who can also 
sometimes be anti-military, and on the other spectrum you have the military who is very military. The interaction 
between the two is not always as productive as it should”. (UN civilian staff, R8). 
In their article, Rietjens and Baudet (2017) make similar observations: 
“With 41 countries participating in MINUSMA, it comes as no surprise that cultural differences, both national 
and professional, greatly affected the organization in general and information sharing in particular. These 
differences were rooted in different languages, beliefs, and values, different levels of training and education, 
and different mental models among the participating units” (p. 212). 
On the other hand, the promotion of a shared mental model was displayed successfully regarding the 
outreach to the local population in Gao region (SHQ-E). In this instance, the Public Information Office 
(PIO) organised public meetings in local settings where the chefs du quartier, their consiglieres, local youth 
leaders, religious leaders etc. came together to drink tea and were explained about the purpose of UN 
MINUSMA and the meaning of its mandate. The setting was informal and ended with questions and answer 
sessions in which all three sub-systems of the mission could provide answers to the questions of the local 
population. According to a PIO officer:  
“We have a mandate but if people are unfamiliar with it they will reject it. So maybe if people perceive the 
mandate as good they will support it. But if they don’t know what it is, who we are and what we are here for, 
our modus operandi, this can create tensions. Most of the time we realise that community expectations are 
much beyond our mandate and this is something we need to reframe every time”. (UN civilian staff, R6). 
According to many scholars the relationships between international interveners and local populations and 
promotion of ‘local ownership’ is key for successful peacebuilding (Richmond, 2005; Pouligny, 2006; 
Donais, 2012; Martin and Moser, 2012). More importantly, the local population cannot be treated as a 
uniformly since “residents of a host country, or a given village, do not form a homogenous community, and 
there is no such thing as one local viewpoint. Instead, any local population includes a multitude of political, 
economic, social and religious groups, which each has its own goals, beliefs, customs and attitudes. As a 
result, ‘the local’ is always highly fragmented” (Autesserre, 2014, p. 495). The importance of ‘local 
ownership’ and focus on local and micro-level dynamics was recognized and hence implemented by UN 
MINUSMA in SHQ-E. As a civil affairs officer puts it: 
“It’s not enough to come as an expat into an area that you barely know or get to know, you must get to love it. 
You must to see the people, talk with them, shake hands and listen. Most of all listen. Sometimes there is just 
too much talking, to many people talking. Malian people don’t talk, especially in the North. It will be very 
difficult to find out what’s going on in a community, truly going on. They will tell you the tip of the iceberg but 
the 90% that is emerged under the water is unknown and is sometimes very difficult to acquire that information 
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and it’s mostly due to the fact that there’s no trust or they want to trust you but first they want to see what kind 
of a person you are. So showing that you listen more than you talk is a plus in this context and if you are able 
to demonstrate results with having said little it’s even better. And once you start doing that you will get closer 
to the community, closer than others and will be willing to take you by the hand. So it’s not you taking them 
by the hand it’s them taking you by the hand and they take you where things are needed, where problems are 
and they will take you into discussions that concerns them deeply, closely to them. So this is a relationship you 
want to have”. (UN civilian staff, R2). 
By contrast and due to the fragile security situation, the composition of SHQ-N was very different compared 
to SHQ-E. It comprised of a much smaller number of troops and a very limited civilian staff and police 
staff element. Additionally, nearly none of the other actors operating in SHQ-E were present in Kidal. 
Hence, SHQ-N consisted of a more homogenous system. A HoO sums it up: 
“Regarding the other actors, there are not so many. There are a few NGOs. UN agencies such as UNICEF, 
WFP, UNDP and WHO haven’t sent any staff working in Kidal yet. The natural interlocutor of the NGOs, 
UN OCHA, wasn’t present in Kidal for the past two years. The representative of UN OCHA only arrived two 
months ago here in Kidal. In the camp, we have some international companies for construction activities for 
example. We also sub-contract a lot of work to local private companies. The host nation government is not 
relevant since they are not present in the region. The only personnel from the FAMA is 100 men living in the 
camp near Tessalit. They do not employ any activity but are more symbolic”. (UN civilian staff, R2). 
The homogeneity of UN MINUSMA in SHQ-N and the absence of many actors in the region hindered the 
promotion of a shared mental model. Since the security situation was very fragile, one would expect that 
differences in organisational culture could be overcome. However, these differences remained an influential 
element in the interaction between UN MINUSMA and the few NGOs present. As a civil affairs officer 
mentioned: 
“There are a few NGOs. We don’t have any difficulty in interacting with them from our side. The NGOs from 
their point of view don’t want to be next to the blue helmet which is a standard policy of them. They consider 
the blue helmet as the force and uniform of MINUSMA and therefore a target for potential terrorist attacks. 
For their own security, they don’t want to be associated with the force or the uniform of MINUSMA. However, 
we do meet with them. Very rarely they come here to our camp to meet. That applies to those with who we 
run and fund some of their projects. More often we have meetings and coordinate with them outside of our 
camp. Outside of the camp they are willing to talk to me. Coordination meetings take therefore place in town”. 
(UN Civilian Staff, R9). 
The French military forces deployed into Mali (including SHQ-E and SHQ-N) were part of the greater 
French BARKHANE and were operating under a National mandate. This mandate had a complete different 
nature than that of UN MINUSMA since the former is a counterterrorism operation. Hence, the distinction 
between UN MINUSMA and BARKHANE is based on their respective tasking. Whereas the activities of 
BARKHANE may be viewed as a critical condition for successful peacekeeping, the clear distinction in 
tasking can be defined as the differentiation between conflict resolution and conflict management 
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(Charbonneau, 2017). In other words, BARKHANE tries to manage the situation in Mali by conducting 
CT activities in order to prepare the ground for UN MINUSMA and other systems in the supra-system to 
support conflict resolution efforts. However, as argued by many scholars, conflict management efforts (and 
particularly counter-terrorism) are often found to be an obstacle to conflict resolution since it eliminates 
pressures for resolution (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). As a result, there was neither a functional relationship 
nor an institutionalised structure between the two. However, information was shared between some of the 
military units of the UN military staff (e.g. ASIFU, SOLTG and helicopter detachment) and elements of 
BARKHANE in order to de-conflict their activities and create some form of shared awareness.  
The purpose of interaction with the private sector (both international as local) was twofold. First, several 
international as well as local private firms (e.g. construction, logistics and transportation) were present on 
the various UN MINUSMA bases for providing construction, logistics or transportation services. In some 
instances, they were responsible for providing more operational related services such as deploying camera 
surveillance for security purposes. This was mainly done through sub-contracting by the SHQs themselves. 
Hence, the relationship between UN MINUSMA and these private firms was functional, since they had 
established a contract. The collaboration motives were instrumental since UN MINSUMA hired them for 
several reasons. First, they had unique resources such as the camera surveillance equipment which could be 
deployed quickly. Second, most local private firms their services were cheaper compared to those of 
international private firms or governmental agencies. The private firms, obviously collaborated with the UN 
MINUSMA to make profit. A second purpose of the interaction between UN MINUSMA and the private 
sector was the implementation of a so-called Quick Impact Project (QIP). A QIP generally is a short-term 
project that should be implemented within three months and have a maximum of $ 50,000 per project. 
Once they are implemented, these projects should have an immediate impact within the local community. 
UN MINSUSMA has only a facilitating role in this process which highlights the importance of local 
ownership. A stabilisation and recovery officer explains: 
“When we do QIPs we are in touch with the private sector but then our main role is to facilitate the liaison 
between the beneficiaries who own the QIP and the stakeholders who are going to conduct the execution. The 
contract is between the two. So, for example a local NGO owns the project and the company who realises it. 
Maybe a construction company or an IT satellite phone, all depending on the project. The vendor is the one 
under contract and the association or group that is benefiting from the project. So theoretically the QIP should 
come from the community to MINUSMA, then evaluated and approved by MINUSMA, sponsored by a section 
and the sponsoring section facilitates the liaison with the group who initiated the project and the vendor who 
is going to realize it”. (UN Civilian Staff, R3). 
In sum, differences in organisational culture was an important source for friction within the sub-systems of 
UN MINUSMA and between UN MINUSMA and other systems active in the region. We found that whilst 
in some instances these differences were solved through extensive investments in inter-personal 
relationships, there were some other situations in which the raison d’être of particularly NGO’s hindered 
coordination and communication efforts between them and UN MINUSMA. The unique situation in SHQ-
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N where the host nation government (i.e. the legitimate authorities) were absent lead to the failure to 
implement the biggest part of the mandate. The interaction between UN MINUSMA and the private sector 
was perceived as smooth. This was mainly due to the instrumental character of this interaction. Finally, 
political constraints due to differences in mandate (i.e. UN MINUSMA and BARKHANE) prevented any 
form of interaction except the informal exchange of information and de-confliction between mostly 
Western military units as part of UN MINUSMA and BARKHANE. Therefore, we suggest that the diversity 
amongst the various sub-systems of UN MINUSMA and between the mission and the other systems 
involved are scattered over the three domains of the Cynefin framework. Figure 6.3 provides an overview 
of the analyses of the unpredictability of UN MINUSMA’s condition as complex system while applying the 
framework. 
 
Figure 6.3: The predictability of UN MINUSMA’s condition as complex system applied to the Cynefin framework.
  
 
To summarise, UN MINUSMA can be understood as complex system that is heavily impacted by different 
types of uncertainty derived from its internal organisation as well as the external environment. The impact 
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uncertainty (i.e. sensitive dependence on initial conditions and equifinality), modelling uncertainty (imprecise 
knowledge on how to control input), uncertainty about relations between actors, environmental uncertainty 
(i.e. unpredictable events and factors beyond control) and uncertainty about outcomes can be divided in 
two dimensions, namely complexity and change. Internal and external complexity relates to a number of 
issues to which UN MINUSMA had to attend and the degree to which they were interconnected. Internal 
and external change relates to the degree of discontinues change that occurred within the UN MINUSMA. 
Furthermore, internal and external uncertainty can be categorised in four distinct domains (Duncan, 1972). 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the four dimensions and corresponding levels of internal and external uncertainty. 
Hence, we conclude that the complexity and discontinuous change that characterised the strategic model 
and system diversity of the TFU as well as the operating environment resulted in a high level of both internal 
and external uncertainty. 
Accordingly, proposition 1a and 1b are supported by the case study: 
Proposition 1a:   
The uncertainty derived from the internal organisation impacts the predictability of a system’s condition. 
Proposition 1b:    
The uncertainty derived from the external environment impacts the predictability of a system’s condition. 
 
6.4 SELF-ORGANISATION THROUGH DIFFERENTIATION AND 
INTEGRATION 
 
In this section, we will present the findings regarding UN MINUSMA’s self-organising ability to differentiate 
and integrate its sub-systems, organisational resources and competencies, and with those of other systems 
as part of the supra-system through the ex-ante assessment of the enabling conditions. Representations will 
be presented by using the Cynefin framework. 
6.4.1 “Simple” situation 
As we have proposed in chapter 3 we would expect that systems that find themselves in the ordered situation 
of “simple” are mainly driven by negative feedback controls within both the formal and informal 
organisation. As a result, a single system is expected to be integrated (i.e. strong centralised) while the supra-
system will be differentiated (i.e. weak distributed). Additionally, since cause and effect relationships are 
“clear” (i.e. low uncertainty) the volume of information which needs to be distributed is low. Hence, the 
organisation design strategy is characterised by rules and programs, hierarchical referral and goal setting. 
According to the findings presented in the previous section, UN MINUSMA did not find itself in the 
ordered domain of “simple”. The reasoning for this is twofold. First, UN MINUSMA failed to design and 
implement an information strategy that supported their organisational and business strategy. As a result, 
information processing was hindered by a lack of interoperable ICT assets, insufficient mechanisms and 
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processes. Therefore, UN MINUSMA had to deal with an information asymmetry amongst its own sub-
systems and in their relationship with other systems involved. Second, the incidents that took place in SHQ-
N prevented UN MINUSMA to completely understand the cause and effect relationships throughout the 
rest of Mali (i.e. SHQ-W and SHQ-E).  
6.4.2 “Complicated” situation 
In the situation of “complicated” we proposed to find systems whose formal organisation is mainly driven 
by negative feedback controls while their informal organisation is expected to be potentially driven by 
positive feedback controls. Hence, we expected to find a single system to be integrated (i.e. strong 
centralised) as well as connections with other systems (i.e. strong distributed). In addition, we expect that 
more information needs to be distributed since cause and effect relationships are “complicated”, which 
means that with sufficient time, information and resources, actors should be able to understand these 
relationships and use them to forecast. Therefore, we expect to find an increase in information processing 
capacity through the investment in vertical information systems (i.e. strong centralised) and through the 
creation of lateral relationships (i.e. strong distributed). These expectations are partly supported by the case 
study. The following examples are used to illustrate the application of these non-linear feedback controls 
within these interactions and their subsequent impact on the enabling conditions for differentiation and 
integration. 
Differentiation through self-interest. On the one hand, UN civilian staff and UN military staff interacted 
with each other by attending joint meetings, conduct joint training, and conducted joint patrols, that is, they 
were compatible and there was an integration effort. On the other hand, situations were observed where 
the informal organisation was driven by negative feedback controls based upon the instrumental motive of 
self-interest. Consequently, a lack of integration effort resulted in the differentiation of the sub-systems of 
UN MINUSMA. A CIMIC officer explains: 
“So most of these UN civilian staff each have their personal mandate, instructions of how they supposed to do 
things. This means they get focused on what they’re working on and they don’t want anyone else interrupt them 
with working on this. They simply want to do a project or go to a certain area themselves, they don’t want 
another civilian agency to go with them, and they don’t want any military personnel. They just want us to 
provide security and they want us to show them where to go and then they want to conduct the mission because 
that’s where they’re going to be paid for, they want to show results and if they share that they lose some control 
over it, have to share the results with someone else, so it makes it difficult for these agencies to share”. (UN 
military staff, R13). 
Integration through a sense of urgency. We observed an interesting situation between different units of 
the UN military staff in SHQ-E. We have shown in section 6.4.1 that information processing between 
Western (NATO) units and African units was hindered by a lack of interoperable ICT assets. Thus, the two 
were incompatible. However, information was exchanged during face to face meetings and hence there was 
an integration effort. The same situation was observed in terms of joint tactical operations: the logistical 
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convoys that used the Main Supply Route (MSR) between Ansongo and Gao to provide logistical support 
to UN MINUSMA and local population were targeted by unknown groups through the use of Improvised 
Explosive Devices (IED) and mines. In order to provide additional security to the logistical convoys, 
combined patrols between a conventional UN military unit and the SOLTG were planned and thus were 
determined by environmental demands. The same problem as observed in terms of information processing 
was identified in this specific situation: the SOLTG used NATO encrypted tactical communication 
equipment that could not be shared with the conventional unit as they lacked NATO membership. And 
even more importantly did not have the required material. Since the ability to communicate between the 
two military units was an essential pre-condition for safely and effectively conducting these combined 
patrols, rigorous adjustments before integration could take place were needed. Accordingly, the two units 
were from a formal organisation’s perspective considered incompatible due to its focus on rules and 
procedures. However, the units involved considered the combined patrols as highly important. Therefore, 
rigorous adjustments were made in order to overcome incompatibility through strong integration efforts. 
In other words, compatibility was positively impacted by integration effort. 
Differentiation through technology. Another situation of incompatibility observed occurred between a 
conventional UN military unit and the HELIDET. Whereas in the former situation incompatibility was 
overcome through strong integration efforts, making rigorous adjustments between the conventional UN 
military unit and the HELIDET was considered infeasible and undesirable. This was mainly due to a lack 
of interoperable ICT assets and communication procedures between the two sub-systems and their 
competencies which are essential in deconflicting observations made by the UN military unit and the 
HELIDET, let alone deconflicting situations where the HELIDET was to support the ground factors with 
more kinetic actions. 
Integration through relational mechanisms. Similar results regarding the integration of two or more 
systems was found. A PIO officer mentioned a very specific example in which compatibility and integration 
effort between UN MINUSMA and the local population was displayed: 
“We organise football matches and theatre to bring the local community and MINUSMA closer to each other. 
Last year we had the force commander standing in a stadium filled with 60.000 people and he was the 
goalkeeper. And of course, we don’t want the locals play against the peacekeepers. No, we mix the teams. We 
offer the opportunity to get to know each other, play together and have the match” (UN civilian staff, R7). 
Differentiation through duplication of effort. However, the data further revealed that the sub-systems 
that were found in the “complicated” situation were dealing with strong formal organisations that focused 
on strong centralised connections. In fact, the formal organisation overshadowed the informal organisation 
which is expected to focus on some form of integration between two or more systems (strong distributed). 
Thus, the systems were mainly driven by negative feedback controls. This disequilibrium between the two 
types of organisations resulted in a lack of integration effort and hence incompatibility due to rational choice. 
More importantly, it led to situations where two sub-systems focused their efforts on the same task which 
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is known as a differentiation error (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). A stabilisation and recovery officer sums 
it up: 
“Coordination is needed between several competing agencies and NGOs. There have been some cases where 
the same project was undertaken by different NGOs or different agencies. That situation could have been easily 
mitigated when it had been properly coordinated and discussed either at the PRC level to oversee that 
duplication of effort. It took an intervention on my part to mitigate that to make sure it became quality control, 
it was no quality assurance but quality control where that other agency would limit itself to certain activities and 
I would comprehend with the rest. It caused duplication of effort, it caused time wasted and it caused money 
wasted as well”. (UN civilian staff, R4). 
Interactions that take place in the “complicated” domain requires strong centralised and strong distributed 
connections. We expected to find that strong distributed connections would result in a single system to be 
integrated. Additionally, systems driven by positive feedback controls, were expected to positively impact 
both the compatibility and integration effort of systems to interact and hence would integrate with each 
other. Moreover, both sub-systems and systems in the “complicated” situation were indeed compatible. 
However, regarding the integration effort an important distinction has to be made whether the integration 
effort is based on rational choice or determined by the environment. Whereas the former (driven by negative 
feedback controls) is more likely to differentiate and the latter (driven by positive feedback controls) is more 
likely to integrate.  
 6.4.3 “Complex” situation 
In the “complex” situation of the unordered domain we expect to find systems that are mainly driven by 
positive feedback controls characterised by increased levels of interaction and communication between two 
or more systems (i.e. weak centralised and strong distributed). Moreover, large amounts of information need 
to be processed to deal with the high uncertainty by which the “complex” situation is characterised. Thus, 
we expect to find an increase in information processing capacity through the creation of lateral relations (i.e. 
strong distributed). Again, these expectations are only partly supported by the case study. We found that 
UN MINUSMA was characterised by various interactions that were found in the “complex” situation of 
the unordered domain. The following examples are used to illustrate the application of these non-linear 
feedback controls within these interactions and their subsequent impact on the enabling conditions for 
differentiation and integration. 
Differentiation due to geographical distribution. A form of interaction that was found in the “complex” 
situation was that between UN MINUSMA and the local population. The interaction clearly illustrates the 
non-proportionality of the cause and effect relationship. The example presented above (i.e. the football 
match) indicated strong distributed connections and thus the creation of lateral relations between UN 
MINUSMA and the local population. However, this form of integration, as well as the thé de la grains, which 
were focused on increasing information processing capacity took place in the Gao area which is one of the 
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bigger cities in SHQ-E. Unfortunately, several interviewees stressed that this form of integration was not 
representative to the rest of the SHQ. According to a stabilisation and recovery officer:  
“It is geographical distribution, so the whole idea is to go to areas where we haven’t been before. The problem 
here is that we are all here in Gao. If we for example want to create more stability in another area far from here 
the problem is to get there. Mali is a big country. And we are still very weak at doing. So, we tend to stick very 
close to paved roads. We stay very close to known trails and villages, nearby areas and villages. In an area, such 
as Gao we are barely covering 25% of the whole region. This means there is a good 75% in which we are 
physically not present and/or not able to patrol on a regular basis and/or are not able to develop projects that 
would bring a bit of stability in the area. However, if we want to operate more outside the Gao circle means we 
need to receive the equal amount of security escorts”. (UN civilian staff, R3). 
Complexity through institutional character. The empirical data shows that the connection between UN 
MINUSMA and the NGOs had a strong non-linear character. This is mainly due to the strong informal 
organisations (i.e. institutional character) of the NGOs. In some instances, the positive feedback controls 
guided the informal organisation to relatively strong distributed connections and hence integration:  
“We need to show unity in our approach and the level of cooperation, but also complementarity with UN 
OCHA and all the humanitarian organisations for who UN OCHA is overarching have been initially extremely 
reluctant in dealing with MINUSMA. It is now less so the case. Almost every week now I receive phone calls 
from OCHA about NGOs who come to Gao” (UN civilian staff, R1). 
Moreover, in the absence of UN OCHA in SHQ-N, the UN civilian staff took upon their task of 
coordinating with the few NGOs present in the region:  
“Civil Affairs are interacting with the NGO’s. They do this primarily due to the absence of UN OCHA”. (UN 
civilian staff, R10). 
In some other occasions the negative feedback controls were observed more dominantly thereby 
strengthening the factors of differentiation and hence incompatibility:   
“The NGO’s from their point of view don’t want to be next to the blue helmet which is a standard policy of 
them. They consider the blue helmet as the force and uniform of MINUSMA and therefore a target for potential 
terrorist attacks. For their own security, they don’t want to be associated with the force or the uniform of 
MINUSMA”. (UN civilian staff, R2). 
We expected to find strong distributed connections in the “complex” situations which were the result of 
the non-proportionality of cause and effect. Compatibility was not found in the case between UN 
MINUSMA and the local population throughout wider northern Mali. This was mainly due to a lack of 
resources (i.e. security factors) and organisational strategy (i.e. geographical distribution of UN sub-systems). 
Fortunately, an interesting observation can be made from the data. In the cases of the joint patrols and the 
connection between UN MINUSMA and the NGOs we found that integration effort positively impacted 
the compatibility of the sub-systems and systems to integrate.  
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6.4.4 “Chaotic” situation 
For systems who find themselves in the “chaotic” situation the Cynefin framework argues for both weak 
centralised and distributed connections. Accordingly, in these situations systems should focus on 
establishing order through a top-down approach with no time for investigation or asking for input. As a 
result, the management structure is strong centralised with weak or non-existent distributed connections 
between the sub-systems, without any form of connection feasible. Thus, the various systems are expected 
to be in isolation. In order to deal with the high-level uncertainty (i.e. unclear cause and effect relationships) 
we expect to find systems that focus either on the reduction of information processing needs or on an 
increase in information processing capacity.  These expectations are supported by our findings.  
The fragile security situation in SHQ-N resulted in the absence of many actors (e.g. host nation government, 
UN civilian staff, UN agencies and NGOs). In effect, leading to the inability of SHQ-N to effectively 
implement the coherent and continuous comprehensive strategy. In other words, SHQ-N could not conduct 
the ex-ante assessment of the enabling factors due to the absence of many. Integration was therefore not 
feasible nor desirable as perfectly explained by a HoO: 
“In order to have a collaborative network, other actors need be present. Therefore, I conclude there is no unity 
of effort. This is of course due to the poor security situation in Kidal and the debate of development vs. 
security”. (UN civilian staff, R2). 
6.4.5 Disordered domain 
The systems that are facing the disordered domain are expected to remain the status quo until they are pushed 
into one of the other domains by self-organisation or management efforts. Two events that took place in 
SHQ-N lead them temporarily into the disordered domain: first, the complex attack on the UN camp in 
Kidal. Second, the violent demonstrations and looting of the Kidal airfield, resulting in the loss of key 
facilities such as the camp’s hospital, the operations room from a UN military unit as well as the airport 
itself.  
Table 6.2 provides an overview of UN MINUSMA’s self-organising ability to differentiate and integrate its 
resources through the ex-ante assessment of the enabling conditions. Representations are presented by using 
the Cynefin framework. 
Table 6.2: UN MINUSMA and the factors of integration and differentiation. 





Single system to be integrated 
 
Supra-system to be differentiated 
Not supported (lack of data) 
 





Single system to be integrated 
 
 
Supra-system slightly integrated 
Compatibility supported by data  
Integration effort partly supported by data* 
 
Compatibility supported by data  
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Integration effort partly supported by data* 
 
* distinction between intentional choice and 
determined by the environment)  
“Complex” Supra-system to be integrated Not supported  
 
* Additional finding: integration effort 
positively impacts compatibility 
 
“Chaotic” 






“Disordered” Status quo Supported  
 
In line with our expectations, we observed that UN MINUSMA should be understood as a complex open 
systems composed of multiple sub-systems that interact in a non-linear fashion, in turn impacting its 
condition from inside the system’s boundary. Furthermore, UN MINUSMA was exposed to a highly 
complex, dynamic and uncertain environment from which it could not be isolated, thus impacting its 
condition from outside the system’s boundary. As a result, UN MINUSMA demonstrated bounded instable 
behaviour (i.e. non-linear feedback mechanism) resulting in the dynamic equilibrium of its condition. This 
behaviour is partly the outcome of rational choice or determined by environmental demands. 
Accordingly, proposition 2 is supported by the case study: 
Proposition 2:   
The dynamic equilibrium of a system’s condition is expected to positively impact its required self-organising 
ability.  
 
Integration occurs when either the feasibility or desirability, or both, of the ability of sub-systems or systems 
to interact is positive. By contrast, differentiation occurs when the ex-ante assessment of the ability of sub-
systems or systems to interact is negative. In other words, sub-systems require several modifications in order 
to allow for interaction. 
Therefore, proposition 3 is supported by the case study: 
Proposition 3:  
A system in dynamic equilibrium is expected to be mainly driven by non-linear feedback controls, thereby 
enabling its required self-organising ability to differentiate or integrate. 
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6.5 CONDITION-DEPENDENT CAPABILITIES 
 
Self-organisation (i.e. differentiation and integration) is the result of the ex-ante assessment of the enabling 
conditions. Ideally, the systems involved share information which subsequently leads to a state of shared 
awareness amongst the supra-system and then provides ground for the identifying threats and opportunities, 
and identifying potential resource compatibility. Being responsive to the outcomes of the ex-ante assessment 
relates to the planning of potential activities to the situation observed (i.e. needs, threats and opportunities) 
including those from an integrated or differentiated perspective. A stabilisation and recovery officer sums 
it up: 
“So, my role is to identify areas of concern, areas of weakness or areas that have some potential but need to be 
strengthened and capacities need to be developed. So, when you go into a community the first thing you do is 
to assess what is the next step, the most suitable element to come into that area in order to develop projects 
which help to create stability in one of the five areas which I have mentioned. Then you try to identify the best 
partner whether one of our substantive programs within MINUSMA, or the G9 or UNPOL or through UN 
OCHA. The bottom line is who is the best partner to go into that area and do the work. What I have tried to 
do is create a bit of a buffet of who would be the best partner, being the civilian, military or the police, whether 
being civilian UN or civilian NGO and is it an international NGO or is it a local NGO? When I pick a partner, 
I do this with the reason to best meet the objective, or one of the five objectives”. (UN civilian staff, R3).     
Unfortunately, as we have illustrated in section 6.4.1 UN MINUSMA failed in creating a state of shared 
awareness due the absence of their information strategy. However, as presented in the previous section, 
depending on the condition in which the system was found (i.e. simple, complicated, complex, chaotic or 
disordered), it possessed the self-organising ability to differentiate and integrate its sub-systems, 
organisational resources and competencies. As a result, sub-system capabilities were formed through the 
relationships between the organisational resources and competencies from an individual subsystem (i.e. daily 
activities from the civilian staff, military staff or police force staff in isolation). Additionally, system 
capabilities were formed through the integration of the organisational resources and competencies from two 
or more sub-systems in a relationship. Finally, supra-system capabilities were formed through the integration 
of the organisational resources and competencies of two or more systems. A Dutch diplomat attached to 
the UN military staff provided an example of the integration between the organisational resources and 
competencies of the UN military staff (i.e. CIMIC) and organisational resources (i.e. funding) of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands: 
“I worked with the Dutch Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) section of the ISR-coy and the civil advisor of the 
HOO. Some governments bring their own funding sometimes. The Netherlands brought the Dutch Stability 
Initiative (DSI) funds which belongs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These are small projects under € 5,000 
per piece. So, I talked to the Dutch and asked them if they would support any potential project that we identify. 
A QIP can take 9 months to a year while DSI can be done in a month. It was decided we could use this tool as 
well”. (UN military staff, R15). 
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Moreover, we found that supra-system capabilities can be tangible (i.e. physical resources and competencies) 
as well as intangible (i.e. processes) as a stabilisation and recovery officer explained: 
“We are here to help but we are mostly here to support because it’s not only a stabilization mission but also an 
integrated mission. I will quote our new SRSG now: the need to support them is important but proportionally 
they need to demonstrate what they are willing to do for themselves. The discussion is not only: we are here 
and have this big logistical machine, we’ve got a fair amount of money and they think we can move mountains 
overnight. Therefore, we need to work as consultants to them, we have to work in a consultative manner where 
everything is done through a committee and we want them to steer that committee”. (UN civilian staff, R4). 
Accordingly, proposition 4 is supported by the data. 
Proposition 4:   
System’s self-organising ability to differentiate and integrate positively impacts the development of 




We argue that condition-dependent capabilities positively impact the generated outcomes, yet both 
outcomes and impacts will be ill-defined, difficult to measure and require more than just measurements and 
numerical approaches. This expectation is supported by the case study. On the one hand, several 
interviewees indicated that a great number of projects funded through the three mechanism (i.e. QIPs, trust 
fund and peacebuilding fund) were initiated without analysing the situation ex-ante. Therefore, the 
interviewees perceived it as difficult to interpret the situation after the project was completed due to a lack 
of context. As a CIMIC officer puts it: 
“The problem, however, is that CIMIC is a nice to have for the factors. There’s no general appreciation because 
CIMIC isn’t easily measurable especially in these types of environments. I don’t have the resources and the 
factors don’t have the knowledge, this is about the training piece of it, to get to the point where we are 
conducting a QIP and doing studies beforehand to see how things went before we did it and then study it six 
months after to find out what true impact that had on the community, positive or negative”. (UN military staff, 
R11). 
On the other hand, the findings from the case study present several outcomes that could be considered as 
clear and tangible. The following quote from one of the interviewees is used to illustrate our considerations:  
“If you think about Ansongo, you have a hospital and only last year we gave them a generator so now the 
hospital runs 24/7 and they can conduct surgery. This means people don’t have to come to Gao which is good 
because in case of an emergency it will take 1 hour + to get here. This week in Gao we have the start of a new 
project which is solar power streetlight. MINUSMA financed 75 solar panels. We also have projects for 
handicapped people. Currently we are supporting Gao local radio with a decent transmitter. We also improved 
the prison here in Gao in order to support the living conditions there. (UN civilian staff, R6).  
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In sum, the UN MINUSMA mission is inherently complex and as a result no fixed standards that provide 
a roadmap of how to achieve the intended objectives and end-states were available. Thus, although we argue 
that condition-dependent capabilities positively impact the generated outcomes and impacts will be ill-
defined, difficult to measure and require more than just measurements and numerical approaches. More 
importantly, we found that in UN MINUSMA the actors involved hold different perceptions in regards to 
both the existing or expected situation (characteristics, consequences, causes and possible solutions) and the 
desired situation or outcomes (i.e. ENDS). Thus, there tends to be a difference between the perception of 
policy outputs and policy impacts among the many actors involved in Mali. Interestingly, in SHQ-N the 
legitimate authorities were absent and hence the mandate could not be implemented there. This resulted in 
a unique situation where the host nation government was unable to play an active role in policy making and 
hence was unable to observe the policy outputs impacts in a great part of their country. 
Finally, strategic motives for participating in the mission were found to be an important element at the 
political level. From the Dutch perspective it appeared that there were strategic motives for participating in 
the UN MINUMSA mission that were not directly linked to the mission or Mali in general. This was 
observable in public debate when several political leaders indicated that the Dutch participated in the UN 
MINUSMA mission due to Dutch ambition for a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council (Kuijpers, 
2016). From the perspective of the Dutch government, thus, being elected for a one-year term in the UN 
SC because of their role in UN MINUSMA was a positive outcome. 
Accordingly, proposition 5 is supported by the case study: 
Proposition 5: 
The development of condition-dependent capabilities positively impact the attainment of outcomes, yet, 




This case study follows the chronological analysis of the conceptual model and presents the main findings 
regarding constructs and propositions. The analysis is summarised in table 6.3 and 6.4.  
The analysis revealed that different types of uncertainty, namely impact uncertainty (i.e. sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions and equifinality), modelling uncertainty (imprecise knowledge on how to 
control input), uncertainty about relations between actors, environmental uncertainty (i.e. unpredictable 
events and factors beyond control) and uncertainty about outcomes impact the predictability of a system’s 
condition, in turn influencing the multi-actor interaction during stabilisation operations. Impact uncertainty, 
modelling uncertainty, uncertainty about relations between actors and uncertainty about outcomes was 
found to be caused by two distinct factors, namely the strategic model and system diversity. Environmental 
uncertainty was found to be caused by the operating environment.  
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The extent of the predictability of a system’s condition can be explained through the level of understanding 
of the cause and effect relationships of the respective factors. Applying the Cynefin framework to the 
findings of the case study turned out to be a useful tool to better understand and frame the non-linear 
interactions. In short, the better the cause and effect relationship of a certain force is understood, the more 
likely the system settles into the ordered conditions. Conversely, a system characterised by factors with an 
unclear cause and effect relationship will more likely settle into the unordered conditions. 
Table 6.3: Analysis of constructs. 






Uncertainty about relations between actors 
Uncertainty about outcomes 
 
Section 6.3 
External environment Environmental uncertainty Section 6.3 
 
A system’s condition 





Bounded instable behaviour (i.e. non-linear feedback 
mechanisms) 
Section 6.4 
Ability to differentiate Ability of (sub-) systems to interact is caused by intentional 
choice (i.e. design) or determined by environmental conditions 
Section 6.4 
 
Ability to integrate 
Ability of (sub-) systems to interact is caused by intentional 





Depend on the state of ‘shared awareness’ amongst the actors 






Differences in ‘wicked problems’ 
Differences between outcomes and impacts 




The linkages between a system’s condition and the self-organising ability of a system are more ambiguous 
than expected. Whereas in most situations the relationship between two or more systems was found feasible, 
resource scarcity appeared to be an important source for incompatibility in others. Integration effort had a 
more pragmatic character. In other words, integration effort was depending on the predictability of UN 
MINUSMA’s condition. Our findings indicate that an important distinction has to be made whether 
integration effort is based upon intentional choice (i.e. design) or determined by environmental demands 
(in this case the fragile security situation). Whereby the former (driven by negative feedback controls) is 
more likely to differentiate. Conversely, the latter (driven by positive feedback controls) is more likely to 
integrate. Interestingly, integration effort was found to positively impact the compatibility of sub-systems 
to integrate.  
The case study indicates that information processing is the key operating process through which the ex-ante 
assessment takes place and hence self-organisation occurs. Although it may seem logical and expected that 
the various systems share information with each other, two factors for failure were identified. First, UN 
MINUSMA lacked any form of information strategy in support of their organisational strategy and business 
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strategy. As a result, information could simply not be shared in an effective and secure manner. Second, the 
desirability of actors to share information combined with the classification of the information are important 
determinants for the ex-ante assessment. Ideally, the systems involved share information to create a common 
understanding which subsequently leads to emergent behaviour and ultimately condition-dependent 
capabilities. 
Table 6.4: Analysis of propositions. 
PROPOSITION UN MINSUMA 
Proposition 1a: 
The uncertainty derived from the internal organisation impacts the predictability 




The uncertainty derived from the external environment impacts the predictability 




The dynamic equilibrium of a system’s condition is expected to positively 




A system in dynamic equilibrium is expected to be mainly driven by non-linear 
feedback controls, thereby enabling its required self-organising ability to 




A system’s self-organising ability to differentiate and integrate is expected to 




The development of condition-dependent capabilities impact the attainment of 




Although we argue that condition-dependent capabilities positively impact the generated outcomes, UN 
MINUSMA had to deal with so-called ‘wicked problems’ which are ill-defined and could be dealt with by 
applying multiple solutions. Additionally, these potential solutions, in turn, could generate new problems. 
Indeed, organisations that must deal with ‘wicked problems’ hold important management implications 
(Tompkins, 2005) such as dealing with ambiguous, intangible and changing goals, are experiencing difficulty 
with establishing performance standards and measuring results (Wilson, 1989). This applied in particular to 
Mali where outputs often were unobservable and unmeasurable. As a result, strategic management tools are 
only applicable to a very limited extend. Indeed, although some system capabilities or even supra-system 
capabilities were focused on direct support to the local Malian people it is questionable if certain outcomes 
could be labelled “positive outcomes” due to the fact that the participating systems as part of the supra-
system had different views of a situation and subscribed to different priorities and preferences for particular 
solutions. Moreover, certain outcomes were not even directly linked to the UN MINUSMA mission or Mali 
in general due to strategic motives (the non-permanent seat in the SC).  
Social complexity and the poor security situation lead to a small homogenous supra-system excluding the 
legitimate authorities who were absent. Finally, the very fact that UN MINUSMA had to deal with ‘wicked 
167
problems’ resulted in a situation where the FHQ had no clear indications of when certain ENDS were 
achieved. Hence, outcomes were, even ex-post, not determinable at all. 
Reflecting on linear thought processes, concepts such as stabilisation operations make it seem that 
supporting organisations such as Western IOs, NGOs and private firms have a blueprint for the stabilisation 
and recovery of a post-conflict zone. However, complex systems thinking tells us that that the output of the 
supporting organisations cannot be understood in isolation from organisations and societies such as the 
host nation and local actors whom they support. In complex systems language we would say that we cannot 
explain the behaviour of the whole system by analysing its individual sub-systems. Supporting organisations, 
therefore, should focus their efforts on facilitating and supporting the overall stabilisation and recovery 
process in which the supported organisations and societies self-organise in order to enable emergent 
behaviour necessary to sustain peace. The importance of this is perfectly illustrated by the fact that in SHQ-
N, the legitimate authorities were absent and hence several parts of the mandate could not be implemented.  
In sum, differences in both problem perception and perception of the expected situation (i.e. ENDS) 
illustrate the different types of uncertainty that impacted the predictability of UN MINUMA’s condition, in 
turn influencing the multi-actor interaction during the mission. Particularly, impact uncertainty, modelling 
uncertainty, uncertainty about relations between actors, combined with environmental uncertainty resulted 
in uncertainty about outcomes. Most of these uncertainties only became observable once UN MINUSMA 
was deployed and therefore automatically became part of a supra-system (e.g. other IOs, NGOs, local actors 
both state and non-state as well as the private sector). As a result, we view the TFU as a complex system 
which was sensitive to its initial conditions and, once deployed part of a greater supra-system, of which the 
effectiveness of the strategic model depends primarily on its ability to respond to the changing 
environmental conditions. Accordingly, we propose that the strategic model of stabilisation operations need 
to make a shift from its focus on ENDS towards one which provides ground for an inherent order that 
identifies and models a system’s overall behaviour through adapted and acceptable WAYS to respond 
effectively to changing environmental conditions. In other words, strategic modelling is inherently subject 




Cross-case analysis  
 
“Our commonality gives us power to create a harmonious garden, our uniqueness 
gives us power to decorate each garden a little differently”. 





Chapter 5 and 6 each presented an analysis of the conceptual model. The analysis presented in these chapters 
can be considered ‘within-case’ analysis. However, the objective of this study is not to determine how to 
cope more effectively with the complexity of multi-actor interaction within the TFU or UN MINUMSA. 
Instead we aim to develop a conceptual model which finds its ground in the empirical evidence of both case 
studies. Therefore, we need to describe the comparison of commonalities and differences both of them 
(George & Bennett 2005). Hence, a cross-case analysis is required (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Ruffa and 
Soeters, 2014).  
Furthermore, since design science is an iterative process it should be repeated several times to enable the 
development of the final conceptual model (Markus et al., 2002). The cross-case analysis is considered the 
third iteration which enables the development of our final conceptual model to complete the illustration of 
the alternative for strategy development and implementation to cope more effectively with the complexity 
of stabilisation operations.  
This chapter proceeds as follows: after this introduction we proceed with providing some background to 
the cross-case analysis (section 7.2). What follows is the presentation of the cross-case analysis. The cross-
case analysis compares the TFU case study and the UN MINUSMA case study by chronologically following 
the constructs of the conceptual model: in section 7.3 we describe uncertainty and the impact on a system’s 
condition followed by the illustration of a system’s required self-organising ability in section 7.4. Section 7.5 
illustrates how a stabilisation operation uses information to self-organise the differentiation and integration 
of its sub-systems, organisational resources and competencies into condition-dependent capabilities. The 
outcomes gained from condition-dependent capabilities are described in section 7.6. We conclude with an 
overview of the main findings of this chapter in section 7.7. 
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7.2 CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
 
The aim of this study is to theoretically and practically introduce complex systems thinking as an alternative 
for strategy development and implementation of stabilisation operations, and support the debate over the 
extent to which integration is feasible and desirable. This study is embedded in practice, providing a rich set 
of narratives and data. Recommendations and conclusions are therefore grounded in both theory and 
practice. Reflecting on both the research objective and questions, a design-orientated approach with a 
system perspective of problem-solving together with design evaluation is best suited (Romme, 2003; Van 
Aken et al., 2009; Soeters et al., 2014). This study combines two research methods of solution-orientated 
research, namely design science (Romme, 2003; Hevner et al., 2004) and case study research (Yin, 2014) as 
illustrated in figure 1.1. 
The aim of designing a conceptual model to cope more effectively with the complexity of multi-actor 
interaction during stabilisation operations corresponds with the concept of the design and evaluation of 
artefacts (Romme, 2003; Hevner et al., 2004). Design science has the goal of creating knowledge (i.e. design 
artefact) that practitioners can apply to gain understanding of real-world problems and their potential 
solutions (Hevner et al., 2004). The conceptual model is based on two real-world situations in order to 
support practitioners with the alternative for strategy development and implementation to cope more 
effectively with the complexity of multi-actor interaction during stabilisation operations. The conceptual 
model, as the primary design artefact, serves as the main outcome of this study. 
To accomplish this goal, we need to understand the dynamics of each individual stabilisation operation (i.e. 
TFU and UN MINUSMA) and present their main findings (Chapter 5 and 6) regarding the conceptual 
model. Since the goal of this study is not to examine how to cope more effectively with the complexity of 
multi-actor interaction within the TFU or UN MINUMSA, but to develop a conceptual model based on 
the empirical evidence of both case studies, it is essential to synthesise evidence from the two case studies 
within our multi-case study design (George and Bennet, 2005). 
By synthesising evidence from the two case studies we intent to compare the two different missions with a 
theory-testing purpose (Ruffa and Soeters, 2014). More specifically, we intent to compare how uncertainty 
derived from the environmental conditions as a dependent variable influences a system’s condition, or to 
understand whether a system’s conditions accounts for variations in its self-organising ability to create 
condition-dependent capabilities. 
Moreover, when the many actors involved in stabilisation operations are deployed, they put into practice 
their strategy, resulting from the attempt to achieve certain ENDS (i.e. a desired situation in terms of 
objectives), through the choice of suitable strategic WAYS (i.e. the ‘how’ in the form of a concept), 
employing their MEANS (i.e. policy instruments by which some ENDS can be achieved) (Gray, 2005). By 
doing so, the many actors involved unveil the core characteristics of their respective organisations.  
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In organisation science time-related conditions or different conditions cannot be manipulated the way this 
is done in laboratory research (Ruffa and Soeters, 2014). Although over the last years, experimental design 
has been applied to the fields of political science as well as economics, feasibility and ethical issues surfaced 
with it (Beath et al., 2013). Therefore, for these disciplines a suitable solution will be that of quasi-
experimental research (Campbell and Stanley, 1963).  
This cross-case analysis is based upon the findings from the two case studies, namely the TFU and UN 
MINUSMA. Przeworski and Teune (1970) introduced two main research design when developing and 
analysing research propositions, namely cases that are most similar (see table 7.1), or the contrary, cases that 
are most dissimilar (see table 7.2).  
As table 7.1 illustrates, case 1 to 5 are similar in regards to the variables X2 to X5. By contrast, there is 
comparable variation in X1 and Y. As a result, X1 may be regarded as a relevant variable which explains the 
differences in the dependent variable Y. This reasoning is related to the principle of verification which may 
lead to the explanation of causal inferences.    
Table 7.1: Most-similar comparative research design with five cases and six variables.  
Source: adapted from Ruffa and Soeters (2014). 
 
Figure 7.2 illustrates the opposite, namely an example of case 1 to 5 that differ in regards to the variables 
X2 and X5. Conversely, variables X1 and Y present similar results indicating that they co-vary in an identical 
manner. In other words, variable X1 and U could be causally interrelated. This reasoning is related to the 
principle of falsification which allows for excluding variables as explanatory factors that are irrelevant. 
According to Ruffa and Soeters (2014) this is also called small N-research due to the limited number of 
cases available for this type of research design.  
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Table 7.2: Most-different comparative research design with five cases and six variables.  
Source: adapted from Ruffa and Soeters (2014). 
 
Reflecting on the above we applied the most similar-approach for the cross-case analysis. Reflecting on the 
conceptual model we understand the relationships (i.e. propositions) between the constructs as variables X1 
and Y presenting similar results indicating that they co-vary in an identical manner. The cross-case analysis 
is summarised in table 7.3 and 7.4 and follows the chronological analysis of the conceptual model and 
provides the main findings for each construct and proposition respectively. 
Table 7.3: Cross-case analysis of constructs. 
Construct Operational 
variable 



























1. Business strategy 
(WAYS) 
2. Organisational strategy 
(MEANS) 
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ENDS 
 
7.3 UNCERTAINTY AND THE IMPACT ON A SYSTEM’S CONDITION 
 
Reflecting on the results of the two case studies we identified different types of uncertainty, namely impact 
uncertainty (i.e. sensitive dependence on initial conditions and equifinality), modelling uncertainty (imprecise 
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knowledge on how to control input), uncertainty about relations between actors, environmental uncertainty 
(i.e. unpredictable events and factors beyond control) and uncertainty about outcomes which impact the 
predictability of a system’s condition, in turn influencing the multi-actor interaction during the two missions. 
Impact uncertainty, modelling uncertainty, uncertainty about relations between actors and uncertainty about 
outcomes were found to be caused by two distinct factors, namely the missions’ strategic model and system 
diversity. Environmental uncertainty were found to be caused by the operating environment. The different 
types of uncertainty can be divided in two dimensions, namely complexity and change. We found that 
internal and external complexity relates to the number of issues that a stabilisation operation had to attend 
and the degree to which they were interconnected. Internal and external uncertainty can be divided in two 
categories, namely complexity and change. Internal and external complexity relate to the number of issues 
to which stabilisation operations must attend and the degree to which they are interconnected. Internal and 
external change relate to the degree of discontinuous unintentional change that occurs within a stabilisation 
operation and in its environment. Furthermore, internal and external uncertainty can be categorised in four 
distinct domains (Duncan, 1972). Figure 3.3 illustrates the four dimensions and corresponding levels of 
internal and external uncertainty. Hence, we conclude that the complexity and degree of change that 
characterised the strategic model and system diversity of both stabilisation operations as well as the 
operating environment resulted in environmental conditions which were highly subject to uncertainty. 
More specifically, the mission statement of both stabilisation operations was perceived by most interviewees 
as abstract. However, when one studies stabilisation operations through the scope of systems- and 
complexity theory a general and abstract mission statement fits perfectly with the complexity, dynamic and 
uncertainty of both the internal organisation and external environment, in turn, providing ground for an 
inherent order that identifies and models a system’s overall behaviour through adapted and acceptable 
WAYS. Additionally, although the impact uncertainty and environmental uncertainty imposed a limitation 
on the predictability of both missions as complex systems, it has simultaneously revealed that certain ENDS 
may be the result of WAYS that started from different initial conditions as these differences could be 
amplified through positive feedback controls. Finally, system diversity (e.g. interpersonal orientation; goal 
orientation; time orientation) appeared to be an important factor that created friction amongst the TFU and 
UN MINUSMA’s sub-systems as well as between the TFU and UN MINUSMA and various other systems 
as part of the supra-system.  
 
7.4 SELF-ORGANISATION THROUGH DIFFERENTIATION AND 
INTEGRATION 
 
The extent of the predictability of a system’s condition can be explained through the level of understanding 
of the cause and effect relationships of the respective factors. Applying the Cynefin framework to the 
findings of the case studies turned out to be a useful tool to better understand and frame the non-linear 
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interactions. In short, the better the cause and effect relationship of a certain force is understood, the more 
likely a system settles into the ordered conditions. Conversely, a system characterised by factors with an 
unclear cause and effect relationship will more likely settle into the unordered conditions. 
The linkages between a system’s condition and the self-organising ability of a system are more ambiguous 
than expected. Whereas in most situations the relationship between two or more systems was found feasible, 
resource scarcity appeared to be an important source for incompatibility in others. Integration effort had a 
more non-linear character. In other words, integration effort was depending on the predictability of a 
systems condition. We found that an important distinction has to be made whether integration effort is 
based upon intentional choice (i.e. design) or determined by environmental demands (i.e. the fragile security 
situation). Whereby the former (driven by negative feedback controls) is more likely to differentiate. 
Conversely, the latter (driven by positive feedback controls) is more likely to integrate. Interestingly, 
integration effort was found to positively impact the compatibility of sub-systems to integrate.  
The case studies indicate that information processing is the key operating process through which the ex-ante 
assessment takes place and hence self-organisation occurs. Although it may seem logical and expected that 
the various systems share information with each other, two factors for failure were identified. First, both 
stabilisation operations lacked any form of information strategy in support of their organisational strategy 
and business strategy. As a result, information could simply not be shared in an effective and secure manner. 
Second, the desirability of actors to share information combined with the classification of the information 
are important determinants for the ex-ante assessment. Ideally, the systems involved share information to 
create a common understanding which subsequently leads to emergent behaviour and ultimately condition-
dependent capabilities. 
Table 7.4 presents an overview of the cross-case analysis by following the chronological analysis of the 
conceptual model including the main findings for each proposition. 
Table 7.4: Cross-case analysis of propositions. 
PROPOSITION TFU UN MINSUMA 
Proposition 1a: 
The uncertainty derived from the internal organisation impacts 






The uncertainty derived from the external environment impacts 






The dynamic equilibrium of a system’s condition is expected to 






A system in dynamic equilibrium is expected to be mainly driven 
by non-linear feedback controls, thereby enabling its required 










A system’s self-organising ability to differentiate and integrate is 
expected to positively impacts the development of condition-
dependent capabilities 
Proposition 5: 
The development of condition-dependent capabilities impact the 
attainment of outcomes yet, policy impacts will be difficult to 






7.5 CONDITION-DEPENDENT CAPABILITIES 
 
Although the self-organising ability of a system to integrate and differentiate its sub-systems, organisational 
resources and competencies was hindered by the lack of information processing, condition-dependent 
capabilities were developed. This is mainly due to a high degree of integration effort matching the strong 
distributed connections that were observed in the “complicated” and “complex” situation where most 
integration was found. However, our findings indicate that the strong bureaucratic processes of both 
stabilisation operations hampered the speed of the development of particularly supra-system capabilities. 
Whereas the development of sub-system capabilities were mostly the outcome of prior shared intentions 
(i.e. design), system and supra-system capabilities, by contrast, were the result of emergence from nonlinear 
interactions between the sub-systems or systems in the absence of prior shared intentions or were 




Finally, although we argue that condition-dependent capabilities positively impact the generated outcomes, 
the latter remain hard to determine and measure. More importantly, although some system capabilities or 
even supra-system capabilities were focused on direct support to the local population it is questionable if 
certain outcomes could be labelled “positive impacts” (e.g. woman’s rights violations and child labour) due 
to the fact that the participating systems had different views of a situation and subscribed to different 
priorities and preferences for particular solutions. Moreover social complexity resulted in different options 




In sum, differences in both problem perception and the perception of an expected situation (i.e. ENDS) 
illustrate the different types of uncertainty that impacted the predictability of both missions their condition, 
in turn influencing the multi-actor interaction during both mission. Particularly, impact uncertainty, 
modelling uncertainty, uncertainty about relations between actors, combined with environmental 
uncertainty resulted in uncertainty about outcomes. Most of these uncertainties only became observable 
once both missions were deployed and therefore automatically became part of a supra-system (e.g. IOs, 
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NGOs, host nation government, local actors as well as the private sector). As a result, we view the 
stabilisation operations as complex systems which are sensitive to their initial conditions and, once deployed 
part of a greater supra-system, of which the effectiveness of the strategic model depends primarily on its 
ability to respond to the changing environmental conditions.  
The purpose of this cross-case analysis was to make a comparison between the analyses of the conceptual 
model of the two case studies and identify key themes that were common among both of them as well as 
minor differences between them. As illustrated above, although the TFU and UN MINUSMA had a distinct 
character in terms of foundation (i.e. NATO and UN), the main findings for each construct and proposition 
are yet comparable.  
The cross-case analysis is considered the third iteration which enables the development of our final 
conceptual model. In addition to the cross-case analysis, we presented the final conceptual model to 5 senior 
members of the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (see appendix A5) 
as well as to complex systems scientists at the International Conference on Complex Systems 2018 in 
Cambridge (MA). One could consider this an ex-post reflection and fourth iteration of the conceptual model 
to provide the final information feedback over both the model itself as well as the process for explanation 
building. In the next chapter we will proceed with the presentation of the final conceptual model and 





Designing for future stabilisation operations:  
towards a final model7 
 
“It is not the strongest of the species that survives, not the most intelligent that 
survives. It is the one that is the most adaptable to change, that lives within the 
means available and works co-operatively against common threats”. 





The insights gained from the TFU case study, UN MINUSMA case study and cross-case analysis provide 
us with a thorough understanding of the theoretical constructs which form the foundation of the final 
conceptual model. The final conceptual model is used to finalise the empirical part of this study and serves 
as an enabling practice for organisational design of future stabilisation operations. Additionally, we 
presented the final conceptual model to 5 senior members of the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs 
of the Netherlands (see appendix A5) as well as to complex systems scientists at the International 
Conference on Complex Systems 2018 in Cambridge (MA). One could consider this an ex-post reflection 
and fourth iteration of the conceptual model to provide the final feedback over both the model itself as well 
as the process for explanation building.  
This chapter is organised as follows: after this introduction, the final conceptual model is presented which 
seeks to answer the main research question of this study. While answering the main research question, we 
also aim to answer the sub-questions as defined in chapter 1. We then introduce some additional theories 
that add robustness to the constructs, complimented with the presentation of the derivative design 
guidelines. We do this by following the chronological analysis of the final conceptual model: in section 8.2 
we describe uncertainty and the impact on a system’s condition followed by the illustration of a system’s 
required self-organising ability in section 8.3. Section 8.4 provides an overview of a complex system uses 
information to self-organise the differentiation and integration of its sub-systems, organisational resources 
and competencies into condition-dependent capabilities. The outcomes gained from condition-dependent 
7 Parts of this chapter have been presented at the following peer reviewed conference: 
Gans, B.: Understanding stabilization operations as complex systems. Ninth International Conference on Complex 
Systems (ICCS 2018), July 22 – 27 2018, Cambridge MA, USA. 
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capabilities are described in section 8.5. We conclude with a brief discussion of the main findings of this 
chapter in section 8.6. 
 
8.2 UNCERTAINTY AND THE IMPACT ON A SYSTEM’S CONDITION 
 
The content of this section aims to provide answers to the following sub-question: 
Q1. How do the environmental conditions impact stabilisation operations? 
The two iterations of the initial conceptual model enabled us to identify different types of uncertainty that 
impact the predictability of a system’s condition, in turn influencing multi-actor interaction during 
stabilisation operations. The five uncertainties recognised by the 5 ex-post interviewees are: 
1. Impact uncertainty (i.e. sensitive dependence on initial conditions and equifinality); 
2. Modelling uncertainty (imprecise knowledge on how to control input); 
3. Uncertainty about relations between actors; 
4. Environmental uncertainty (i.e. unpredictable events and factors beyond control); 
5. Uncertainty about outcomes. 
Figure 8.1 illustrates the above described types of uncertainties in regards to stabilisation operations as 
complex systems.  
 
Figure 8.1: Types of uncertainties in regards to stabilisation operations as complex systems. 
 
As the influential physicist Bohr (1922) taught us: “prediction is very difficult, particularly if it is about the 
future” (p. 286). Predictions are attempts to make absolute statements about the future. According to 
Poincaré (1958) the sensitivity to initial conditions prevents us from making any reliable predictions: “a very 
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slight cause, which escapes us, determines a considerable effect which we cannot help seeing, and then we 
say this effect is due to chance. If we could know exactly the laws of nature and the situation of the universe 
at the initial instant, we should be able to predict exactly the situation of this same universe at a subsequent 
instant. But even when the natural laws should have no further secret for us, we could know the initial 
conditions only approximately. If that permits us to foresee the subsequent situation with the same degree 
of approximation, this is all we require, we say the phenomenon has been predicted, that it is ruled by laws. 
But this is not always the case; it may happen that slight differences in the initial conditions produce very 
great differences in the final phenomenon; a slight error in the former would make an enormous error in 
the latter. Prediction becomes impossible and we have the phenomenon of chance” (p. 364). 
If prediction now is understood to be impossible, we may look into possibilities to understand better the 
general behaviour of stabilisation operations as complex system through the identification of schemata. In 
other words, whereas prediction is focused on a quantitative analysis (i.e. mathematical calculation) of the 
condition of the complex system, there needs to be shift towards a more qualitative analysis which should 
aim on the strategic modelling of its overall long-term behaviour. Conducting a qualitative analysis can be 
viewed of as exploring potential future events, which is relevant because most stabilisation operations 
efforts are focused on certain future end states. According to Enserink et al. (2010) the objective of 
exploration of the future is “not to predict the future, but to explore plausible futures, so analysts and 
problem owners become aware of the uncertainties of and around their policy problem. This exploration 
can relate to the development of the problem, the effects of possible solutions in the future, as well as to 
the possible futures and environments of the problem” (p. 109). Such a qualitative analysis of the future is 
not only relevant for understanding the general behaviour of stabilisation operations, it also provides 
ground to achieve a certain level of control over it. In complexity theory this is known as ‘chaos control’ 
which is best described by King (2000) as follows: “rather than trying to figure out all the chains of 
causality, the [non-linear] modeller looks for nodes where feedback join and tries to capture as many of 
the important loops as possible in the system’s “picture”. Rather than shaping the model to make a forecast 
about future events or to exercise some central control, the non-linear modeller is content to perturb the 
model, trying out different variables in order to learn about the system’s critical points and its homeostasis 
(resistance to change). The modeller is not seeking to control the complex system by quantifying it and 
mastering its causality; (s)he wants to increase his/her “intuitions” about how the system works so (s)he 
can interact with it more harmoniously” (p. 54). 
Therefore, applying methods for exploring uncertainties are extremely useful to evaluate whether the 
system’s demarcation (i.e. system’s boundary), its environment and all relevant actors and factors (i.e. 
different types of uncertainties) have been included and classified in a plausible way. Moreover and as 
mentioned by two ex-post interviewees, qualitative analysis clarifies the distinction between the selection of 
policy instruments (means) and uncertainties form outside the system’s boundary, and how they influence 
(via causal relations) the effectiveness of exploration as a policy instrument, ultimately enabling the 
determination of a system’s condition.  
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Applying methods for exploration, and particularly scenario development, are important tools to cope with 
uncertain environmental conditions and expand actors thinking (Schoemaker, 1993). Scenario development 
has the goal to contribute to policy forming and system’s design (Bishop et al., 2007). The purpose of 
scenario development is creating an “alternative future”. When speaking about scenario development, an 
important distinction with scenario planning needs to be made. Whereas the former focuses on creating 
actual stories about the future, the latter includes a complete foresight study. Hence, scenario development 
could be an element of the much more comprehensive activity of scenario planning (Bishop et al., 2007). 
These methods are an instrument of analysis that can be used to challenge the many actors involved in 
stabilisation operations to co-think ex-ante about the exploration of the identified types of uncertainties and 
their impact on the initial condition of stabilisation operations as complex system. Additionally, these 
methods should be used to co-design images of (current and future) scenarios to enable the development 
of condition-dependent capabilities. Most importantly, applying these methods have the potential to enlarge 
the support of the stabilisation mission itself. 
Literature on scenarios distinguishes two types of scenarios, namely exploring or normative (Schoemaker, 
1993; Bishop et al., 2007). Exploring scenarios are used to illustrate one or more possible images of a future 
without determining its desirability. This is also known as ‘forecasting’. By contrast, a normative scenario 
makes use of a desired image of the future which is considered a suitable end-state. By applying normative 
scenarios, one should be able to design the path to the formulation of the start of the mission from the 
desired end-state, with the goal to determine which MEANS and WAYS could lead to the desired ENDS 
(Ensering et al., 2010). This is also called ‘back casting’. Since stabilisation operations are characterised by 
five distinct types of uncertainties that impact the predictability of a system’s condition, applying both types 
of scenarios is considered most effective. We will address this in more detail below. 
According to Walker (2000) the first step in policy forming and system design is “developing a system 
diagram that clarifies the system by (1) defining its boundaries and (2) defining its structure – the main 
elements and the relationships among them” (p. 13). This means that system demarcation and problem 
formulation are closely connected. Typically, a system diagram is actor-specific since it describes a system 
form the viewpoint of a specific actor. However, as demonstrated in this study, stabilisation operations are 
complex systems interacting with other complex systems (e.g. IOs, NGOs, local actors both state and non-
state and the private sector) in complex environments. All these systems together form a greater supra-
system constituting of multiple interacting systems. In other words, when deploying a stabilisation operation 
such as the TFU or UN MINUSMA it automatically becomes part of a larger supra-system in which each 
individual system needs to find its balance between order and chaos. Hence, mutual adjustment through 
consultation and coordination is essential in order to prevent systems from being isolated from their 
environment, and to apprehend their interconnectedness (Alberts and Hayes, 2003). Consequently, the 
development of a systems diagram (see figure 8.2) should be employed by multidisciplinary design teams 
which preferably include actors of the respective systems, who, in the course of the design process, put 
182
forward their ideas and results several times to a broad forum of other creative and critical experts. As 
emphasised by a diplomat:    
“In order to successfully attract NGOs and private firms for an integrated approach they need to be engaged 
at the initial decision-making process. Collaborative goals need to be developed so those NGOs and private 
firms can conduct their own long-term planning and allocation of resources. Talking about the analyses, what 
is the problem, what are we going to do about it? There you have the possibility to really include the options 
for the NGOs and the private sector to take their role”. (TFU HQ, R2). 
This should be done not only to safeguard quality, but also to cope more effectively with the complexities 
of multi-actor interaction (i.e. creating social consensus), namely the social complexity (e.g. extreme cultural 
differences; behaviour to maximise an actor’s own interest; differences in problem perception). Moreover, 
since this social complexity is boosted by interdependencies, differences in power, knowledge and 
information, a holistic approach to exploration should be applied in order to improve the coordination 
between the many actors and across hierarchies, thereby increasing the effectiveness of the scenarios as a 
policy instrument. It was the Prussian general von Clausewitz (1832) who was already aware of the 
limitations of traditional analysis, and taught us about the profound interconnectedness of open systems 
with their environment: “it is bound to be easy if one restricts oneself to the most immediate aims and 
effects. This may be done quite arbitrarily of one isolates the matter from its setting and studies it only under 
those conditions. But in war, as in life generally, all parts of the whole are interconnected and thus the effects 
produced, however small their cause, must influence all subsequent military operations and modify their 
final outcome to some degree, however slight” (p. 82). 
In a wide range of disciplines, complex problems are typically solved in four steps: intelligence, design, 
choice and implementation (Simon, 1977). For stabilisation operations, the actors of the systems involved 
preferably start out with an abstract end-state (ENDS), and then use these abstract ENDS to select various 
possible policy instruments (i.e. MEANS) to pursue their interests and influence the supra-system, 
improving the degree to which the determined goals may be realised should be described in various policy 
scenarios (i.e. WAYS or the ‘how’).  
A detailed policy scenario (i.e. ‘back casting’) describes the exploration of possible policy mechanisms that 
could be deployed to achieve the desired ENDS, as illustrated in the system diagram (see figure 8.2). This 
could provide the multi-disciplinary design team with a clear picture of what the individual systems want to 
accomplish (i.e. intelligence), followed by the determination of how much integration is feasible and equally 
how much integration is desirable (i.e. design). By doing so, the actors involved are able to intentionally 
choose for an integrated or differentiated design with appropriate governance arrangements needed to 
influence the system.  
As illustrated in figure 8.2, scenario development includes the exploration of the external factors (i.e. 
‘forecasting’) and how they influence the effectiveness of exploration as a policy instrument. The 
combination of policy and context scenarios deal with the images of the whole. Therefore, strategic 
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scenarios are used to clarify strategic choices between kinds of developments or policies by providing insight 
into the expected effects.  
 
Figure 8.2: System diagram: from cooperative strategy to end-states. 
 
Since many actors involved in stabilisation operations hold different ideas on both what is desired and have 
different perceptions of the existing (or future) situation, developing a system diagram from initial strategy 
to ENDS is complicated (see figure 8.3). More specifically, the many actors involved have different thoughts 
about the situation or problem and about how these should be formulated and solved. The term ‘problem 
perception’ is used to illustrate the diverging views that ultimately lead to different problem definitions. 
Differences in problem perception typically occur when there are different impressions of the existing or 
expected situation and the desired situation. 
 
Figure 8.3: Problems as perceived gap. Source: adapted from Enserink et al. (2010). 
 
Reflecting on the above, we could conclude that perceptions are connected to individual actors. As a result, 
one could find a stabilisation operation with one actor thinking in terms of problems while another actor is 
thinking in terms of solutions. Several explanatory variables can be found in the literature which explain 
184
differences in perception (Simon, 1977; Enserink et al., 2010; Von Hippel and Von Krogh, 2016). Examples 
of such variables are the background and history of the actor concerned, the position and interests of the 
actor, communication patterns, individual reference frameworks, the available vocabulary and the modelling 
method. Moreover, for ‘wicked problems’, it is possible that consensus cannot be achieved over problem 
formulation since the externalities are severe (Rittel and Weber, 1973). Consequently, problem formulation 
is a key element of strategic modelling.  
A system’s initial condition. Due to the identified impact uncertainty, we first introduce a system’s initial 
condition which deals with the sensitive dependence on its initial conditions, a key characteristic of 
stabilisation operations as complex systems. The first step in determining a system’s initial condition is by 
positioning the situation or problem in the context of systems and complexity thinking. The analysis of the 
uncertainty derived from the environmental conditions in regards to a particular situation or problem then 
needs to be conducted by the members of a multi-disciplinary design team, who, each from the viewpoint 
of their organisation participate in the analysis and develop a strategic model that is aimed at improving the 
situation that is perceived as a problem by their respective organisation. As described in the above section, 
having some level of consensus in regards to the problem formulation is essential in order to define some 
form of abstract end-state. According to Koppenjan (1990) a suitable solution for this issue is to view all 
ways of reducing the gap as fundamental and should focus on the causes of a problem situation, the 
characteristics and consequences of a problem situation, the perceptions of stakeholders in regards to the 
two previous points and the views and ideas of the desired situation (objectives). By conducting an analysis 
of the uncertainty derived from the environmental conditions in regard to particular situation or problem, 
the multi-disciplinary design team obtains clarity and possibly consensus about the respective factors that 
may influence a particular situation or problem. By doing so, the multi-disciplinary design team should be 
able to develop measures that address one or more of the aspects that could reduce the gap, depending on 
the availability and acceptability of MEANS (as illustrated in figure 8.5). 
The analysis of the uncertainty derived from the environmental conditions in regard to particular situation 
or problem, described in strategic scenarios is thus an activity which is fundamental to strategic modelling. 
Hence, it requires an appropriate amount of time and attention in order to allow the members of the multi-
disciplinary design team to deliver strategic advises to their respective organisations. Table 8.1 depicts the 
characteristics of such an analysis. 
Table 8.1: Characteristics of problem analyses. Source: adapted from Enserink et al. (2010). 
Activity Method 
A clear and well-thought out introduction to the problem (e.g. 
context, history) 
 
A precise identification of the client and other relevant actors  
A concise description of the problem (what is the desired situation 
and how is that measured, what is the present or expected 
situation, and what is the gap between these two situations?) 
Objectives tree 
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A demarcation of the aspects and factors that are important (what 
does the problem relate to?) 
Causal relation diagram and system diagram 
An overview of potential solutions Means-ends diagram 
A thorough and in-depth problem formulation that pays attention 
to the causes of the problem (factors) as well as to the context of 
the problem (the views on the problem and the solutions of other 
actors involved and aspects that the client did not think were 
relevant 
Actors and network analyses 
Target audience analyses 
An indication of substantive certainties and uncertainties 
(reliability of a problem analyses and formulating of knowledge 
gaps for further research) 
 
An indication of strategic threats and opportunities (the context of 
the analyses, how to fit into the whole process of problem solving) 
 
A basis of support with the client, and far as possible also with 
other actors that are needed in the process of problem solving 
 
 
To summarise, the predictability of a system’s initial condition can be best explained through the level of 
understanding and consensus of the analyses of the uncertainty derived from the internal organisation and 
external environment in regard to particular situation or problem. The better the causes of a problem 
situation, the characteristics and consequences of a problem situation, the perceptions of stakeholders in 
regard to the two previous points and the views and ideas of the desired situation (objectives) are understood 
and consensus is achieved, the more likely the system settles into stable equilibrium (i.e. order). By contrast, 
a system characterised by low-level of understanding and consensus over a particular problem situation will 
more likely settle into the unstable equilibrium (i.e. chaos). However, as demonstrated in this study, the 
environmental conditions of stabilisation operations are so complex that three additional forms of 
uncertainties were found in the data, namely modelling uncertainty, uncertainty about relationships and 
environment and context uncertainty. Hence, we need to think of a hybrid or malleable organisational form 
which imposes some form of order on this chaotic initial condition. In terms of strategic management this 
hybrid or malleable organisational form can be seen as the intended strategy as presented to us by Mintzberg 
(1978). 
Applying the Cynefin framework to the findings of the case studies turned out to be very effective to 
understand better and frame the non-linear interactions. However, reflecting on the findings of the case 
studies we introduce a simplified framework which consists of three specific situations that better match 
the specific context of stabilisation operations and which describes three initial conditions and derived 
organisational strategies, namely bureaucratic order, organised anarchies and chaos control. The initial 
conditions serve as metaphor to illustrate the hybrid organisational strategy needed to cope more effectively 
with the uncertain and ambiguous circumstances (see figure 8.4), and accomplish organisational goals. 
Following the Information Systems Strategy Triangle (introduced in Chapter 5) these different 
organisational strategies, should be in alignment with the information strategy.  
The three respective organisational strategies include the system’s design, as well as how to command, 
control and coordinate the managerial processes. Table 8.2 provides an overview of the organisational 
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design variables from the managerial levers framework (Cash et al., 1994) we used to develop the three 
respective organisational strategies. 
Table 8.2: Organisational design variables. Source: adapted from Cash et al. (1994). 







Formal reporting relationships 
 
Authority to initiate, approve, implement, and control various types of 
decisions necessary to plan and run the organisation. 
 
The set of ordered tasks needed to complete key objectives of the 
organisation. 
 
The structure set up to ensure coordination among all (sub-) systems within 
the (supra-) system; reflects allocation of decision rights. 
Informal networks Mechanism, such as ad hoc groups, which work to coordinate and transfer 
information outside the formal reporting relationship. 
 
Before we introduce the new framework and derived organisational strategies in more detail, we first 
examine four types of organisation structures and their characteristics. Traditionally, an organisational 
structure could be hierarchical, flat or matrix. More recently, the network form is introduced to complement 
the other three types. The characteristics of the four types of organisation structure are presented in table 
8.3. 
Table 8.3: Comparison of organisational structures. Source: adapted from Pearlson and Saunders (2009). 
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As demonstrated by Bar-Yam and Minai (2003), the organisational structure of stabilisation operations 
needs to shift from a strong hierarchical organisation with its focus on internal efficiency (i.e. a closed 
system) towards a network consisting of loosely connected components. This should allow for emergent 
behaviour, which in turn require matching organisational variables which provide ground for adaptation to 
the different type of uncertainties. This form is that of the networked organisation structure. Applegate et 
al. (1988) described this organisation structure as “rigid hierarchies are replaced by formal and informal 
communication networks that connect all parts of the company… [This type of organisation structure] is 
well known for its flexibility and adaptiveness” (p. 128 – 136). Thus, the networked organisation structure 
is particularly well suited to the dynamic, unstable environments which characterise stabilisation operation. 
Network organisation structures are typically characterised by their decentralised decision-making and 
distributed ICTs that offer an alternative for the hierarchical organisation structures which are considered 
to be inflexible. Indeed, as described by Bar-Yam and Minai, 2003) hierarchical structures are found to be 
less efficient in conditions that are characterised by high complexity: “hierarchical command systems are 
designed for the largest scale impacts and thus relatively simple warfare. Indeed, traditional military forces 
and related command, control and planning, were designed for conventional large scale conflicts. 
Distributed control systems, when properly designed, can enhance the ability to meet complex challenges” 
(p. 1). Military theorists Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1997) argue that the changing security environment requires 
“major innovations in organisational design, in particular a shift from hierarchies to networks. The 
traditional reliance on hierarchical design may have to be adapted to network-oriented models to allow 
greater flexibility, lateral connectivity, and teamwork across institutional boundaries. The traditional 
emphasis on command and control, a key strength of hierarchy, may have to give way to an emphasis on 
consultation and coordination, the crucial blocks of network designs” (p. 45). In contrast to insurgents, 
guerrillas and terrorist organisations, this form of organisational structure does not match with our 
traditional emphasis on hierarchy which is relates to a human’s desire for control (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). 
Hence, stabilisation operations face an inevitable paradox between their ability to adapt to the changing 
environmental conditions and the ability to apply the network organisational structure when deploying the 
purposeful activities of all the participating actors from the various systems as part of the supra-system. 
However, all interviewees stressed the importance that it is not feasible nor desirable for the participating 
actors (most notably state actors) to completely abandon hierarchical organisation structure. Therefore, we 
have designed and presented three distinct forms of network organisation structure (i.e. hybridisation) which 
offers the ability to balance between flexibility and adaptability while maintaining some hierarchical 
characteristics and centralised control.  
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Bureaucratic order. In the bureaucratic order we propose to find a situation in which the participating 
systems gain a deep understanding and consensus of the analysis of the uncertainty derived from the 
environmental conditions in regards to particular situation or problem. In other words, the relationship 
between cause and effect of the uncertainty derived from the internal organisation as well as the external 
environment and a system’s initial condition is complicated but proportional and indestructible. Thus, with 
sufficient time, information and resources, the members of a multi-disciplinary design team should be able 
to explore cause and effect relationships and use them for strategic scenarios. As a result, stabilisation 
operations will find themselves in stable equilibrium which is characterised by a loosely coupled supra-
system with functional independence of its systems with limited mobility within the supra-system if the 
environmental conditions require so. As a result, this organisational structure is characterised by tightly 
coupled systems coupled systems with centralised control mechanisms and limited emergent behaviour. The 
leadership of each system imposes control mechanisms that enables it to increase its efficiency when all 
works smoothly. However, one small disturbance may have a huge impact on the whole system, thereby 
affecting the supra-system modestly resilient to unexpected changes in environmental conditions. 
Organised anarchies. In organised anarchies we expect situations in which the cause and effect 
relationships of the uncertainty derived from the internal organisation as well as the external environment 
and a system’s initial condition cannot be explored ex-ante. However, as events evolve actors may be able to 
understand how they were initiated, that is, ex-post. On the one hand, this is the initial condition in which 
the behaviours of the participating systems never fit perfectly within the supra-system, they neither display 
chaotic behaviour on the other hand. Therefore, we expect to find stabilisation operations in a dynamic 
equilibrium which is characterised by a moderately coupled supra-system with limited functional 
dependence of sub-systems on the one hand, and moderately coupled systems with decentralised control 
mechanisms which allows for emergent behaviour which makes them resilient to the complex and rapid 
changing environmental conditions.  
Chaos control. In chaos control we expect to find situations in which the cause and effect relationships of 
uncertainty derived from the internal organisation as well as the external environment and a system’s initial 
condition factors cannot be explored ex-ante or ex-post. Hence, we propose to find stabilisation operations 
in an unstable equilibrium characterised by a loosely coupled supra-system with functional independence of 
sub-systems and loosely coupled systems with chaos control mechanisms which result in little resilience to 
large-scale perturbations. As a result, in these situations the participating systems are sensitive for dissolving 
into turbulence. 
In sum, in this first part of our final model (see figure 8.4) we offer a combination of control and exploration 
on one hand, and decontrol and adaptability on the other hand. We understand that due to characteristics 
of the many actors participating in stabilisation operations it is feasible nor desirable for individual actors to 
completely ignore hierarchical structures and some form of centralised control. Therefore, individual 
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systems need to balance between order (i.e. control) and chaos (i.e. adaptability) in the interoperability 
continuum.  
 
Figure 8.4: Final representations of a system’s initial conditions. 
 
The process is circular in its way that the participating systems absorb information derived from the 
exploration of respective internal factors, identify regularities and subsequently translates this information 
into policy scenarios. By contrast, the participating systems absorb information derived from the exploration 
of the respective external factors, identify regularities and subsequently translate this information into 
context scenarios. The combination of policy scenarios and contextual scenarios result in strategic scenarios 
which provide an image of the whole. In our model, strategic scenarios are used to support strategic choices 
in regard to the desired organisational design variables including organisation strategy, structure, processes 
and derivate level of control by offering insight into the expected outcomes. Finally, results derived from 
these strategic choices will feedback in order to maintain the perpetually evolving nature of strategic 
scenarios (i.e. schemata) when faced with new information. This circular process is essential in order to 
impose order on chaos in the perpetually renewed world of stabilisation operations that is uncertain, ever-
changing and unpredictable. Strategic scenarios should thus support a strategy for a long term sustainable 
stabilisation operation through aligning the multi-actor capabilities following an initial cooperative and 
flexible strategic model. Such a model should focus specifically on the ‘why’ question as well as on ‘how’ 
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(WAYS + MEANS) to intervene. Moreover, such a model is supported by different strategic scenarios in 
order to allow for a stabilisation operation to enhance their responsiveness (i.e. cooperative adaptability) to 
the different types of uncertainties, most importantly their sensitive dependence on initial conditions. 
Taken together we suggest that: 
Design guideline 1a:   
Members of a multidisciplinary design team with a deep understanding and consensus of the uncertainty 
derived from the environmental conditions and their impact on a system’s initial conditions should explore 
cause and effect relationships, use them for strategic scenario development and will subsequently settle a 
system in bureaucratic order. 
Design guideline 1b:     
Members of a multidisciplinary design team with a low level of understanding and consensus of the 
uncertainty derived from the environmental conditions and their impact on a system’s initial conditions will 
be hindered to explore cause and effect relationships, be able to conduct strategic scenario development 
only to a limited extent and will subsequently settle system in organised anarchies. 
Design guideline 1c:     
Members of a multidisciplinary design team that are unable to establish any level of understanding and 
consensus of the uncertainty derived from the environmental conditions and their impact on a system’s 
initial conditions will be unable to explore cause and effect relationships, nor conduct strategic scenario 
development and will subsequently settle a system in chaos control. 
 
8.3 SELF-ORGANISATION AND THE FACTORS OF INTEGRATION AND 
DIFFERENTIATION 
 
The content of this section aims to answer the following sub-question: 
Q2. How do stabilisation operations respond to the complexity derived from the 
environmental conditions? 
Our model suggests that the uncertainty derived from the environmental conditions and their impact on a 
system’s initial condition is linear and hence characterised by the mathematical principles of proportionality 
and superposition (see chapter 2) However, on the contrary a specific factor may emerge weakly and grow 
in strength over time until a response from the system is initiated. The response to a specific factor could 
emerge as an incident or as a point of evolutionary punctuation which could change the impact on or bring 
about discontinuous change to other factors (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002). For instance, the removal of 
Jan Mohamed Khan as the governor of Uruzgan Province and the subsequent negative effects on the 
security situation throughout the Province found in the TFU case study. To put it differently, the very nature 
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of the uncertainties derived from the internal organisation and external environment is continuously 
nonlinear and thus makes prediction impossible. This dynamic has severe implications for the planning of 
stabilisation operations since this needs to be based on assumptions instead of facts as emphasised by the 
Prussian Field Marshal von Moltke (1871): “no plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the 
first contact with the main hostile force” (p. 124). Moreover, and according to Liang and Xianqsui (2015) 
“planning that seeks to tie a war to a set of ideas within a predetermined plan is little short of absurdity or 
naïveté” (p. 215). In other words, stabilisation operations are indeed inherently sensitive to initial conditions. 
As a result, the effectiveness of stabilisation operations depends, apart from the development of strategic 
scenarios, for the most part on their ability to respond to changing environmental conditions.  
To illustrate the organisational adaptability of stabilisation operations we add a co-evolutionary framework 
to our final model (see figure 8.5 – P2). After the initial design process in which the strategic scenarios 
ideally are developed by a multidisciplinary design team, the systems involved take the form of one of the 
three presented initial conditions and calibrate their organisational form and derived control mechanisms 
accordingly to fit the most likely strategic scenario. This should serve as the intended strategy (Mintzberg, 
1978). It is important to note that this selected initial condition constitute an influence on the constantly 
changing environment to which the system has adapted (Baum and Singh 1994). To put it differently, while 
a stabilisation operation adapts to its respected environment, it simultaneously shapes this same 
environment since the output produced has a certain effect. From an organisational perspective, the formal 
organisation (focusing on executing daily operations as efficiently as possible to attain the organisation’s 
goals) of systems should be driven by negative feedback which generates stable behaviour. By contrast, the 
informal organisation (a network of interpersonal relationships focusing on norms, values and beliefs) of 
the systems may be driven by positive feedback controls which generates stable behaviour. Thus, 
stabilisation operations should be driven by non-linear dynamics to maintain a certain level of control while 
providing ground for emergence and self-organisation. 
It is therefore we suggest that: 
Design guideline 2:   
Stabilisation operations should be driven by non-linear feedback controls in order to provide ground for a 
state of dynamic equilibrium, which in turn, positively impacts their required self-organising ability to 
differentiate or integrate. 
 
Once the selected condition is influenced by changes derived from the internal organisation and external 
environment, it should seek to adapt and calibrate its organisational structure and derived control 
mechanisms to better fit with its new environmental conditions. Our co-evolutionary framework expects a 
bifurcation in a system’s conditions between the established organisational form (i.e. driven by the formal 
organisation) and the emergence of a new organisational form (i.e. driven by the informal organisation). 
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First, we propose that the initial established organisational structure adapts its processes and control 
mechanisms through well-defined hierarchical structures, rules and procedures to sustain its efficiency and 
fit better with their new environment. This is known as the deliberate strategy (Mintzberg, 1978). Second, 
we expect a second organisational response, namely the emergence of a new organisational form that 
matches the changed environmental conditions more closely than that achieved by established 
organisational form. From the perspective of strategic management, such an organisational response is 
known as an emergent strategy (Mintzberg, 1978). Consequently, a third organisation response is required 
which is the reciprocal adjustment of the existing organisational form and the new organisational form 
through differentiation and integration. In addition to the reciprocal adjustment, the adapted condition and 
its accompanying processes and control mechanisms begin to feedback and reshape both the environmental 
conditions to guaranty the continuation of this co-evolutionary process of schemata when new information 
will be received. 
Therefore we suggest that: 
Design guideline 3a:   
A stabilisation operation in dynamic equilibrium, driven by non-linear feedback controls adapts its initial 
organisational structure, processes and control mechanisms through well-defined hierarchical structures, 
rules and procedures to sustain its efficiency and fit better with their changing internal organisation and 
external environment. 
Design guideline 3b:  
A stabilisation operation in dynamic equilibrium, driven by non-linear feedback controls, enables the 
emergence of new organisational structures as well as types of behaviour that match the changed internal 
and environmental conditions more closely than that achieved by established organisational form.  
Design guideline 3c:  
A stabilisation operation in dynamic equilibrium, driven by non-linear feedback controls, enables the 
reciprocal adjustment of the existing organisational form and the new organisational form through 
differentiation and integration. 
Design guideline 3d:   
A stabilisation operation in dynamic equilibrium, driven by non-linear feedback controls, provides ground 
for the adapted organisational form and its accompanying processes and control mechanisms to feedback 
and reshape the environmental conditions in order to guaranty the continuation of this co-evolutionary 
process of schemata when new information will be received. 
 
As in the first part of the model, this process is circular in its way that on one hand the participating systems 
absorb information derived from the exploration of the internal organisation, identify regularities and 
subsequently translate this information into adapted policy scenarios. On the other hand, the participating 
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systems absorb information derived from the exploration of the changed external environment, identify 
regularities and subsequently translate this information into adapted context scenarios. The combination of 
the adapted policy scenarios and contextual scenarios results in the adaptation of the strategic scenarios 
which provide an image of the whole. In sum, our co-evolutionary framework shows the fact that 
stabilisation operations should be considered complex open systems that continuously evolve as a result of 
the constantly changing environmental conditions. 
 
Figure 8.5: The co-evolution of stabilisation operations and their respective environments. 
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In the above section, we introduced three distinct forms of network organisation structure (i.e. 
hybridisation) which offer flexibility and adaptability while maintaining some hierarchical characteristics and 
centralised control. However, adapting to changing to changing environmental conditions requires more 
than a shift form classic hierarchical structures towards network design. Alberts and Hayes (2003) connect 
this rethinking of command and control to the Information Age where “control needs to be thought about 
and approached differently. Control is not something that can be imposed on a complex system, particularly 
when there are many independent actors. Control, that is, ensuring that behaviour stays within or moving 
to within acceptable bounds, can only be achieved indirectly. The most promising approach involves 
establishing, to the extent possible, a set of initial conditions that will result in the desired behaviour. In 
other words, control is not achieved by imposing a parallel process, but rather emerges from influencing the 
behaviours of independent agents” (p. 206-208).  
Indeed, as demonstrated in this study, systems need to make a change from a functional- (or silo) to a 
process perspective. According to the literature, a process perspective enables management to avoid 
duplication of effort, improve communication and organisational processes (Pearlson and Saunders, 2009). 
More importantly, adapting to changing environmental conditions requires for stabilisation operations to 
build agile organisational processes or dynamic organisational processes. Agile processes, known for their 
incremental character, are purposefully designed with the intention adapt easily to the changing 
environmental conditions. Dynamic processes, by contrast, enable the reconfiguration of the various sub-
systems within the supra-system through emergence and self-organisation (van der Aalst, 2003; Weber et 
al., 2007; Weske, 2012). Generally, agile and dynamic processes require substantial IS support (Pearlson and 
Saunders, 2009), something we will discuss below. 
Generally, there are two techniques which could be used to create agile or dynamic processes, namely radical 
process redesign and incremental process improvement or adaptive (Mintzberg and Quinn, 1996) and ad 
hoc reactive (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). Both techniques are equal from the perspective that they both 
provide ground for management to affect change by viewing an organisation as a bundle of organisational 
processes instead of applying a functional perspective (Davenport and Stoddard, 1994). Whereas 
incremental change is an approach in which management intent to change processes through small, 
incremental changes, radical change is concerned with the rapid attainment of more aggressive goals. Table 
8.4 provides an overview of the key aspects of both techniques (Pearlson and Saunders, 2009). 
Table 8.4: Key aspects of incremental and radical change processes. Source: adapted from Pearlson and Saunders 
(2009). 
Incremental change Radical change 
Choosing a process to improve The need for major change in a short amount of time 
Choosing a metric by which to measure the process Thinking from a cross-functional process perspective 
Enabling personnel involved with the process to find 
ways to improve it based on the metric 
Challenging old assumptions (i.e. strategic scenarios) 
 Networked (cross-functional) organising 
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 Empowerment of individuals in the process 
 Measurement of success via metrics tied directly to 
organisational goals and the effectiveness of the new 
processes 
 
According to Pearlson and Saunders (2009) radical change approaches tend to be more effective when it 
comes to changing cross-functional processes. Reflecting on stabilisation operations we propose both 
incremental, continuous process improvement and radical process configuration to be a core competency 
which enhances their ability to adapt to the constantly changing situation. These two types of change 
processes are an important part of our co-evolutionary framework in which a bifurcation in the conditions 
between the established organisational form (i.e. driven by the formal organisation) and the emergence of a 
new organisational form (i.e. driven by the informal organisation) is expected. We propose that the 
established organisational structure adapts its processes and control mechanisms through well-defined 
hierarchical structures, rules and procedures to sustain its efficiency and fit better with their new 
environment. This should be realised by applying incremental, continuous process improvement. By 
contrast, we expect a second organisational response, namely the emergence of a new organisational forms 
that matches the changed environmental conditions more closely than achieved by established 
organisational form. A dynamic realised by applying radical process configuration (see figure 8.5 P2). 
When implementing radical process configuration as a core competency one should keep in mind that this 
type of change typically face great internal resistance. Consequently, incremental and radical process 
configuration should be an integral part of the strategic scenarios developed by the multi-disciplinary design 
teams in order to gain support amongst the various systems involved.  
Requirements to enable information processing. The requirement to change from a functional to a 
process perspective requires a solid strategic model which consists of a business strategy that is supported 
by a matching organisational strategy and information strategy. Indeed, both the TFU and UN MINUSMA 
failed to link their information strategy with their organisational and business strategy. Generally, this was 
due to insufficient mechanisms, processes, and resources such as interoperable Information and 
Communications Technology (ICTs). There’s a need to make a distinction here between internal centralised 
information sharing (i.e. within the individual sub-systems), internal distributed information sharing (i.e. 
between the sub-systems of the TFU and UN MINUSMA) and external distributed information sharing 
(i.e. between the sub-systems of the TFU and UN MINUSMA and the other systems involved). While 
internal centralised information sharing was considered by all interviewees as sufficiently institutionalised, 
both internal distributed information sharing and external distributed information sharing was hampered by 
the absence of an ICT-architecture with access for all the sub-systems and was depending on the 
classification of the information.  
In this section we intend to answer how IS could enable the multi-actor interaction during stabilisation 
operation by making the translation from information strategy to architecture to infrastructure. More 
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specifically, in this section we focus on identifying requirements that enable the internal distributed as well 
as external distributed information processing accordingly. 
Since stabilisation operations are characterised by an environment which is highly uncertain and ambiguous, 
large amounts of information needs to be processed between the sub-systems and between the complex 
system and the other systems as part of the supra-system. Organisations that are characterised by their 
strong hierarchical structure find difficulty in processing such large amounts of information (Rietjens, et al., 
2007). Consequently, new design strategies are to be adopted to effectively coordinate daily operations. 
Galbraith (1973) introduced two organisation design strategies to better deal with uncertainty. First, an 
organisation may act with the intent of reducing the amount of information being processed. Conversely, 
they may act to increase the volume of information processing. Van Creveld (1991) connects these findings 
to the Command and Control systems of military organisations by arguing that they need to make choice 
between the two design strategies to cope with uncertainty: “is to increase its information processing 
capacity, the other is to design the organisation, and indeed the task itself, in such a way as to enable it to 
operate on the basis of less information” (p. 269).  
Following Van Creveld (1991), increasing an organisation’s capacity to process information results in a 
multiplication of communication channels (both vertical and horizontal), in turn, resulting in the increase 
of the volume and complexity of the so-called central command & control structure. Reducing the amount 
of information being processed can be further divided into two distinct sub-design strategies: first, one could 
radically simplify the organisation by planning everything in the greatest detail followed by an extensive 
rehearsal of the actions planned for. Second, an organisation can be seen as a set of sub-systems, each 
performing a specific task. According to Van Creveld (1991), the latter has been proven to be more effective 
than the other two when organisations must cope with high-levels of uncertainty.  
The integration of the various IS into a single, flexible system was the most mentioned business requirement 
mentioned by most interviewees. First, the multi-disciplinary design team conducts their analysis and 
preferably achieve some level of consensus in regards to a strategic model. Second, business requirements 
associated with each derived goal should be able to offer the team with a detailed insight of the designated 
tasks for IS to be conducted. Then governance mechanisms are defined which should allow for the 
distribution of information throughout the complex system. Governance mechanisms typically describes 
how the command & control of the IS is organised. The business requirements are then analysed in more 
detail and subsequently translated into concrete processes (e.g. data management and security management) 
as part of the architecture. Figure 8.6 provides an overview of the process from strategy to infrastructure. 
 
Figure 8.6: From strategy to architecture to infrastructure. Source: adapted from Pearlson and Saunders, 2009). 
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Detailed views of the business requirements and subsequent translation into infrastructure (e.g. lack of 
compatible hardware, data, networks and software) were mentioned as the reasons for the failure of the 
information strategy (Pearlson and Saunders, 2009). Reflecting on the data, IS infrastructure should focus 
on the inter-organisational level (i.e. the supra-system) by laying the foundation for communication within 
the individual system and between the various systems as part of the supra-system across systems 
boundaries. Ideally, an IS architecture and infrastructure should be realised by an independent actor in order 
to prevent actors from using such a system due to cultural differences, as stated by an information manager: 
“I do not think, how shall I say this, that one organisation should be responsible for this. Because if it is the 
MoD there are a number of NGOs which are not willing to corporate with them”. (TFU HQ, R14). 
According to most interviewees, classified information needs to be processed through encrypted ICTs. 
Consequently, the actors that did have access to such encrypted ICTs did not share classified information 
with those who were not authorised. Hence, information asymmetry between sub-systems with and without 
encrypted ICTs was created. By developing a single, flexible system developed by an independent actor also 
keeps us away from the issue related to the classification of information. However, we recognise that it is 
not feasible nor desirable for individual systems (particularly governmental actors) to declassify all the 
information available and share it amongst the other actors involved. Hence, like the organisational strategy, 
hybridisation should be the goal. 
Traditionally, an IT architecture can be divided into three main configurations, namely centralised, 
decentralised, service-oriented and cloud (Pearlson and Saunders, 2009). A centralised architecture is 
characterised by support and management, typically in a data centre, in order to eliminate the complexities 
that characterise the management of a distributed infrastructure. This type of architecture, in which most of 
the hardware is connected to a single computer in order to establish a centralised hub that operates in 
accordance with the mainframe, is not a feasible or desirable solution for supporting an information strategy 
for stabilisation operations.  
In a decentralised architecture, the basic components depend heavily on the network that connects them 
together. It operates by distributing information between the different ICTs. A decentralised architecture 
typically consist out of a number of servers that are operated from different geographical locations. The 
servers form the core of the infrastructure. This type of architecture better matches the desire to create a 
single, flexible system. 
A third configuration is the service-orientated architecture. These are the systems we know from online 
employment forms or ticket processing services in which a limited number of functionalities are made 
available to many applications. This type of architecture is less feasible and desirable solution for supporting 
an information strategy of stabilisation operations. 
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We found that both the TFU and UN MINUSMA failed to link their information strategy with their 
organisational and business strategy. Generally, this was due to insufficient mechanisms, processes, and 
resources such as interoperable ICTs. Therefore, we asked the interviewees about how such type of 
architecture could be developed in order to support information processing amongst the systems involved. 
According to many interviewees, the notion of an open system accessible for all the systems as part of the 
supra-system is desirable. The suggestion was made to develop an open system based on the characteristics 
of a social media platform which should increase shared awareness in regards to demographic information, 
information about the terrain and information of other systems operating in the same operating 
environment. According to a CIMIC officer: 
“Various organisations naturally come to a lot of different places, and they all speak a lot with the population, 
which is always important to all of us. Having basic information about other organisations in the same area 
would already be a goal for such a system. Who is working there with what, contact information of the 
organisations and things like that, I can imagine that we want to swap such information together”. (UN military 
staff, R11). 
Finally, as we have learned throughout this study, an important aspect in regards to information processing 
is the classification of the information. Therefore, the desired architecture should be open to all participating 
systems and thus the information needs to be declassified. However, we acknowledge that it could be 
unfeasible or undesirable for (particularly) state actors to define all information available as unclassified. 
Hence, we need to think of an architecture that consist of multiple layers of architecture whereby only the 
unclassified information is stored in the first layer. As an information manager explained: 
“Improvised Explosive Devices or IEDs are commonly found in conflict situations. Once an IED is found by 
a military unit the location of that IED is marked and could be stored as unclassified information. Consequently 
this unclassified information is releasable amongst the systems involved. However, information on what specific 
type of IED was found should be classified on the IO level and therefore only IOs can access that information 
by using a second architecture. Even more specific information about which unit discovered the IED is even 
higher classified as secret information and is only accessible by military personal of the respective unit by using 
a third type of architecture”. (TFU HQ, R13).  
By using this multi layered-model of classification the actors involved in stabilisation operations should be 
able to cope more effectively with the hurdles for information sharing, distribute uncertainty throughout 
the complex system, and thus create enhanced shared awareness in a responsible way, which in turn, 
positively impacts their required self-organising ability to differentiate or integrate. 
 
8.4 CONDITION-DEPENDENT CAPABILITIES 
 
This section aims to answer the following sub-question: 
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Q3. How do stabilisation operations differentiate and integrate their sub-systems, 
organisational resources and competencies into condition-dependent capabilities? 
Being responsive to changes in the environmental conditions requires systems to possess the ability to 
reconfigure the condition-dependent capabilities to compete to the constantly changing environment. The 
reconfiguration of capabilities is in the literature known as dynamic capabilities (Winter, 2003; Teece, 2007). 
Whereas the resourced-based-view (RBV) relates to the actual selection of resource combinations and their 
VRIN characteristics, dynamic capabilities are focused on the reconfiguration of resources into new 
combinations of operational capabilities to create sustainable competitive advantage (Pavlou and Sawy, 
2012). In order to better understand the application of dynamic capabilities, we first need to present their 
differences compared to operational capabilities. 
As we have described in chapter two of this study, capabilities refer the use and deployment of competencies 
in order to attain organisational objectives (McGrath et al., 1995; Teece et al., 1997). In this study, we use 
the definitions given by Pavlou and Sawy, 2012) to illustrate the distinction. Operational capabilities are “the 
ability to execute day-to-day activities” whilst dynamic capabilities are defined “as those capabilities that 
help units extend, modify, and reconfigure their existing operational capabilities into new ones that better 
match the changing environment” (p. 242). Connecting these definitions to our co-evolutionary framework, 
operational capabilities would focus on the established organisational form which adapts its processes and 
control mechanisms through well-defined hierarchical structures, rules and procedures to sustain its 
efficiency, whereas dynamic capabilities would focus on the emergence of new organisational forms that 
match the changed environmental conditions more closely than achieved by established organisational form 




Figure 8.7: Understanding condition-dependent capabilities in the context of stabilisation operations. 
 
According to Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) “dynamic capabilities actually consist of identifiable and specific 
routines that often have been the subject of extensive empirical research in their own right” (p. 1107). Teece 
(2007) proposed a set of distinct dynamic capabilities (see table 8.5), namely sensing, seizing and 
reconfiguring capabilities to explain how organisations may dynamically adapt and align their routines and 
resources to achieve competitive advantage which are extremely useful to add to our final model. In strategic 
management literature this is also known as an emergent strategy (Mintzberg, 1978). 
Table 8.5: Definitions of three distinct dynamic capabilities.  
Capability Definition Basic routines 
 
Sensing capability 
Observation and orientation of an actor’s (or system) its 
environment (i.e. external), its situation within it (i.e. 
internal organisation), and the actions of the other actors 
(or systems) involved. 
Observation, Orientation, 




The ability to reconfigure system capabilities with new 
knowledge to meet the requirements of their respective 
condition. 








Reconfiguring system capabilities in such a way that they 
meet the requirements of their condition could result in a 
Reconfiguration of logic 
and patterns of interaction 
between systems to allow 
emergent supra-system 
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state of integration and hence emergent (system) 
capabilities. 
capabilities to arise 
(Crowston & Kammerer, 
1998; Orlikowski, 2000). 
 
The proposed dynamic capabilities are presented as important enablers to reconfigure the condition-
dependent capabilities to keep them relevant to the constantly changing conditions through incremental or 
radical change processes, as described in detail below. 
Sensing. From a business perspective, reconfiguration can be enabled by applying surveillance over 
emerging markets and technology (Pavlou and Sawy, 2011). According to Teece et al. (1997) “the ability 
to calibrate the requirements for change and to effectuate the necessary adjustments would appear to 
depend on the ability to scan the environment, to evaluate markets and competitors, and to quickly 
accomplish reconfiguration ahead of competition” (p. 521). For the purpose of this study the basic routines 
of sensing capability are observation, orientation, decision, action (Boyd, 1986). We suggest 
reconfiguration requires observation and orientation of an actor’s (or system) its external environment, its 
situation within it (i.e. internal organisation), and the actions of the other actors (or systems) involved to 
sense and seize opportunities and threats, and identify potential responses. In this phase individual actors 
(or system) absorb information from its environment conditions and analyses this accordingly. In the 
decision phase the actor(s) involved select a suitable course of action (based upon the previous observation 
and orientation phase) which is subsequently carried out in the action phase. 
Seizing. The above described process is circular in its way that during the observe-orient-decide-act 
process new information received from the interaction with the environmental conditions is included. 
Moreover, the process is highly non-linear and thus feedback loops exist between all four basic routines 
of sensing capability. As a result, the analytical framework described in the orientation phase could 
potentially be modified through new observations of an actor’s (or system) external environment, its 
situation within it, and the actions of the other actors (or systems) involved. Boyd (1986) makes a 
distinction between two fundamental processes within the orientation phase, namely analyses and synthesis 
(i.e. creating new schemata when the previous schema becomes obsolete). Hence, sensing and seizing are 
distinct dynamic capabilities since sensing focuses on the development of schemata while seizing focuses 
on learning from previous experiences and adapt the schema with new knowledge when it becomes 
obsolete. It is argued that seizing facilitates reconfiguration and innovation processes (Van den Bosch et 
al., 1999). Accordingly, we view seizing capability as the possibility to reconfigure systems capabilities in 
such a way that they meet the requirements of their respective condition.  
Reconfiguring. Reconfiguring system capabilities in such a way that they meet the requirements of their 
condition could result in a state of integration by design or through emergent capabilities. According to 
Okhuysen and Eisenhardt (2002) this demands for shared interaction patterns. In this study, we view 
emergent supra-system capabilities as those capabilities that neither sub-system possesses individually nor 
that are modified as a result of the integration. Therefore, individual systems integrate their logic and 
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patterns of interaction with those of other systems in order to allow emergent supra-system capabilities to 
arise (Crowston & Kammerer, 1998). In other words, reconfiguration represents how systems capabilities 
fit together or are in alignment to execute collective activities to meet the requirements of their condition. 
According to Weick and Roberts (1993) groups with a high-level of integration may better respond in 
complex situations. Therefore, we expect that within the organised anarchies systems are most likely to 
interact with each other, that is, be compatible.  
The reconfiguration of system capabilities adjusted to its specific condition requires effective coordination 
(Peterson et al., 2000). Coordination is defined by Peterson et al. (2000) as “the timely and purposeful 
adjustment of decisions pertaining to values of different aspects, between stakeholders involved in decision 
making” (p. 436). More specifically, coordination is the orchestration of collective tasks, resources and 
activities (Henderson and Lentz, 1994; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998). We propose coordination as an 
important facilitator for the ex-ante assessment. First, it enables individual systems to identify, gather and 
allocate resources that fits its specific condition. This can be done through sensing and seizing (i.e. 
dissemination of the interpretation of the information collected and making sense of the situation 
observed). Second, coordination leads to better synchronisation of efforts thereby preventing duplication 
of effort. Third and according to Quinn and Dutton (2005), “coordination is the process people use to 
create, adapt, and re-create organizations” (p. 36). Accordingly, one would expect better coordination to 
take place in the organised anarchies. 
Taken together, we suggest the following: 
Design guideline 4:   
A system capable to respond to changing environmental conditions requires the self-organising ability to 
differentiate and integrate its sub-systems through the application of dynamic capabilities, which in turn, 




This final section aims to provide answer the following sub-question: 
Q4. How do condition-dependent capabilities positively influence the attainment of 
outcomes? 
As we have learned throughout this study, stabilisation operations often face situations or problems that are 
characterised by their unclear nature. Therefore, we have introduced problem exploration activities in order 
to define an unambiguous formulation of the situation or problem. Once a specific situation or problem 
has been clearly identified, mapping the causal relationships (i.e. what factors cause the situation or problem) 
becomes feasible. As we have introduced in the above section, the actors of the systems involved in 
stabilisation operations ideally begin with a cooperative strategy (the ‘why’), which is subsequently translated 
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into specific goals. Then various possible policy instruments (i.e. MEANS) to influence the supra-system, 
improving the degree to which the determined goals may be realised should be described in various policy 
scenarios (i.e. WAYS or the ‘how’). The realisation of goals (i.e. a certain desired situation) is typically 
formulated in the form of end-states (ENDS) which, in turn, are measured through the use of criteria 
(Walker, 2000). However, in stabilisation operations the actors involved hold different perceptions in regard 
to both the existing or expected situation (characteristics, consequences, causes and possible solutions) and 
the desired situation or outcomes (i.e. end-states). Moreover, according to many respondents identifying 
cause and effect relationships or outcomes is very difficult. Even when it was possible to determine a certain 
outcome, it often was impossible to identify what had caused that outcome. This is mainly due to the 
interconnectedness and nonlinear relationships in the complex system. 
Therefore, a qualitative analyses (i.e. strategic scenarios) conducted by a multi-disciplinary design team of 
what should be achieved, including the perceptions of all the participating actors, should provide a clear 
picture of what the individual systems want to accomplish is essential to close this gap. A suitable method 
for describing potential solutions is a MEANS-ENDS diagram. With this MEANS-ENDS diagram, 
members of the multi-disciplinary design teams present various MEANS-ENDS to formal decision-makers 
in order to include these policy outputs in decision-making and close the gap in regards to the difference 
between the perception of policy outputs and policy impacts.  
Linear thought processes suggest that supporting organisations such as Western IOs, NGOs and private 
firms can design a blueprint for the stabilisation and recovery of a post-conflict zone from INPUT to 
OUTPUT. On the contrary, complex systems thinking tells us that that the output (i.e. realised strategy) of 
the supporting organisations cannot be understood in isolation from organisations and societies such as the 
host nation and local actors who they intent to support. In complex systems language we would say that we 
cannot explain the behaviour of the whole system by analysing its individual sub-systems. 
Accordingly, 
Design guideline 5:   
Although the development of condition-dependent capabilities positively impacts the attainment of policy 
outputs, policy impacts remain hard to identify and measure due to the interconnectedness and nonlinear 




In sum, differences in problem perception and the expected situation (i.e. ENDS) perfectly illustrate the 
different types of uncertainty that impact the predictability of stabilisation operations as complex systems, 
in turn influencing the multi-actor interaction during such missions. Particularly, impact uncertainty, 
modelling uncertainty, uncertainty about relations between actors, combined with environmental 
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uncertainty results in uncertainty about outcomes. Most of these uncertainties only become observable once 
a stabilisation operation deploys and therefore automatically became part of a supra-system (e.g. IOs, 
NGOs, local, population, host nation government and the private sector). As a result, we view stabilisation 
operations as a complex systems with a sensitive dependence on its initial conditions and, once deployed 
and thus part of a supra-system, of which the effectiveness of the strategic model depends inherently on its 
ability to respond to changing environmental conditions.  
Having all the above summarised and discussed with the ex-post interviewees, we suggest the following 
answer to the main research question of this study: 
How to better cope with the complexity of multi-actor interaction during stabilisation 
operations, and how does information processing enable this interaction?  
The strategic model of stabilisation operations needs to make a shift from its focus on ENDS, 
towards one which provides ground for an inherent order that identifies and models a 
system’s overall behaviour through adapted and acceptable WAYS. In other words, the 
strategic modelling of stabilisation operations is subject to change. 
In figure 8.8 we present our final conceptual model, including the influence of the uncertainty derived from 
the environmental conditions on the initial conditions and intended strategy of stabilisation operations (P1) 
followed by the co-evolutionary framework which illustrates a system’s self-organising ability (i.e. emerging 
strategy) to respond to changing environmental conditions and by taking on an adapted condition and 
reconfigure the condition-dependent capabilities to keep them relevant to the constantly changing 
conditions (P2). We conclude our final model to illustrate the impact of the condition-dependent capabilities 
on the policy outputs and ultimately policy impacts as part of the realised strategy (P3). 
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Contributions, limitations and conclusions 
 
“I not only think but also look and study things carefully. When I travel around, 
I look at things carefully, make comparisons of what I see. I don’t accept things 
at face value, you cannot trust what you hear or see. Don’t jump to conclusions 
without thinking”. 





This concluding chapter summarises this study and provides insights regarding the research contributions 
to both theory and practice. The outcomes of this study are grounded in the results of the literature review 
(Chapter 2), development of the initial conceptual model (Chapter 3), two case studies (Chapter 5 and 6), 
cross-case analysis (Chapter 7) and development of the final conceptual model (Chapter 8).  
This chapter proceeds as follows: section 9.2 discusses the contributions of this study for both academics 
and practitioners. In section 9.3 we discuss the limitations of this study and provide possible directions for 
future research. This chapter concludes with a brief reflection whether the findings of this study fulfils the 
research aim by answering the two main research objectives. 
 
9.2 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This study has two main objectives. We first aim to understand the impact of uncertainty derived from the 
environmental conditions on stabilisation operations as complex systems and the subsequent influence on 
their required self-organising ability to apply differentiation and integration. Second, we explore the role of 
information processing as a key organising concept through which the self-organising system differentiates 
and integrates its sub-systems, resources and competencies into condition-dependent capabilities. 
By presenting our final conceptual model we aim to provide guidance on the following elements for the 
organisational design of stabilisation operations: 
1. The impact of the environmental conditions on the condition of stabilisation operations. 
2. The application of non-linear feedback controls as a response to the complexity of the 
environmental conditions. 
3. The role of information feedback in the reconfiguration of condition-dependent capabilities to keep 
them relevant to the constantly changing environmental conditions. 
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4. The impact of the condition-dependent capabilities on the policy outputs and ultimately policy 
impacts. 
Hence, this study contributes both conceptually, empirically and practically to the organisational design of 
stabilisation operations which deals with the complexity of multi-actor interaction. 
9.2.1 Contributions to theory 
Literature on strategic thinking of stabilisation operations is rich and includes different distinct research 
streams. The dominant research stream applied to this study is that of the organisational design of 
stabilisation operations. The stream of organisational design focuses on strengthening coordination and 
integration efforts amongst the various actors involved in stabilisation operations (Patrick and Brown, 2007; 
De Coning and Friis, 2011; Schnaubelt, 2011; Smith, 2012). Additionally, although stabilisation operations 
have always been structurally complex (De Coning, 2016), they were commonly organised following a 
general and structured input-process-output organisational model that was applicable to different operations 
(Ramalingam, 2013; ADDP, 2014; Chandler, 2016).  
However, one of the primary lessons learned from the interventions in the Former Yugoslavia, Iraq and 
Afghanistan was that conventional modelling tools are not able to cope with the complexity of stabilisation 
operations since different types of uncertainties impact the predictability of a system’s condition, in turn 
influencing the multi-actor interaction during stabilisation operations (Manning, 2003; Rathmell, 2005; Paris, 
2009; De Coning, 2016). Therefore, this study introduces complex systems as an alternative for the strategic 
modelling of stabilisation operations and supports the debate over the extent to which integration is feasible 
and desirable. 
Stabilisation operations and organisational design theory. As discussed in chapter 2, most literature on 
stabilisation operation focuses on the successful integration of IOs, Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs), host nation governments, local actors both state and non-state as well as the private sector (Dutch 
Ministry of Defence, 2000; De Coning and Friis, 2011; Zelizer et al., 2013; Chandler, 2016). However, an 
integrated or comprehensive approach to stabilisation operations can be applied to the many civilian and 
military actors involved, across various sectors, and at various levels, aimed at creating peace, security and 
stability in a certain geographical area, country or region throughout the whole spectrum of conflict. As a 
result, multi-actor interaction occurs over a broad range of issues, take place under complex and uncertain 
conditions, with each interaction following its own pace dictated by its specific conditions. Hence, 
stabilisation operations can be understood as an organisational system that is formed around various sub-
systems which interact in a non-linear fashion. Interactions in a non-linear fashion are defined as “complex” 
(Perrow, 1972; Waldrop, 1992; Capra, 1997). Thus, stabilisation operations can be viewed as complex 
systems. As a result, we subsequently introduced literature on systems theory and more specifically 
complexity theory to illustrate the connection between complex systems thinking and the organisational 
design of stabilisation operations. Combining the two theories allows us to offer three contributions in the 
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field and illustrates the proposed alternative way of thinking which is characterised by the non-linear 
sciences. 
The first is support for the discussion within organisational design theory that uncertainty is caused by 
factors derived from the external environment. Most of the literature on organisation design argues that 
complexity, unpredictability, and instability of the external environment seems to have outpaced traditional 
organisation design approaches and concepts (Duncan, 1972; Daft and Lengel, 1986; Worley and Lawler, 
2010). Connecting these arguments to systems thinking we find that a system is defined as a closed system 
when it is in a state of being isolated from its environment and operates deterministically, while open systems 
are characterised by a certain degree of interaction with their environment and operate most probabilistically 
(Wiener, 1948; Von Bertalanffy, 1968). Indeed, the empirical findings in this study suggest that stabilisation 
operations take place in a highly complex, dynamic and uncertain environment from which it cannot be 
isolated, thereby influencing a system’s condition from outside the system’s boundary (i.e. the external 
environment). In other words, stabilisation operations are impacted by environmental uncertainty (that is: 
unpredictable events and factors beyond control) 
The second contribution is the support for the underexposed discussion within organisation design theory 
that uncertainty is caused by factors derived from the internal organisation. The empirical findings in this 
study suggest that stabilisation operations require a highly differentiated as well as integrated organisational 
system with interaction between the actors of its sub-systems. These interactions occur over a broad range 
of issues, take place under complex and uncertain conditions, with each interaction following its own pace 
dictated by its specific conditions. Hence, stabilisation operations can be understood as an organisational 
system that is formed around various sub-systems which interact in a non-linear fashionm, in turn 
influencing a system’s condition from inside the system’s boundary (i.e. the internal organisation). In other 
words, stabilisation operations are impacted by uncertainty derived from the relations between actors. In 
sum, stabilisation operations are heavily impacted by the uncertainty derived from the internal organisation 
as well as the external environment resulting in the dynamic equilibrium conditions of the complex system.  
The third contribution in the field relates to the conceptualisation of a system’s condition which deals better 
with its dynamic equilibrium. To provide a more detailed conceptualisation of a system’s condition we 
applied the Cynefin framework (Snowden, 2002). The framework (see figure 3.4) consists of three main 
domains (i.e. ordered, unordered and disordered) that reflect different relationships between causes and 
effects and derivative ways of practices. For every domain, the framework presents a different form of 
behaviour which then implies for different forms of connections. Applying the Cynefin framework to the 
findings of the case studies turned out to be a valuable tool to better comprehend and frame non-linear 
interactions. Based on our findings, we introduced an adapted framework which consists of three specific 
situations that better match the specific condition of stabilisation operations and which describes three 
hypothetical initial conditions (see figure 7.5) and derived organisational strategies, namely bureaucratic 
order, organised anarchies and chaos control as metaphor to illustrate the hybrid organisational strategy 
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which allows greater flexibility, lateral connectivity, coordination and cooperation between the many actors, 
enabling and supporting emergence in relationship to the dynamics of governance. When we connect this 
to Mintzberg (1978) we find that our results connect very closely to his explanation of emergent strategy. 
Stabilisation operations and complex systems thinking. This study connects stabilisation operations 
with complex systems thinking (Gell-Mann, 1994; Holland, 19995; Capra, 1997) which enables our study to 
offer several distinct contributions to the field. The first is the support for the recognition that stabilisation 
operations are characterised by their sensitive dependence on initial conditions. As we have described above, 
stabilisation operations operate in dynamic equilibrium (i.e. stable equilibrium through negative feedback 
controls or far from equilibrium through positive feedback). Because of this non-linearity, complex systems 
are highly sensitive to their initial conditions (Holland, 1995; Stewart, 2000). This phenomenon can be best 
explained through the non-proportionality of the cause and effect relationships (i.e. asymmetrical input to 
output) that characterise open systems. In other words, even the smallest changes to a system’s initial 
condition may result in large-scale alterations in its future way of behaving. A system’s sensitive dependence 
on the initial conditions is popularly known as the “butterfly effect” which is a metaphor for the question 
whether “the flap of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil doe set off a tornado in Texas” to illustrate the complexity 
and unpredictability of weather systems (Lorenz, 1972, p. 181). 
Indeed, the empirical findings in this study suggest that stabilisation operations initial conditions are heavily 
influenced by impact uncertainty (i.e. sensitive dependence on initial conditions and equifinality) due to four 
distinct types of uncertainty, namely modelling uncertainty (imprecise knowledge on how to control input), 
uncertainty about relations between actors, environmental uncertainty (i.e. unpredictable events and factors 
beyond control) and uncertainty about outcomes. As a result, our findings suggest that the strategic 
modelling of stabilisation operations should be a probabilistic process that provides ground for an inherent 
order that identified and modelled the system’s overall behaviour through adapted and acceptable WAYS. 
These findings are contrary to opinion prevalent within the field which stresses that in order to achieve its 
mission, stabilisation operations need to set clear, tangible and measurable ENDS (i.e. objectives, 
performance targets) that should be achieved by suitable MEANS through determined WAYS (Farrell et 
al., 2013; Grandia, 2015; Kitzen, 2016).  
Combining the two theories resulted in a second contribution. Although the impact uncertainty and 
environmental uncertainty imposes a limitation on the predictability of stabilisation operations as complex 
system, it simultaneously revealed that certain ENDS may be the result of WAYS that started from different 
initial conditions as these differences could be amplified through positive feedback controls. This is known 
as the equifinality of open systems (Gleick, 1987; Prigogine, 1997).  
These characteristics of complex systems lead to many analytical challenges and implications to develop or 
simulate such a model. In contrast to the Newtonian paradigm, which traditionally focused on gaining a full 
and comprehensive understanding of a system, complex systems thinking allows for a more qualitative 
understanding of the cognitive processes and recognising information processing as the key operating 
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process through which these systems (i.e. organisations) adapt and self-organise their sub-systems, 
organisational resources and ultimately co-evolve using schemata. However, the conceptualisation of 
information processing as the key operating process remains quite abstract this far. To have a better 
understanding of this we connected the theory on stabilisation operations and complex systems thinking 
with the literature on information processing, distribution and exchange. 
Stabilisation operations and information processing theory. Following information processing theory 
(Galbraith, 1973), the level of uncertainty and the volume of information that needs to be distributed are 
regarded as a cause and effect relationship. Thus, organisations that face considerable uncertainty require 
considerable amounts of information to be processed. Since stabilisation operations are characterised by an 
environment which is highly uncertain and ambiguous, large amounts of information needs to be processed 
between the various sub-systems as well as between multiple complex systems as part of the supra-system. 
Organisations that are characterised by their strong hierarchical structure find difficulty in processing such 
large amounts of information (Rietjens, et al., 2007).  
Indeed, the empirical findings in this study suggest that even though stabilisation operations are 
characterised by an environment which is highly uncertain and ambiguous, both internal and external 
information processing was hampered due to the organisational structure of the mission. Our findings 
indicate that information sharing between different sub-systems can be hindered due to differences in 
norms, values, beliefs, mandates, processes and expectations. Moreover, in bureaucratic organisations such 
as NATO and the UN, command & control are centralised at the higher levels of an organisation. As a 
result, (the speed of) information sharing could be impeded since decision rights are held at the top of an 
organisation, a characteristic which relates closely to the formal system of an organisation (Kim and Lee, 
2006). Consequently, new design strategies should be adopted to effectively coordinate daily operations. 
In order to do so we added a co-evolutionary framework to our final model (see figure 7.6 – P2). After the 
initial design process in which the strategic modelling ideally is developed by a multidisciplinary design team, 
the systems involved take the form of one of the three presented initial conditions and calibrate their 
organisational form and derived control mechanisms accordingly to fit best the most likely environmental 
conditions. It is important to note that this selected initial condition constitute an influence on the constantly 
changing environment to which the system has adapted (Baum and Singh 1994). To put it differently, while 
a stabilisation operation adapts to its respected environment it simultaneously shapes this same environment 
since the output produced has a certain effect. From an organisational perspective, the formal organisation 
(focusing on executing daily operations as efficiently as possible in order to maintain goal attainment of the 
systems should be driven by negative feedback which generates stable behaviour. By contrast, the informal 
organisation (a network of interpersonal relationships focusing on norms, values and beliefs) of the systems 
may be driven by positive feedback controls which generates stable behaviour. Thus, stabilisation operations 
should be driven by non-linear dynamics to maintain a certain level of control while simultaneously enabling 
emergence and self-organisation. 
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Once the selected condition is influenced by changes derived from the internal organisation and external 
environment, it should seek to adapt and calibrate its organisational structure and derived control 
mechanisms to fit better with its new environmental conditions. Our co-evolutionary framework expects a 
bifurcation in the conditions between the established organisational form (i.e. driven by the formal 
organisation) and the emergence of a new organisational form (i.e. driven by the informal organisation). 
First, we propose that the initial established organisational structure adapts its processes and control 
mechanisms through well-defined hierarchical structures, rules and procedures to sustain its efficiency and 
fit better with their new environment. Second, we expect a second organisational response, namely the 
emergence of a new organisational form that match the changed environmental conditions more closely 
than that achieved by established organisational form. Consequently, a third organisation response is 
required which is the reciprocal adjustment of the existing organisational form and the new organisational 
form through differentiation and integration. In addition to the reciprocal adjustment, the adapted condition 
and its accompanying processes and control mechanisms begin to feedback and reshape the environmental 
conditions the adapted condition and its accompanying processes and control mechanisms begin to 
feedback and reshape both the environmental conditions to guaranty the continuation of this co-
evolutionary process of schemata when new information will be received. 
Stabilisation operations and strategic management theory. Finally, this study contributes to the 
strategic management literature. Adapting to changes in the environmental conditions requires systems to 
possess the ability to reconfigure the operational capabilities to keep them relevant to the constantly 
changing environmental conditions. The reconfiguration of capabilities is in the literature known as dynamic 
capabilities (Winter, 2003; Teece, 2007). To better understand the application of dynamic capabilities, there 
is a need to clarify their differences from operational capabilities. 
Although operational capabilities and dynamic capabilities are a collection of routines there is a clear 
distinction between both. Operational capabilities are defined as “the ability to execute day-to-day activities” 
whilst dynamic capabilities are defined “as those capabilities that help units extend, modify, and reconfigure 
their existing operational capabilities into new ones that better match the changing environment” (p. 242). 
Connecting these definitions to our co-evolutionary framework, operational capabilities would focus on the 
established organisational form which adapts its processes and control mechanisms through well-defined 
hierarchical structures, rules and procedures to sustain its efficiency, dynamic capabilities would focus on 
the emergence of a new organisational forms that matches the changed environmental conditions more 
closely than that achieved by established organisational form. 
Teece et al. (1997) proposed a set of distinct dynamic capabilities (see table 7.5), namely sensing, seizing and 
reconfiguring capability as tools for the reconfiguration of operational capabilities. This set turned out to be 
very helpful to add to our final conceptual model. This study confirms that the dynamic capabilities 
presented by Teece (1997) is indeed important to keep the operational capabilities relevant to the constantly 
changing conditions by reconfiguring them through incremental or radical change processes. Interestingly, 
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this study intents to make a modest contribution to the strategic management literature by introducing the 
reconfiguration of sub-system, system and supra-system capabilities through self-organisation as condition-
dependent capabilities (i.e. new organisational forms emerge and adapt). Sub-system capabilities are the 
high-level routines that are formed through the relationships between the organisational resources and 
competencies from a single sub-system. In other words, a single system is differentiated into several distinct 
sub-systems. System capabilities are the high-level routines (or a collection of routines) that are formed 
through the relationships between the organisational resources and competencies of multiple sub-systems. 
Hence, a single system is integrated. Supra-system capabilities are the high-level routines (or a collection of 
routines) that are formed through the relationships between organisational resources and competencies 
from two or more systems, that is, they are integrated.  
9.2.2 Contributions to practice 
The paradox between the linear logic of an integrated and comprehensive approach and the complexity of 
stabilisation operations, and between stabilisation operations and its environment echoes the purpose of 
this study: offering complex systems thinking as an alternative for the strategic modelling of stabilisation 
operations and supporting the debate over the extent to which integration is feasible and desirable. The fact 
that both participants as well as the researcher involved in the case studies are practitioners is considered to 
be of high value. Accordingly, although the aim of this research is in nature theoretical, offering a new 
reading for strategic thinking of stabilisation operations by introducing complex systems thinking as the 
steering mind-set to cope more effectively with the complexity of multi-actor interaction during stabilisation 
operations, it is embedded in practice, designating a key role in the presentation of the results to 
practitioners. 
Coping with uncertainty. The findings of this research indicate that an investment in the application of 
methods for exploring uncertainty derived from the environmental conditions - which could be extremely 
useful to evaluate whether the system’s demarcation (i.e. system’s boundary) and its environment are right 
and whether all relevant actors and factors (i.e. types of uncertainty) are included in the right way – is very 
useful. Moreover, exploration clarifies the distinction between the selection of policy instruments (MEANS) 
and uncertainties form outside the system’s boundary, and how they influence (via causal relations) the 
effectiveness of exploration as a policy instrument, ultimately enabling the determination of a system’s 
condition. Applying methods for exploration, and particularly scenarios, has the goal to contribute to policy 
forming and system’s design. These methods are an instrument of analysis that can be used to challenge the 
many actors involved in stabilisation operations to co-think ex-ante about the exploration of the identified 
types of uncertainty and their impact on the initial conditions of stabilisation operations as complex system. 
Additionally, these methods should be used to co-design images of the possible (current and future) 
scenarios to enable the development of condition-dependent capabilities. Most importantly, applying these 
methods have the potential to enlarge the support of the stabilisation mission itself. Consequently, this study 
recommends that exploring uncertainties should be employed by multidisciplinary design teams which 
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preferably include actors of the respective systems, who, in the course of the design process, put forward 
their ideas and results several times to a broad forum of other creative and critical experts. By doing so, the 
actors involved are able to intentionally choose for an integrated or differentiated design with the 
appropriate governance arrangements.  
Organisational adaptability. The above recommendations regarding exploration suggests that the 
uncertainty derived from the internal organisation and external environment and their impact on a system’s 
condition are linear. On the contrary, a specific factor may emerge weakly and grow in strength over time 
until a response from the system is initiated. The response to a specific factor could emerge as an incident 
or as a point of evolutionary punctuation which could change the impact on or bring about discontinuous 
change to other factors. In other words, the very nature of the uncertainties derived from the internal 
organisation and external environment is continuously nonlinear and thus makes prediction impossible. This 
dynamic has severe implications on the planning of stabilisation operations since this needs to be based on 
assumptions instead of facts. Indeed, the effectiveness of stabilisation operations depends, apart from the 
development of strategic scenarios, mainly on their adaptability to the constantly changing environmental 
conditions.  
To illustrate the organisational adaptability of stabilisation operations we added a co-evolutionary 
framework to our final model. After the initial design process in which the strategic scenarios ideally are 
developed by a multidisciplinary design team the systems involved take the form of one of the three 
presented initial conditions and calibrate their organisational form and derived control mechanisms 
accordingly to fit best the most likely strategic scenario. It is important to note that this selected initial 
condition constitute an influence on the constantly changing environment to which the system has adapted. 
To put it differently, while a stabilisation operation adapts to its respected environment it simultaneously 
shapes this same environment since the output produced has a certain effect. Once the selected condition 
is influenced by changes derived from the internal organisation and external environment, the complex 
system should seek to adapt and calibrate its organisational structure and derived control mechanisms to fit 
better with its new environmental conditions. Our co-evolutionary framework expects a bifurcation in the 
conditions between the established organisational form (i.e. driven by the formal organisation) and the 
emergence of a new organisational form (i.e. driven by the informal organisation). First, we propose that 
the initial established organisational structure adapts its processes and control mechanisms through well-
defined hierarchical structures, rules and procedures to sustain its efficiency and fit better with their new 
environment. Second, we expect a second organisational response, namely the emergence of a new 
organisational form that matches the changed environmental conditions more closely than that achieved by 
established organisational form. Consequently, a third organisation response is required which is the 
reciprocal adjustment of the existing organisational form and the new organisational form through 
differentiation and integration. In addition to the reciprocal adjustment, the adapted condition and its 
accompanying processes and control mechanisms begin to feedback and reshape both the environmental 
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conditions to guaranty the continuation of this co-evolutionary process of schemata when new information 
will be received. 
Steering mind-set. Adapting to changes in the environmental conditions requires more than a shift form 
classic hierarchical structures towards network design. Indeed, as demonstrated in this study systems need 
to change from a functional to a process perspective. Adapting to changes in the environmental conditions 
demands stabilisation operations to build agile and/or dynamic organisational processes. Agile processes, 
known for their incremental character, are purposefully designed with the intention adapt easily to the 
changing environmental conditions. Dynamic processes, by contrast, enable the reconfiguration of the 
various sub-systems within the supra-system through emergence and self-organisation (van der Aalst, 2003; 
Weber et al., 2007; Weske, 2012).  
Generally, there are two techniques which could be used to create agile or dynamic processes, namely radical 
process redesign and incremental process improvement (examples are for instance total quality management 
(TQM) and Six Sigma). Both techniques are equal from the perspective that they both provide ground for 
management to affect change by viewing an organisation as a bundle of organisational processes instead of 
applying a functional perspective (Davenport and Stoddard, 1994). Whereas incremental change is an 
approach in which management intent to change processes through small, incremental changes, radical 
change is concerned with the rapid attainment of more aggressive goals.  
Reflecting on stabilisation operations we propose both incremental, continuous process improvement and 
radical process configuration to be a core competency to enhance their ability to respond better to the 
constantly changing situation. These two types of change processes are an important part of our co-
evolutionary framework in which a bifurcation in the conditions between the established organisational 
form (i.e. driven by the formal organisation) and the emergence of a new organisational form (i.e. driven by 
the informal organisation) is expected. We propose that the established organisational structure adapts its 
processes and control mechanisms through well-defined hierarchical structures, rules and procedures to 
sustain its efficiency and fit better with their new environment. This should be realised by applying 
incremental, continuous process improvement. By contrast, we expect a second organisational response, 
namely the emergence of a new organisational forms that matches the changed environmental conditions 
more closely than that achieved by established organisational form. This should be realised by applying 
radical process configuration. 
When implementing radical process configuration as a core competency one should keep in mind that this 
type of change typically face great internal resistance. Consequently, incremental and radical process 
configuration should be an integral part of the strategic scenarios developed by the multi-disciplinary design 
teams in order to gain support amongst the various systems involved.  
To summarise, we argue that practitioners need to consider stabilisation operations as a complex systems 
which are sensitive to their initial conditions and, once deployed and thus part of a supra-system, of which 
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the effectiveness of the strategic model depends inherently on their ability to respond to changing 
environmental conditions. Accordingly, we propose that the strategic model of stabilisation operations 
needs to make a shift from its focus on ENDS towards one which provides ground for an inherent order 
that identifies and models a system’s overall behaviour through adapted and acceptable WAYS. In other 
words, strategic modelling is subject to change. 
 
9.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
We identified several limitations in this research that might offer some guidelines for future research on 
stabilisation operations. First, the results presented in this study are constrained by its specific context, 
namely stabilisation operations as a multi-actor environment. For many other research problem, that are 
characterised by uncertainty and involve multiple actors, potential solutions to cope more effectively with 
complexity may have different meanings and influences on strategic thinking of multi-actor environments. 
Therefore, the empirical findings of this study cannot be generalised to the many other multi-actor 
environments. Yet, the conceptualisation of our final co-evolutionary model might offer some ideas in 
regards to the strategic thinking of other types of multi-actor environments, hybrid contexts for example. 
Second, this study investigates different types of uncertainty and the impact on a system’s condition. In this 
study we selected the most mentioned factors in the interviews that caused the different types of uncertainty, 
namely the strategic model applied to stabilisation operations and system diversity. As there are various 
other factors that that could lead to the different types of uncertainty, it is possible that uncertainty could 
be caused by other factors than we selected for this research. Therefore, future research might pursue a 
similar explorative approach which aims for the identification of other factors of influence. Such findings 
might complement this study when it comes to the determination of the factors of influence which cause 
the different types of uncertainty and ultimately impact a system’s condition.  
Third, other limitations stem from the specific character of this study, namely addressing the so-called 
‘wicked problems’ (Hevner et al., 2004). By applying design science we were able to gain a solid 
understanding of the research problem and its solution space through the development of the design 
artefact, namely the final conceptual model introduced in chapter 8. In this concluding chapter, we presented 
the key findings from the analyses of the conceptual model, developed the final conceptual model and 
generated final propositions. Future research may investigate these final propositions by applying them to 
other case studies in order to analyse their robustness. One may look into the ‘charm of the skeleton’ 
(Weijck, 2004) which refers to organisation design as bare bones framework which emerges when actors 
interact in their day to day situations. This ‘charm of the skeleton’ which finds its origin in psychology may 
be very useful to further explore the organisation design of stabilisation operations as complex systems. 
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A study that aims at investigating the complexity of multi-actor interaction during stabilisation operations 
should be undertaken in the operating environment where the operation itself is conducted and needs to 
get as close (in both time and space) to the dynamic events that take place in the operating environment. 
Therefore, data should be collected in the field. An important aspect to consider hereby is the difficulty of 
accessibility to the respected area. Consequently, for this study we selected two cases which answered to 
these two criteria. My position as a military officer enabled me to gain unique insights of the TFU and UN 
MINUSMA missions. Conversely, the same position prevented me from collecting data in local 
communities which is a limitation of this study.  
According to Yin (2014) the suggested number of cases for a qualitative study is between four and ten. 
However, a small number of cases offers the potential of gaining in-depth insight into the phenomena of 
study (Voss et al., 2002). We believe that the through the in-depth analysis of the two case studies we were 
able to collect the empirical evidence for a thorough evaluation of the conceptual model. Yet, future research 
is needed and should be conducted in more real-life case studies as this can aid in broadening knowledge 
and understanding of the phenomena investigated. 
The final limitation of this study is that the analysis of the conceptual model is limited to the construct level. 
Reflecting on Bacharach (1989), a theory “may be viewed as a system of constructs and variables” (p. 498). 
Hence, future research could follow up on of this study by refining the constructs into variables and generate 




The first objective of this study was to examine how complexity impacts multi-actor interaction during 
stabilisation operations. The findings in this study suggest that uncertainty derived from the internal 
organisation as well as the external environment influence stabilisation operations in a non-linear fashion 
resulting in the dynamic equilibrium conditions of the complex system. Moreover, our study explains 
subsequent influences on a system’s required self-organising ability to differentiate and integrate its various 
sub-systems, their organisational resources and competencies into condition-dependent capabilities 
The second objective was to understand how information processing enables this interaction. The findings 
indicate that during stabilisation operations profusion of information circulate by different means amongst 
the actors involved. To cope with such uncertainty and ambiguity, complex systems require not only quantity 
but also quality of information. Additionally, conflicting interests coupled to a form of incentives to mistrust 
information, add complexity to the dynamic and uncertainty of stabilisation operations. Hence, information 
asymmetry has been identified as the second main challenge to be undertaken.  
Now that we have reached the end of this study, we are confident to conclude that the emergence of 
condition-dependent capabilities through self-organisation is key in reaching a state of dynamic equilibrium 
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while processing, distributing and exchanging information. In other words, we need to consider stabilisation 
operations as complex systems in which the actors involved need to find their balance between order and 
chaos in the interoperability continuum if the challenges of future post-conflict theatres are to be 




Appendix A1: List of interviewees TFU case study  
 
TFU sub-system Position Reference number 
TFU HQ C-TFU R1 
TFU HQ C-TFU R2 
TFU HQ C-TFU R3 
TFU HQ C-TFU R4 
TFU HQ C-TFU R5 
TFU HQ C-TFU R6 
TFU HQ C-TFU R7 
TFU HQ CivRep R8 
TFU HQ CivRep R9 
TFU HQ CivRep R10 
TFU HQ C2OST R11 
TFU HQ C2OST R12 
TFU HQ C2OST R13 
TFU HQ C2OST R14 
BG C-BG R15 
BG C-BG R16 
BG  C-BG R17 
BG C-BG R18 
BG C-BG R19 
PRT C-PRT R20 
PRT C-PRT R21 
PRT C-PRT R22 
PRT C-PRT R23 
PRT CIMIC R24 




Appendix A2: Interview protocol TFU case study 
 
Explain people that we’re working on a research about the comprehensive approach and would like to 
collect their opinion and expertise since they are experts in this field. In this interview we will focus 
particularly on the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU). 
1. When have you been involved within TFU? What type of position did you have within TFU? How will 
you describe the nature of your responsibilities during that time frame? 
 
2. What goals did the TFU and other organisations had?  
 
3. What type of activities and associated resources did the Dutch government and other organisations 
deploy into Uruzgan province during your involvement in TFU?  
 
4. What type of collaboration between the Dutch government and private firms was displayed within 
TFU? (Level of collaboration and type of relationship) 
 
5. How efficient was the collaboration process? 
 
6. How would you describe the decision-making processes in TFU? Do you maybe have a particular 
example in mind? (Strategic – tactical – operational / centralised or decentralised / network 
communication) 
 
7. Were the decisions implemented efficiently in your opinion? 
 
8. Which partner holds the decision-right in the process? (command structure)  
 
9. What type of Information Technology or systems were involved? If any, how efficient or inefficient 
were those? Do you maybe have a particular example in mind? 
 
10. Do you have anything I omit asking that you think of relevance or importance for this study? 
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Appendix A3: List of interviewees UN MINUSMA case study 
 
UN MINUSMA sub-system Position Reference number 
UN civilian staff HoO R1 
UN civilian staff HoO R2 
Un civilian staff Stabilisation and recovery R3 
Un civilian staff Stabilisation and recovery R4 
Un civilian staff Political affairs R5 
Un civilian staff Public information office R6 
Un civilian staff Public information office R7 
Un civilian staff Civil affairs R8 
Un civilian staff Civil affairs R9 
Un civilian staff Civil affairs R10 
UN military staff CIMIC  R11 
UN military staff CIMIC R12 
UN military staff CIMIC R13 
UN military staff LNO R14 
UN military staff LNO R15 
UN military staff LNO R16 
UN military staff CMI R17 
UN military staff CMI R18 
UN military staff ASIFU R19 
UN military staff SOLTG R20 
UN police staff Head of UNPOL R21 
UN police staff Head of UNPOL  R22 
UN police staff UNPOL officer R23 
UN police staff UNPOL officer R24 




Appendix A4: Interview protocol UN MINUSMA case study 
 
We are working on a research regarding the collaboration between the main stakeholders (Inter-
Governmental Organizations (IGOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the private sector, Host 
Nation Government (HNG) as well as centers of influence in the local population) in peacebuilding 
missions. We would like to collect your opinion and expertise since you are experts in this field. This 
interview will focus on the situation in Mali. 
1. a). Since when and for which organisation are you working in Mali?  
b). How will you describe the nature of your responsibilities? 
 
2. a). What goals does your organisation have in Mali?  
b). b). To what extend is your organisation tending to align its own specific goals with those of 
MINUSMA? 
c). To what extend is your organisation tending to align its own specific goals with those of other 
stakeholders in the network for the benefit of the MINUSMA mission? 
 
3. a). What type of activities and associated resources does your organisation deploy into Mali? 
b). Are there any complementary resources and capabilities in the network identified and evaluated by 
your organisation?  
 
4. a). How is the collaboration between your organisation and other stakeholders (IGOs; NGOs; private 
sector; HNG; local centres of influence)?  
b). How is this collaboration facilitated?  
- Are there any coordination measures implemented? 
- Are there any knowledge sharing processes (regular pattern of interactions between 
organisations that enables the transfer, recombination or creation of specialised 
knowledge) between your organisation and others in the network? 
- How do you share information and coordinate activities with other organisations in the 
network?  
- Is there any form of governance between organisations? 
 
5. Are there any dedicated information systems or ICT in place to facilitate the information sharing and 
collaboration between organisations?  
 
6. Are there any shortcomings in those dedicated information systems? How are these shortcomings 
impacting your operations?  
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7. Do you have any other not yet discussed additions of which you believe are important for this study?  
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Appendix A5: List of interviewees ex-post reflection 
 
Organisation Position Reference number 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate of Security Policy R1 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate of Security Policy R2 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate of Security Policy R3 
Ministry of Defence Directorate of Operations R4 
Ministry of Defence Directorate of Operations R5 
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Appendix A6: Example of a coded interview 
 
Red = fact       
Blue = opinion/believes 
Yellow = attitude [+] [-] [N] 
Green = incidents 
 
January 31, 2016 
Paul Snyder 
Chief J9 CIMIC (SHQ-E) 
1. a). Since when and for which organization are you working in Mali?  
I am the chief G9 for SHQ-E.  
b). How will you describe the nature of your responsibilities? 
I am responsible for Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) which is assist with the security of 
the force by engaging with the local population, finding out exactly what their concerns and 
issues are, supporting the force in doing what they need to do, and informing the local 
population in what is going on. Secondly, we are working with the civilian agencies, those of 
MINUSMA, NGO’s, IGO’s and making sure you provide them support, especially the UN 
civilian staff to accomplish their mission. So if they need for example security support I 
coordinate that with the G3 operations and G2 intelligence and provide that support. 
 
2. a). What goals does your organization have in Mali? 
The Force Commander puts out his quarterly guidance and the C-SHQ-E adjusts it then for his 
region. I take that adjusted guidance , specifically the CIMIC guidelines for me to follow and I 
develop a plan, which is usually a plan with four lines of operation. (1) The first line is CIMIC 
operations like QIP’s and projects in areas of interest, the second one is coordination with 
civilians, the third one is information operations which means while we’re out there conducting 
operations trying to find out if there is support for our mandate, support from the local 
population, and if there’s not find out why is not and see how to support that. It also means 
messaging, sending messages out to the local population for which we have the Public 
Information Office (PIO). We work with them to broadcast positive things MINUSMA is doing 
to the local population. The last one is education. Education the population on what CIMIC is, 
both on the civilian side of MINUSMA because they are unfamiliar with CIMIC and the 
military and then train CIMIC officers. (2) Since we have a very small staff (we have three 
CIMIC officers working here) which means most of the time we have two people out in the 
field conducting missions. And then the end state of that is just to slowly increase the capacity, 
the number of QIP’s, the amount of coordination, increase the training on CIMIC and at the end 
let the local people understand what we can do in their region. (3)  
The problem, however, is that CIMIC is a nice to have for the forces. There’s no general 
appreciation because CIMIC isn’t easily measurable especially in these type of environments. 
(4) [-] I don’t have the resources and the forces don’t have the knowledge, [-] this is about the 
training piece of it, to get to the point where we are conducting a QIP and doing studies 
beforehand to see how things went before we did it and then study it six months after to find 
225
out what true impact that had on the community, positive or negative. So there’s no follow up, 
it’s very in the moment and things can come from Force HQ to adjust the focus. (5)  
So in quarterly guidance too, it can change the focus area. I do for example a QIP in a certain 
area because that’s the focus area, then the next quarterly guidance comes out, and they shift 
focus, we’re stuck in that region on that project because it may take upwards almost a year to 
get it through the whole process. This can create some issues on CIMIC engagement. (6) 
Another problem [-] is the fact that most UN civilian employees work with minimal a two year 
contract and sometimes try to be here for three years depending on their mission. So there’s not 
an urgency and they can take a long slow development approach to it and unfortunately since 
my focus area is security and helping the security of the force it creates conflict since the two 
go hand in hand. (7) They don’t understand the security situation changes and if we don’t react 
now the situation can go out of control . They don’t change their paths and are not very flexible 
unless the SRSG steps in and says we need to change focus. [-] (8) 
b). To what extend is your organization tending to align its own specific goals with those of 
other actors?  
 
We have two meetings with UN OCHA. (9) We have the monthly UN OCHA coordination 
meeting. This is where all the representatives for NGO’s, IGO’s as well as the UN civilian 
agencies and UNPOL get together and discuss. (10) Issues will be brought up regarding the 
force or if there are friction points with the force all the way down the lowest level where a 
NGO in Menaka didn’t see any patrols happen form Niger battalion and now they do not as 
safe as they did before. Then they reach out to the UN OCHA chair here in Gao and she brings 
it up in this coordination meeting. This is also a place where I de-conflict projects (11), so I will 
tell them what we’re doing in the region and these are the projects that we plan to propose 
because I need bine from UN OCHA table members, UN OCHA chair, UNPOL, so if they say 
“yes, this is a good project” and nobody objects we are going to construct a sports field here. 
So we also need to de-conflict there. It’s a good meeting for all the agencies to de-conflict 
activities and built some kind of a long-term plan for development. (12)  
 
We also have the monthly security meeting which deals specifically with issues of security. 
(13) We talk for example about the security of the airfield here in Gao. It’s an effective 
coordination mechanism for the civilians to get their message out but I don’t think it’s an 
effective coordination method for having a joint plan, like a military action plan for the region. 
[-] It brings us together, it gets us talking, issues are brought up and discussed but nothing 
actionable because the next meeting is something new. The intent is to create a Unity of Effort 
but to me it’s more like de-confliction right now and I can explain why that is: [-] most of the 
direction and guidance in this mission comes from F-HQ, I mean UN MINUSMA HQ in 
Bamako, so the SRSG. So most of these UN civilian agencies each have their personal mandate, 
instructions of how they supposed to do things. This means they get focused on what they’re 
working on and they don’t want anyone else interrupt them with working on this. They simply 
want to do a project or go to a certain area themselves, they don’t want another civilian agency 
to go with them, they don’t want any military personnel. They just want us to provide security 
and they want us to show them where to go and then they want to conduct the mission because 
that’s where they’re going to be paid for, they want to show results and if they share that they 
lose some control over it, have to share the results with another agency, so it makes it difficult 




3. a). What type of activities and associated resources does your organization deploy into 
Mali? 
UN MINUSMA provides money for QIP’s and this money is provided amongst the 
organization. Anybody, including the local population can request money for a QIP. (15) In the 
case of the local population it usually will be a local leader like a mayor or a governor but most 
of the time it goes through an organization. So they can submit a QIP to the Stabilization and 
Recovery section and then there’s a long process. [-] You submit a QIP, get all the paperwork 
together including invoices, costs, validity for what you’re doing and take the photos on the 
initial visit. Then it comes in front of the resource committee which has five members (Head of 
Office, UNPOL, Chief CIMIC, Chief Civil Affairs and Chief Stabilization and Recovery) who 
each have a vote. (16) Once approved by the committee the request goes up to FHQ and once 
they agree the QIP can be executed. For SHQ-E there is 1 million US $ available. The 
committee together with UN OCHA decides which agency is most suitable for executing it. (17   
b). Are there any complementary resources and capabilities in the network identified and 
evaluated by your organization?  
 
I worked with the Dutch Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) section of the ISR-coy and the civil 
advisor of the HOO. Some governments bring their own funding sometimes. The Netherlands 
brought the Dutch Stability Initiative (DSI) funds which belongs to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. These are small projects under € 5000 apiece. So I talked to the Dutch and asked them 
if they would support any potential project that we identify. A QIP can take 9 months to a year 
while DSI can be done in a month. It was decided we could use this tool as well. (18)  
 
4. a). How is the collaboration between your organization and other actors? 
We usually don’t communicate with NGO’s because they want no direct dealings with the 
military. [-] (19) This is being done through UN OCHA of the HOO. There are no hostilities 
between us but there is no actual collaboration. When we meet them in the field we do talk to 
each other. The only time we are having issues with them is when we are doing something they 
don’t like. For example having a project in an village or city where they intended to do 
something. [-] (20) 
We work a lot with the HOO and PIO when it comes to working here in Gao. At the moment 
we are sitting down with the district chiefs (chef du quartier) here in Gao once a week and give 
them an information briefing on CIMIC and what we can provide to them. Most of the 
interaction we are having with the local population is when we are doing projects or village 
assessments. We then sit down with the city council, the mayor, the governor and have 
discussions on what their concerns are in the region. We also interact with the implementing 
partner of a project. So if for example a local business gets the project we deal with them 
directly. (21) Occasionally, we get a request from the UN OPS or UN OCHA for us to help 







Are there any knowledge sharing processes (regular pattern of interactions between 
organizations that enables the transfer, recombination or creation of specialized knowledge) 
between your organization and others in the network? 
The first month we were here we did a CIMIC training in coordination with Stability and 
Recovery. The training was about implementing QIP’s. We took an officer from every unit, 
each battalion and company, and basically learned them how to be a CIMIC officer, how to do 
this business, how to do QIP’s, how to recommend QIP’s to us. This makes them our eyes and 
ears on the ground. So if we need to do some coordination we don’t necessarily have to go 
through the operational process. We can simply pick up the phone and call the trained CIMIC 
officer and this persons now knows what we are talking about. (22) 
How do you share information and coordinate activities with other organizations in the 
network?  
We share information with the J3’s of the battalions by phone. We get direct emails and calls 
from the different commanders. We handle requests from the J2; J4 and J5 as well regarding 
CIMIC support. (23) 
Regarding systems there is no general system with access for most actors. (24) If you have a 
system it us usually self-contained. We have for example information on the Menaka area for 
our engagements, we have our own information on who the local leaders are. Information, 
especially regarding people (like phone numbers) we don’t share. However, I do share this 
information with the G2 and ASIFU. There is no joint system for the civilian side that are 
compatible to ours. These are military only. (25) This is a huge shortcoming. [-] The biggest 
shortcoming for being a civil affairs person and normally having all the assets the US is bringing 
to the mission like Psyops, IO is the fact that there is nothing here. [-] There is only one 
information officer in all UN MINUSMA and he is in the U5. Here the information comes from 
public affairs, and normally this is for PR, and if you split into the command support and 
information outreach to the population the UN is more interested in supporting the command 
by saying look at all this great stuff we’re doing in the Gao region or look what human rights 
did instead of outreach to the community and try to counter for example terrorist armed groups 
or messaging to the local population by radio. [-] It’s all focused on public affairs so they write 
articles and do radio broadcasting, they’re not active and offensive information campaigners or 
psychological operations people. I do know that the French TF Barkhane has that capability. 
This means that we do CIMIC and then the PIO needs to broadcast the message that we have 
or write the article for the governors paper. We don’t have that resources ourselves.  
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OCHA. The all listen. (9); OCHA. The a committee implemented bottom line is and was OCHA. The 
bottom line is For example, bottom line and we want through a who is the best environment, undertaken by bottom line is 
who is the 
best partner to 
coordination is 
needed between 
is who is the 
best partner 




partner to go 
into that area 
elections and so 
on and so forth. 
different 
NGO’s or 
who is the 
best partner to 
go into that several to go into committee Bamako. (11); and do the You also have different go into that 
area and do competing that area [+]. (28); But So we need to work. (7); Six now in the agencies. area and do 
the work. (7); agencies and and do the of course we show unity in are already military That situation the work. (7); 
It’s not NGO’s. There work. (7); don’t want to our approach approved by segment or could have When I pick a 
enough to has been some So if you distribute and the level of the Project component the been easily partner I do 
come as an cases where the want to that cooperation, but Review G3 and G9 with mitigated this with the 
expat into an same project was meet that randomly also Committee who we are in when it had reason to best 
area that you undertaken by person face and we don’t complementarity (PRC) which is close contact. been properly meet the 
barely know 
or get to 
different NGO’s 
or different 
to face it 
requires for 
want, to a 
certain 
with OCHA and 
all the 
a bit like 
a steering 
(3); So to do 




one of the 
know, you agencies. That me for extent, take humanitarian committee. be a strategic either at the five 
must get to situation could instance a responsibility organizations Ideally it approach which PRC level to objectives. 
love it. You have been easily security for who for who OCHA should be a consist of three oversee that (8); The 
must to see mitigated when escort should get a is overarching committee main elements: duplication of mechanisms 
the people, it had been obviously. solar panel (20); So the which maintain you have the effort [-]. It we want to 
talk with properly So I went to and who NGO’s who a degree of civilian took an have to do 
them, shake coordinated and Ansongo should not. were very quality component, the intervention that is all 
hands and discussed either recently and So we are reluctant to deal assurance in military on my part to based on 
listen. Most of at the PRC level had nearly getting with us in the the component and mitigate that funding, all 
all listen. (9); to oversee that 30 – 40 involved past [-] are now implementation a third to make sure based on 
We are at the duplication of people with with the local willing to come of projects. I component it became money. If you 
point now that effort [-]. It took me, three authorities, and work with don’t think we which are all quality want to 
people are an intervention APC’s, the local us. Some are have reached the civilian control, it was demonstrate 
knocking on on my part to that’s one government even willing to that level yet [- international no quality results and 
our door and mitigate that to mechanized and created a implement one ]. We are still NGO’s and assurance but acquire the 
showing make sure it platoon, one committee of our trust fund in the quality other UN quality trust of the 
interest in became quality EOD on how and projects despite control stage country team control where community 
what 
MINUSMA is 








where we wait 
for a crisis to 




[N] we need a 
proportional 
doing. assurance but the back, were going the organization happen to UNICEF, limit itself to donation of 
Especially quality control there was to be which says not finally react, or UNHCR an so certain support from 




limit itself to 
with a 
driver and a 
to. So you 










(10);  For 
international certain activities 2nd vehicle committee DPKO. And the finally react. loosely of the with the rest. example, 
NGO’s who and I would with close the mayors constitution of That cooperation It caused coordination 
according to comprehend protection. of the that organization committee, to within duplication of is needed 
their raison with the rest. It So when I different even prevents my personal MINUSMA but effort, it between 
d’être are caused move I circles, you them from opinion, needs there’s a great caused time several 
humanitarian duplication of move with have the accepting to move cooperation wasted and it competing 
and therefore effort, it caused around 40 conseil money from towards quality outside the caused money agencies and 
should not be time wasted and people in régional, the DPKO. They assurance MINUSMA wasted as NGO’s. There 
seen it caused money order to economic can accept instead of circle and in well. (16); has been 
anywhere wasted as well. facilitate the and financial money from being busy there is the Everything some cases 
near someone (16); movement advisor to the WFP or with mitigating special being done is where the 
in uniform or Everything from point governor. UNICEF or and quality relationship we coordinated same project 
an being done is A to B (29) UNHCR or control [-]. have with with the local was 
organization coordinated with safely. This  other UNCT (15); You ASIFU. So government. undertaken by 
that is the local is a huge  agencies but not have to be there’s an (23); We are different 
involved with 
the military [- 
government. 
(23);  Using 
drain on the 
resources, 
 DPKO. But they 





here to help 
but we are 
NGO’s or 
different 
]. But we have email is a bit the military to work with us become as well which mostly here to agencies. 
managed to difficult since resources of saying we can duplication. strategically is support That situation 
show enough not all of them the mission funnel money Working essential. (5); because it’s could have 
success that are online or because this through WFP or together means So the NGO’s not only a been easily 




is just me [- 
]. (32) 
OCHA and from 
them they will 
that everybody 
knows his area 
who were very 




when it had 
that all three to send it to and then accept the of with us in the also an been properly 
pillars of 
which I talked 
you’re not sure 
the person on the 




past [-] are now 
willing to come 
integrated 
mission. So I 
coordinated 
and discussed 
about are other end is humanitarian unit. It’s a bit and work with will quote our either at the 
equally reading your NGO’s who will like a military us. Some are new SRSG PRC level to 
important and message. So go that far while section or even willing to now: the need oversee that 




fall on his back 
[+]. (19); 
weak at the 
moment. A lot is 
being done over 
the phone. A lot of 
texting. A lot of 
meetings face to 
face when we can 
which is 
sometimes 
difficult if you are 
dealing with the 
mayor of Ansongo 
or Bourem [-]. 
they will not give 
us the time of the 
day [-]. I like what 
we’re doing right 




working and the 
mindset, not only 
the population we 
want to influence 
into reaching the 
five objectives of 
which I talked 
about but also the 
NGO’s who have 
always been 
reluctant to work 
with the UN, 
especially DPKO 
missions, have 
now finally five 





has its arch of 
vision, now the 
moment the one 
starts to do the 
work of the other 







of our trust fund 
projects despite 
the core 
philosophy of the 
organization 
which says not to 
deal with any 
military 
components or 







They can accept 
money from WFP 
or UNICEF or 
UNHCR or 
other UNCT 
agencies but not 
DPKO. But 
they were still 
willing to work 
with us saying we 
can funnel money 
through WFP or 
OCHA 
and from them 
they will then 
accept the money. 
So we have now 
humanitarian 
NGO’s who will 
go that far while 
six months ago 
they will not give 





they need to 
demonstrate 
what they are 
willing to do 
for themselves. 
(26); 
effort [-].It took 
an intervention 
on my part to 
mitigate that to 
make sure it 
became quality 




where that other 
agency would 
limit itself to 
certain 
activities and I 
would 
comprehend 
with the rest. It 
caused 
duplication of 
effort, it caused 
time wasted and 
it caused money 
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